PHYSICAL ETHICS

OR

THE SCIENCE OF ACTION.

AN ESSAY

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1869.

PREFACE.

THE substance of this Essay must speak for itself; as to its form I may perhaps be allowed a few words of apology.

The superabundance of notes in many places and the extrusion of much important matter into appendices may probably seem a sign of imperfect mental assimilation in the writer and a source of much unnecessary trouble to the reader. My justification must be on the one hand the importance (which seems to me especially great in the case of an Essay as distinct from an exhaustive scientific Treatise) of keeping the central subject unmixed with outlying interests and unperplexed by lengthy digressions, and on the other hand the pardonable unwillingness of an author to send forth his arguments and theories unsupported by those illustrations and marks of external congruity which often form their principal strength in his own mind.

The Notes are mainly intended to illustrate rather than explain, to connect the ideas suggested in the text with sundry trains of association which spring from well-known or striking passages of other authors, and so both to throw new light upon that which is intended to be conveyed and to induce the reader to seek for himself explanations or reasons for dissent, instead of blindly accepting or rejecting the words he reads. They are therefore not vital to the argument, and if anyone feel them to be either irksome to himself or unsuited to the sternness of philosophy, he can at his option pass them by.

In the Appendices I have attempted not only to elucidate the obscurer portions of the Essay by giving some account of certain difficulties and consequences which they naturally suggest, but also incidentally to explain in an imperfectly connected series

the relations of the moral system upheld in the text to those wider principles of mental and physical science with which as one of their branches it must necessarily come into contact. In the first I have accordingly endeavoured to clear away some confusions and misconceptions which have crept into mental science: in the three next I have given a sketch of the origin and nature of mental laws from the two sides of physics and psychology, phenomena and consciousness, matter and mind, and have tried to shew the relation between the two: and in the remainder I have expanded to somewhat greater length than was admissible in the actual Essay the consideration of certain mental phenomena (the æsthetic and religious emotions) which though perhaps not strictly of the essence of morality must have very considerable weight in any comprehensive system of Ethics.

And after all, *in nature* there is nothing isolated or self-supporting, but if we see anything smooth and rounded off on every side we know it to be artificial and lifeless. So it seems to me that a scientific Essay, if it content itself with a mere statuesque simplicity of outline and neglect to interweave its ideas with those of other minds and kindred sciences, can never become a living member of the organism of knowledge, can never be more than a dead and sapless trunk. The living tree may have a stem just as straight; but it puts forth roots and branches into the surrounding riches of nature, and shades itself off into a multitude of fluttering leaves which while they increase its strength and vitality make it also more graceful and attractive to contemplate.

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INTRODUCTION.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, like mathematics and the physical sciences, may be divided into two parts, which are in fact two successive links in the great chain of organized knowledge. One of these suspends the principles of the science from the more general knowledge above it, while the other shews their connection with the more particular sciences below. And inasmuch as the relation between these two parts is everywhere the same, they may be here best distinguished in the nomenclature of the most abstract and typical of the sciences, Mathematics. The first we shall accordingly call *Pure Ethics*. It treats of the fundamental laws of action; and its First Principle is the answer to the question, What is the chief Good, the End of Action? The second is *Mixed* or *Applied Ethics*, which in addition to the axiomata media derived from the former branch, contains as its data the principles of Ethology, or the laws of the formation of character; and the fundamental question of which is, How is the chief Good perceived? These laws of application correspond in mathematics to the laws of force and motion, which when combined with those of pure number produce the sciences of statics and dynamics, and so connect the former more abstract principles with the phenomena of practical experience. Thus the student of Pure Ethics, of Applied Ethics, the Statesman and the Man of Virtue stand to each other in the same relation as the student of Algebra, of Dynamics, the Engineer and the Mechanic. Now as each of the three last in both lists takes his starting point from the principles supplied to him by his immediate superior, it is evident

that success in any of their departments depends ultimately upon the accuracy and completeness with which the duty of the first has been performed. As therefore on the one hand excellence of machinery and facility of manufacture are derivative products of the knowledge of the laws of number, and depend as much for their advancement on the study of those laws as a river on the continued flowing of the water from its fount; so on the other hand it is reasonable to suppose that the empiricism of modern statesmanship and the unscientific caprice of popular morality are due to some fault or uncertainty in the fundamental principles from which they spring, and that it will be vain to try to cleanse them of their imperfections unless we first remove the impurity from their source. This presumption coincides with the actual absence of any settled and recognized First Principles of Ethics. There is no common standard of appeal by which the disputes of Moralists may be decided; no orderly arranged building where each particular induction of experience may be stored in its proper department: but Morality is little more than a confused agglomeration of facts and maxims, from which each may choose according to his whim, and find authority for the gratification of every passing impulse.

This neglect of First Principles in Ethics is due not only to the difficulty of an abstract study deprived of the ordinary appliances of hand and ear and eye, but also to the flood of aphoristic nostrums and quack panaceas with which the good housewife society has ever fomented and salved over the rubs and bruises of man's moral nature. These gradually forming the artificial skin of 'conscience,' and of 'honour,' have sufficed for the ordinary needs of generation after generation. That which has satisfied the father is ever good enough for the son;—for surely, it is agreed, the commonest prudence would dissuade us from deserting the principles under which the great and good men our fathers formed their virtue, in order to follow a new guide whose fidelity we have never tested, and

whose experience cannot but be small. Such an answer we might imagine to have been made to a man who half a century ago proposed a journey by the new hot-water machine, instead of by the well-tried coach which up to that time had sufficed for all the travels even of the most restless of mankind. Yet now every civilized nation is carried about, not by horses but by engines which insultingly measure their strength by tens of horse power; and coaches, like armour and ruined castles, are degraded from use to ornament, and are only attractive because there are so few of them left. And what is there to prevent the old worn out morality from following in their wake? Are we to neglect the study of the science of medicine because all medical knowledge must begin in quackery, and because quacks have often skilfully set a broken bone, or bled their patients not so far but that with a healthy constitution they might recover? Moral empirics have hitherto proceeded on the same method as their brothers in medicine, by arrogating to themselves the cures which nature works, and by pronouncing incurable those diseases which they have failed to alleviate, and so both have deceived many. But as we soon come to doubt the statements of the one class, why should we longer place implicit trust in those of the other? Why do we refuse to admit a mathematical formula unless we can see the reason for it, or in other words connect it with the fundamental axioms of the science—yet accept a moral maxim, which has tenfold more influence on our conduct, simply because we have been taught it in our youth or seen it asserted in a fashionable treatise? It is indeed well to retain the shelter of the old tottering roof until the new mansion has risen from the ground, but meanwhile what hinders our quarrying the stones and drawing up the plans for the builders?

The object of the present essay is to try and establish this First Principle which is the condition of further progress:—the author hoping not to gain admiration for originality in

paths so well trodden as those which he pursues, but rather aiming at the profit of one who searches for hidden jewels among the dust-bins of antiquity, and tries to turn to the best account the patrimony which has been amassed by his ancestors. In this course alone can success be anticipated, for novelty would be a sure proof of error in a law which must necessarily rest on all previous experience for its truth. But if we can discover a principle which at once underlies all action, and reconciles all theories, we must either accept it as fundamental, or renounce all laws of evidence and of truth.

Our method must be therefore at once inductive and deductive; for it must appeal not only to the experience of generations unconsciously stored up in each individual breast, but to that same experience as expressed in the doctrines of successive philosophies, and as continually repeated in the facts of everyday life. If we can establish a principle *a priori*, and then verify its universality by an appeal to mental phenomena and to philosophical theories, its existence as a fact will be made certain: if in addition to this we can connect it with laws still more general and with the family of natural sciences, it will become no longer a fact but a scientific law, a section of the universal code; and the title of this essay will be justified.

The second part of the subject, Applied Ethics, must be left to future investigation; it will be here sufficient if it be shewn in what direction such investigation should proceed. This, as Aristotle tells us, is the true method of the sciences: "*δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.*"

PART I.

DERIVATION FROM GENERAL EXPERIENCE.

THE sphere of Pure Ethics is Action: and its principal subject the end of Action. Like Mathematics it is grounded on Axioms and Definitions, and deduces results in the form of Propositions. These results are the principles which form the starting point of Applied Ethics. The following is rather a sample of the method to be employed than an attempt at anything like an exhaustive treatment of the subject.

*Axioms.**

1. Actions like objects are capable of being classified according to their properties, and of being measured by a definite standard.

Obs. This axiom merely means that the qualities of actions like those of objects are fixed and constant, so that the same action has always the same properties and moral value, and under the same circumstances always produces the same effect. If this be denied we are reduced to the scepticism of the Sophists, and moral science is impossible; just as physical science is impossible, except as founded on the corresponding axiom in the physical world, the law of uniformity of causation. It is in fact from the uniform consequences of our own actions that this law is first revealed to us.† It follows from this axiom

* We have called them axioms rather than postulates to intimate that besides being the necessary data of our science, they represent actual truths of experience. They differ from the axioms of mathematics by being less abstract or self evident. This of course follows from the greater speciality of Ethics, the starting point of which is not number, the most general property of the external world, but action, a rare and very complex phenomenon.—Its axioms are therefore not the simplest conditions of knowledge, but the laws of the science immediately above it in order of generality.

† *Ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι.*" Arist. Eth. X. iv 8.

that it is possible to act so as to attain a definite object, and thus a general end of action may be arrived at. The standard or general property of actions by which this End is estimated is pointed out below in Axiom 7.

2. The End of action (being some common property or effect) is a possible object of knowledge.

Obs. We may here notice that action and therefore also the end of action is not necessarily limited to the sphere of *human* action, but includes all instances of conscious co-ordination of means to an end.

3. We are capable of being affected by any external object* only through our faculties, or (in other words) as a part of our consciousness.

Obs. Discredit has been thrown at this axiom by the dreams of Transcendentalism with which modern philosophy has from time to time flattered its vanity. Surely, however, it is self-evident; for even if a new faculty be invented for grasping the supersensual, still it must be *our* faculty. To affect us *is* merely to affect our faculties. Aristotle recognises its truth when he says that the deprivation of one sense would irrevocably cut off a great portion of our knowledge. Εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν,

"If it be true that by the side of all mental phenomena there runs a line of physical causation, the interruption of the mental sequences would imply irregularity in the physical. The two worlds must stand or fall together." Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 397. cf. Plato, Theæt. 159. This two-sided law is here called an axiom for the sake of clearness, but it may be deduced from still more universal experience,—from the general nature of consciousness (vid. Appendices i. and iv). We cannot in thought annihilate consciousness, or, speaking objectively, force: nor can we think except by relations, by which we mean subjectively, changes, objectively, order or position. Now a persistent consciousness or force added to a definite arrangement gives persistent relations among states of consciousness or forces. This proves the triple law of uniformity of causation, mental, moral and physical: the first relating wholly to the internal life, the last to the external, and the second to the connection of the former with the latter. See also Herbert Spencer's First Principles, § 63, 65.

* By external I always mean (as explained below) external to each other or to our bodies, not to our consciousness. In the latter sense there *is* nothing external, every thing being part of our consciousness. Hence the truth of this axiom is apparent.

ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα ἐκλελοιπέναι ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει· ἐστὶ δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος'—ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον."—An. Post. i. 18. So Cabanis says, "Si nous n' éprouvions qu'une seule sensation nous n'aurions qu'une seule idée." (Rapports, I. iii.) Montaigne even sees no reason to think that men are endowed with all the natural senses, for if any were wanting no examination could discover the defect. The same truth was recognized by the Cyrenaics, as Sextus tells us (adv. Math. vii. 191—quoted in Ritter and Preller); *"φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαίνομεθα φασὶ ἢ γλυκαζόμεθα δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαφεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως, ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστιν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν οὐχ οἷον τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι."*—So also ib. vi. 53;—*"μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν."* If general consent be the test of an axiom, the list of authorities quoted by Sir W. Hamilton amply proves the universal belief in that which we are considering.*

Since we only know what our consciousness tells us, the last part of this axiom follows as a corollary from the first. The external world, *so far as we know it*, is really a part of self—

> "Self that no alien knows;
> "Self, far diffused as Fancy's wing can travel;
> "Self spreading still—oblivious of its own
> "Yet all of all possessing."†

This is the true meaning of the dogma *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*.—A

* Mr. Herbert Spencer in his first Principles, § 22, sqq. sets up a modified theory of the absolute, to which, as coming from so great a philosopher, separate consideration has been given in Appendix I.

† Coleridge—Religious Musings. The same doctrine is clearly put by Aristotle —*"ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἐστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὰ ἐπιστητά πως ἡ δ'αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά,"* de An. iii. 8. So Met. vii. 10, *"ἡ ὑλὴ ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν."* See also the passages quoted in reference to Axiom 4, and the note to Pt. II. ch. ii. § 1, below. Cf. Spinosa, Ethica iii, 2, Schol. and ii, 19, 26.

man is the measure of himself, because he knows nothing else —and he has no criterion of truth or reality except so far as they become parts of himself. "Si un artisan était sur de rêver toutes les nuits douze heures durant qu'il est roi, je crois qu'il serait presqu' aussi heureux qu'un roi qui rêverait toutes les nuits douze heures durant qu'il serait artisan."*

What has been said applies not only to man but to all consciousness. Consciousness is merely a collective name for states of consciousness, and therefore it is almost an identical proposition to say that it is composed of nothing else.

The meaning of this has been mistaken when it is supposed to deny the existence of an external world. That objects exist outside our bodies is indubitable, all that we say is that they cannot exist outside our consciousness.† Outside our consciousness, our mind in the widest sense, is utterly unintelligible, because outsideness is merely a product of our mind. This of course can be combined with other products and gives birth to the external world, whose existence in phenomena is as certain as any truth that we possess. But though one part of ourself is outside another, we can imagine nothing outside our whole self, and if we could, it would be no longer outside it, for it would become part of it.

4. Faculties are known only by their action, or (in other words), so far as they are portions of our consciousness.

Obs. This axiom is the obverse of the last. They might both be comprehended in the more general statement that experience or knowledge is only of states of consciousness, that is, of a union of what we call subject and object. We can separate neither part from the other, and it is no more possible

* Pascal, Pensées, I. vi. 20.

† If this were properly understood our common sense would become Berkeleyite. Of course objects exist outside us, *i. e.* outside our ideas and their home our bodies, for what else do we mean by exist, and outside, and objects? But equally of course they do not exist outside our consciousness; for existence and outside and objects are parts and products of our consciousness.

to conceive form apart from matter, than to imagine how Ralpho

> "Had first matter seen undressed,
> And took her naked all alone,
> Before one rag of form was on."

Berkeley's spirit is just as realistic and unreal as the 'matter' whose existence he so clearly disproves. That the mind and the universe are really two sides of the same fact, separable only verbally, is shewn by Aristotle. We know the universe only by thinking of it, and we cannot think without thinking of some definite object: "*νοεῖν οὔκ ἐστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος*," * and "*ὁ νοῶν κἂν μὴ νοῇ ποσὸν, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσὸν, νοεῖ δ' οὐχ ἧ ποσόν.*"† So also Proclus says, "*πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδειγματικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά.*"‡

5. The sphere of action lies in the adaptation of 'inner' to 'outer' sequences—of faculties to the laws of nature.

Obs. The uniform sequences among our primary states of consciousness, or those states which (to use the common phraseology) are due immediately to an outward object, and which we call sensations, are the laws of 'outward' nature, of the universe: those which hold among our secondary states of consciousness, or those states which are either mental reproductions of the primary or follow on these primary sensations

* De Mem. i. So de An. iii. 4;—"*δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν πρὶν ἂν νοῇ· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.*" cf. ib. iii. 8. Aristotle however obscured his doctrine with the notion of *δύναμις*, which is really nothing in itself apart from the results which it produces. This the Megarians saw when they said "*ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ μὴ δύνασθαι· οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα μὴ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν.*" So Cicero (de Fato) says "placet Diodoro (a Megarian) id solum fieri posse quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit." Cf. Bayle, Dict. s. v. Chrysippe, 929, quoted by Leibnitz, Theodicée, sur la bonté de Dieu, § 170. Abelard (Introd. a la Theologie, iii) also says, "Dieu ne peut faire que ce qu'il fait."

† De Mem. i. 5.

‡ Inst. Theol. 194. See also Hamilton's Discussions, p. 644, and Spinosa, Ethica II. 11, 23, 48; III. 53.

or their reproductions,* are the laws of 'inward' nature, of logic or psychology. To both these sets of laws all action must conform:—the sphere of deliberation is only to choose between different instances of their application, that is, we can only select one law from the rest, not transgress any. The 'will' therefore consists in choosing a particular sequence or faculty, and using it in conformity with external conditions. On this the Stoics founded their system of morality, the keystone of which was the accommodation of the will to nature: "Cupias quodcunque necesse est."† So said Cleanthes—

> "ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη
> "ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος·
> "ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω
> "Κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι."

The Stoical system, however, was one-sided, as not seeing the obverse of the picture—that these laws are really only part of ourselves after all.

6. The constitution of man and other animate beings is an organism consisting of a number of parts, each having its appropriate function, and the end of each part results from the performance of its function.

Obs. This includes all functions both bodily and mental. Whether either can be analysed into the other is a question unimportant for our present object. The function or end of each part must be, as was seen in the last axiom, to adapt itself to some particular law of nature or some particular combination of laws exhibited in the surrounding medium. The more complete this adaptation the better is the special function per-

* We here differ from Hume's Classification (Human Nature, Book II. Part I. § i). taking together his secondary impressions and ideas, as being both products of association and terms not of an external but of an internal sequence. Spinosa agrees with us in distinguishing the "ordo affectionum corporis humani" from the "ordo intellectus," and shews their connection.—Ethica II. 18, 7; V. 1.

† Lucan Phars. iv. 487, cf. Spinosa, Ethica IV. 59;—"Ex ratione agere nihil aliud est quam ea agere quæ ex necessitate nostræ naturæ in se sola consideratæ sequuntur."

formed, and the more completely is the end attained. It must be remembered too that these functions are not disconnected but all united under a central government. Yet the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts, and therefore the end of the whole is nothing but the sum of the partial ends. Organization adds nothing new, it only arranges. I need hardly add that functions and ends are no independent entities; they are merely approving names for results or effects. (See below, Axiom 7.)

7. Approbation is the standard whereby we judge of the moral value of actions, and is the universal mark of the due performance of a function and of the attainment of an end.

Obs. The quality of exciting moral approbation or its contrary distinguishes one action from another, and our conception of function or end of action is determined by the anticipation of such approval. So far as we approve the action of any part of our organism, so far do we hold that it attains its end, and *vice versâ*, so that Object of Approbation and end of action are co-extensive. This will be more clearly seen under the definition of Good. Apart from approbation the end has no objective existence in nature, any more than the lions and bears of astronomical charts. We write it there and then forget our own handwriting. Final cause is merely a certain anticipated effect: and approbation is its mark.

Definitions.

1. *Good* is the object of moral approbation. The highest good is therefore the ultimate object of such approbation, the end of action.

Obs. This definition does not, as at first sight appears, reverse the true order of thought. We do not approve a thing because it is good, for—'good' means to us nothing more than a signal of approval. As to what good is in itself, or even if there be such a thing, no two men would agree. Our present definition does not pretend to advance our knowledge on this

point, it only prescribes what meaning is to be attached to the word when used in the following pages. With this view an author may make what definitions he pleases:—only he must beware of surreptitiously introducing into his argument any meaning of the word not contained in the definition: "en sorte que le nom imposé demeure dénué de tout autre sens, s'il en a, pour n'avoir plus que celui auquel on le destine uniquement."*

Of the three names therefore, Good, End of action, Object of moral approbation, which are confessedly co-extensive (v. Axiom 7.) we take the last as the most fundamental;† and whenever we make use of the two former terms it will be merely as synonyms of the latter.

2. *Pleasure* is that state of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance (as such) of its function by one or more of the parts of our organism.

Obs. This definition includes the pleasures both of our bodily organs, and of what are usually called our faculties. It may seem at first sight that the pleasures arising from the contemplation of beauty, or from poetry or music, are hardly in-

* Pascal, Pensées, I. ii. Definitions of *names*, which are the necessary starting point of deductive science, must be carefully distinguished from the definitions of *things*, which are the ultimate objects of inductive science. Each is of course really of things, but the former is of non-existent, the latter of existent things. A non-existent thing can be perfectly defined, as created by ourselves, like the straight lines and surfaces of geometry; in other words its properties are all potentially contained in the definition. An existent thing can under no circumstances be perfectly defined; its definition is gradually extended by advancing science, but can never be complete. The practical use of geometry (as of our present science) lies in its *approximation* to fact. By varying our definitions we might create any number of equally certain, but useless sciences.

† Cf. Brown, Lect. 82;—"Certain notions excite certain emotions of approbation or the contrary. These we call Good or Bad." So Spinosa says, "Constat nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere, quia id bonum esse judicamus, sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare, quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus." Eth. III. ix. schol. So Præf. ad P. iv.; and ib. viii. So also IV. 29—"id bonum aut malum vocamus quod causa est lætitiæ aut tristitiæ." He also assumes the identity of Good and the End of Action, *e.g.* Appendix to Ethica IV. cap. xxx; "res illæ sunt bonæ quæ corporis partes juvant, ut suo officio fungantur." Similarly Plato in the Philebus makes this the criterion of Good that it is the object of universal choice or approbation (*e.g.* 20, D; 22, B; 64, C).

cluded; yet though these may be classed together with other emotional states as secondary pleasures, they differ from the primary, only in that they do not result immediately from a definite ἐνέργεια, but are connected with a class of previous ἐνέργειαι, recorded in the experience either of the individual or the race, and recalled according to those laws of our inner sequences, which we call the laws of association. In any case they are felt only on an excitation of the peculiar æsthetic or emotional faculty on which they depend, and though we were unable to shew the derivation of this from simpler feelings, the pleasure would still be due immediately to the exercise of this faculty, and not to the unknown object by which we say it is excited according to a law which would, in the supposed case, seem primary and direct. The derivation of these secondary pleasures from the primary will be clearly seen when we come to treat of the natural history of the emotions.

This definition, like the former one, being an ἀρχὴ, is of course merely of a name, but it is well to notice that we are warranted alike by the conjectures of ancient philosophers,* and by the researches of modern science,† in affirming that the real thing

* Plato, Phileb. 31 D;—"πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε (τῆς ἁρμονίας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις) καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπισύσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον," cf. ib. 32 A. "ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή." So he says, λύπη is φθορὰ and ἡδονὴ is "ἡ εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδός." He, however, thinks of it too much as an ἀναπλήρωσις presupposing pain, hence this definition is with him not sufficiently comprehensive, and does not include the highest pleasures. (Ar. Eth. Nic. X. iii. 6.) Aristotle is therefore more right in calling it an ἐνέργεια, or rather the inseparable accompaniment of an ἐνέργεια. Eth. VII. xii. 2, 3. ib. xiii. 2, "ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, εἴθ' ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην·εἶναι, τοῦτο δ'ἐστὶν ἡδονή." ib. xiv. 8; X. iii. 6; iv. 5—vi. In the last passage the theory is fully explained, and might be translated almost word for word for the purpose of the present essay. So also Rhet. I. xi. 1, where pleasure is defined as κίνησίς τις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασις ἁθρόα καὶ αἰσθητὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν." cf. de An. V.

† Bain, Mental and Moral Science, pp. 75, 80, 321. Maudsley, p. 149;—"An idea which is favourable to the impulses or strivings of the individual to self-expansion is accompanied by a feeling of more or less pleasure; and an idea which betokens individual restriction, which is opposed to the expansion of self, is attended with a feeling of more or less discomfort or pain. . . . Even in the earliest sensation

pleasure approximates as much to our definition, as the real lines and surfaces of nature to their definitions in Euclid.

It must be remarked that Pleasure means nothing more than pleasant states of consciousness. We use the abstract word only for shortness and must be careful to guard against any metaphysical association. We must also not confound it with the law of pleasure, which is a statement of the resemblance between pleasures; just as in physics the law of heat is different from heat.* Heat means merely something hot: a law on the other hand is not an object but a relation among objects, a fact. Action deals with objects in accordance with facts—just as a man who wishes to ascend in the air procures not the law of gravity, but a balloon. The same remarks apply to Pain, which scarcely needs a precise definition if we remember that it stands to pleasure as wet to dry or light to heavy. We know of no absolute or perfect instance of either.

the existence of pain or pleasure is a sort of obscure judgment on its advantage or disadvantage to the personality or self." What applies to ideas, or associated sensations, applies still more strongly to the sensations themselves. So Cabanis, Rapports, ii. § 6. Coleridge, Prudential Aphorisms, ii. Spinosa, Ethica III. 11, 59, IV. 7, 31. In defining, however, lætitia and tristitia as "quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit," he reverses the true order—increased vitality precedes, not follows pleasure.

* This is the ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν, (as distinct from the ἓν παρὰ πολλὰ), which is necessary to general knowledge and classification, and so to scientific proof, but has no separate existence. So Aristotle says, "εἴδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἢ ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται, εἶναι μέντοι ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ᾖ· ἐὰν δὲ τὸ καθόλου μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἔσται, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀπόδειξις." An. Post. I. ii. So Met. vi. 15, δῆλον ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς." Cf. ib. 14, and Eth. VI. xi. 4,—"ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου," and Anal. Post. IV. p. 100. For his mode of accounting for our arrival at the universal, with which we almost entirely coincide, see An. Post. II. 19. The notion of an ἰδέα self-existent is, as shewn by Berkeley, one of the errors derived from language. It is merely "a word congealed in northern air," (Hudibras, I. i. 148), and used as a deadly weapon in the Arimaspian and Nephelebite battle of Metaphysics, (v. Rabelais, vol. iv. ch. 5, 6). This was really seen by Plato himself and exposed in the Parmenides, where nearly all Aristotle's arguments are anticipated and left unsolved. The true doctrine of universals, that of the μία ἰδέα διὰ πολλῶν is also clearly stated in Soph. pp. 253, sqq.

PROPOSITION I.

The Good is relative to our faculties.

For, No object can affect us except through our faculties, (Ax. 3); but to be known by us is to affect us;

Therefore, nothing can be known except through our faculties, or (in other words) except in relation to our faculties:

But the Good, or End of Action, is a possible object of knowledge, (Ax. 2);

Hence the Good is relative to our faculties.

COROLLARY I. The highest good of man at any time is relative to his faculties at that time.

COROLLARY II. Since ideas derive their elements from experience the idea of perfect Good, or God, can only be an idealization of humanity.

Obs. We have only apparently proved here that the Good *as known*, or capable of being known, is relative to our faculties, —and it may be objected that in itself it may have an absolute existence. To this we need only reply that what neither is nor can be known forms no part of philosophy, which is organized *knowledge:* and more than this, that the term existence means to us merely a certain form of our knowledge and can only be applied without contradiction in the sphere of that knowledge. The existent is synonymous with the possible object of knowledge; 'is' and 'is known as' are identical, and to say that Good may be something incognoscible is to say that it may be non-existent. (See next Proposition.) Still further, an Unknowable Good can have nothing to do with the science of Ethics, (Ar. Eth. I. vi. 13; so Spinosa, Ethica IV. 29).

The truth here shewn is seen by Aristotle, when he shews that virtue consists "ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς," not "τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα." 'What is little for Milo is too much for a beginner,' (vid. Eth. II. vi. 7). Still it does not follow, as the Sophists held, that there can be no science of Ethics, because each man differs from the rest. There are general laws to which all men, or all animals conform, and on these science is

based: just as astronomy is possible in spite of the fact that no two planets are alike. Aristotle's standard the σπουδαῖος, (vid. Eth. III. iv. 4; X. v. 11: see however note to Pt. II. ch. ii, § 1, below), if not involving an argument in a circle appeals only to public opinion, which is a guide useless for scientific accuracy. Only in Ethics, where the object matter forms part of everybody's experience, is it at all applicable. Of the failure of the method elsewhere the Scholastic speculations on the natural sciences are an example.

Proposition II.

The Good is a state of Consciousness.

For, The Good is a possible object of knowledge, (Ax. 2); but all objects of knowledge are states of consciousness, (Obs. to Ax. 4):

Hence the Good is a state of Consciousness.

Or, The Good exists (or is capable of being known) only by affecting our faculties, or, in other words, only as an affection of our faculties, (Prop. I);

But an affection of our faculties is a state of consciousness:

Hence the Good exists only as a state of consciousness.

Obs. In the last proposition, we made use of the common speech when we spoke of the Good as affecting our faculties—we now see that we ought to speak of it merely as an affection of our faculties, or more correctly still as a state of consciousness. To speak of anything existent external to our consciousness, is, as we saw, a pure hypothesis, incapable of proof, perfectly unintelligible and void of utility. White *is* (in the only philosophical sense of the word) our sensation of it: similarly Good *is* our consciousness of it. When therefore we make use of the ordinary dualistic phraseology, we must remember that the two worlds there distinguished are merely two divisions of the universe of self, considered as distinct for convenience of language, but differing only as two classes comprehended under a common genus.

Proposition III.

The Good is relative to circumstances.

For, The Good is determined by and therefore lies in action, (Ax. 7, 6, (Obs.)); but Action is relative to circumstances (Ax. 5):

Hence the Good is relative to circumstances.

Obs. As observed under the last Propositions, circumstances or the external world mean our primary states of consciousness, which we distinguish from the secondary by various peculiar properties of quality and sequence which will be hereafter enumerated.

Proposition IV.

The Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circumstances.

For, The Good is identical with the end, (Def.); which results from the performance of function by each part of the organism, (Ax. 6);

But the function of each part is its adaptation to circumstances, (Ax. 5, 6):

Hence the Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circumstances.

Corollary. Since man is an organism composed of parts, (Ax. 6) the whole good of man is the sum of the goods of his parts, and therefore depends upon the adaptation of all his parts to their corresponding circumstances.

Proposition V.

The Good is Pleasure.

For, The Good results from the due performance of function, (Prop. IV.); but the Good is a state of consciousness, (Prop. II.); therefore the Good is the state of consciousness which results from the due performance of function (as such).*

* These words are important, for if they were omitted there would be an apparent failure in the proof as given above, which might cause some difficulty unless ex-

Hence (by Definition) the Good is Pleasure.

Obs. By our definitions of Good and Pleasure it was evident that they were coextensive, being both marks of the same thing: to prove their identity it was necessary to show that Good is a state of consciousness.

We might multiply these propositions at will, but the preceding are sufficient for our present purpose, which is merely to establish Principles of the highest generality. For the prosecution of the derived science of Applied Ethics, greater detail would be necessary; but on abstract principles such as those given above, the foundation of the whole must be laid, if the art of morality is to be built upon its true basis, the constitution of organized nature.

These main Principles it will be well to illustrate a little more fully.

Perhaps Propositions I. and II. are the most important of all. They assert the impossibility of Transcendentalism. We can never be affected by anything except through our faculties, and it is not only a gratuitous hypothesis, but an improper use of language to predicate existence of that which can never in any way affect us. Existence and the Absolute are heterogeneous, and can have no communion. For existence, as being appreciable by us, is necessarily relative in a double sense: that is to say, a thing exists or is capable of being known only by its relations to other things, which are themselves only states of our

plained. For by substituting 'Pleasure' for 'the state of consciousness which results from the due performance of function,' we should assume that 'Pleasure' is the *only* state of consciousness so connected, whereas certain Perceptions or Intellectual states also follow on the same fact, and therefore ought apparently to be included under Good. To this we might answer that perception does not universally follow on the performance of function, and that there is therefore only an accidental, not a fundamental connection between them. But the difficulty is entirely obviated by the insertion of these two words, for when perception does follow, it follows not on the performance of function *as such*, but merely as a fact capable of comparison with other facts. The *only* state of consciousness universally connected with such performance is pleasure, and thus our proof is logically correct.

consciousness, or (as we incorrectly express it) relative to our senses. Existence, therefore, as a product of Perception, is a relation among different parts of ourselves, and has thus no place except in ourselves. Not only therefore do we not know that the Absolute exists, but we know that it does not exist; for by the law of contradiction that which is the product of Knowledge must be entirely absent from the Unknowable. To predicate existence of the Absolute, is infinitely more ridiculous than it would be for the blind man to assert that colours are noisy—for one sense is more like another, than sense in general to its total absence. This applies even to the Deity. If God be unperceivable by our faculties, Atheism necessarily results. The object of religion must be capable of being thought of by our minds, and presenting himself to our consciousness. Moreover if God were unable to reward or punish, or to excite in us any feelings of love or fear, aspiration or remorse, his will could have no influence on our actions, and his existence would be entirely unimportant to us.

Hence it follows directly that the motive of action must be some state of our own consciousness. Anything external to our consciousness (if there were such a thing) could affect us only by becoming part of that consciousness, and we could know nothing more about it than the states of consciousness which we supposed it to produce in us, and of which it really must consist.* So on the one hand the Good, which is the end of action, has no existence outside ourselves; and on the other hand each individual has no connection with his fellows or with the Deity, except so far as the latter are or become parts of himself.

Not only, however, must the Good, of which we are in search, be a state of consciousness; it must be such a state as is capable of being produced mediately or immediately by all con-

* Cf. Cabanis, Rapports, i. § 3;—"Il n'existe pour nous de causes exterieures que celles qui peuvent agir sur nous, et tout objet auquel nous ne saurions appliquer notre faculté de sentir doit être exclu de ceux de nos recherches."

scious action—for it is by definition the end not of any particular class of actions, or parts of the organism,—but of action in general, of the whole man; just as the law of attraction considered as the fundamental law of matter, applies to all matter equally, to the balloon which soars upwards as well as to the stone which falls from the hand.* Now the only states of consciousness which follow universally on conscious action, are pleasure and pain, which (as will be more clearly shewn hereafter) are at once more fundamental and more universal forms of consciousness than any of the modes of emotion or perception. Hence we arrive at their material identity with good and evil.

We might have arrived at the same result by a slightly different method, if we had taken as our starting point motive to action instead of approbation. We should then have seen that good the ultimate or general motive, could have no other content than pleasure the universal motive,† and that a man's good must stand in the same relation to his separate pleasures, as the class man to the individuals contained in it. Mere perception of an object can never put us into moral relation with it, can never originate action in respect of it.‡ This is due to an im-

* All partial systems of morality must equally fail, whether the intellect, or an isolated emotion like sympathy, or the senses be taken as the centre. A true conception of the Good must be equally applicable to all parts of our nature, and to all kinds of actions.

† Cf. Arist. de An. iii. 10;—"ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτόν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν." (cf. Eth. III. iv.) and ib. iii. 7;—"Τὸ ἡδέσθαι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ᾗ τοιαῦτα." So also Plato, Legg. II. 663 B,—"οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἕπεται." This we have treated more fully in the next chapter.

‡ Cf. Arist. Eth. VI. ii. 5;—"διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ." ὄρεξις is the only motive power. See also his account of προαίρεσις the differentia of moral action, and of its distinction from δόξα. Eth. III. ii. 10—16; iii. See also note to Pt. II. ch. i, § 3, below. The ultimate end is given by βούλησις, which always aims at good (ib. iv.) and with which are associated the means of attainment (ib. iii. 11), and this process of association is the deliberative (βουλευτὸν) part of προαίρεσις. Spinosa, too, shews how action necessarily springs from desire. He defines Cupiditas as "ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum" (Ethica, III. 59, see also IV. 14), from whence arises the idea of Good (III. 9, and IV. 8). His mistake was to deduce the Law of

mediately accompanying, or associated pleasure or pain, which in the latter case takes the shape of desire or avoidance of the object perceived, and so produces the corresponding action. This is most apparent in the simple cases where we have no previous association of good or evil;—and we might hence conjecture, what we shall hereafter see to be true, that our notion of Good is merely a complicated association of pleasures, arising where more than one element of our nature and one portion of the consequences of action is taken into consideration. No abstract conception of Duty, or of the will of God could influence us to action, were we not convinced that on our acting in certain ways, certain consequences of pleasure or pain would follow to ourselves, either in the way of direct reward or punishment, or of what we call the approval of conscience, or of the satisfaction of our emotions of gratitude or love. What these feelings really are we shall see later; it is sufficient here to remark, that motive to intentional action necessarily lies in anticipation, though it may be grounded on memory. All moral action presupposes that the future will correspond to the past;—else where is our standard of choice? The past in itself can furnish no motive, for it is unalterable,—it is removed from the sphere of action altogether. Its importance only lies in the fact that by its help we are able to anticipate the future, and thus to prepare our actions in conformity with those laws which are the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

If then the ultimate motive be some anticipated state of consciousness, and this excites in us desire or avoidance, according as it is pleasant or painful, it is evident that the ultimate object of choice, the end of action, the Highest Good, is composed only of pleasant states of consciousness, or as we call it for the sake of brevity Pleasure. No one can help following

Self Conservation from the 'actualis essentia' of each thing, instead of shewing its connection with ordinary physical laws, ib. III. 7, 28; IV. 19, 20. Here we see the failure of the *a priori* method, if it stand alone; we must therefore look on this our first part only as hypothetical until it is supplemented by the second.

Pleasure, though some do it better than others: "Trahit sua quemque voluptas."

Perhaps it may be said that in shewing the identity of Good and Pleasure, we have been merely arguing from our arbitrary definitions, and that our conclusion, though true of the meanings which we have capriciously given to the words, implies no connection between the Good and Pleasure of ordinary life. Let us then express definitely the principle which we have reached. Substituting for the words Good and Pleasure our definitions of them, it takes the following shape:—The object of Approbation, or the End of Action, consists in those states of consciousness which follow on the unimpeded attainment of their function by the parts of our organism.* If this mode of stating the proposition be thought better, we are content to adopt it;—but the former is shorter, and if its meaning be different, that difference is due to an unscientific importation into the meanings attached to the words of ideas unwarranted by facts. We know nothing of Good except as the End of Action, or the object of Approbation:—the burden of proof therefore rests with those who say it has really a further existence, and this proof they are unable to give. We know nothing of Pleasure except as Pleasant states of consciousness, and science tells us that what we have been accustomed to call pleasant states, are those described in our definition. It is true that we have never experienced a perfectly pure pleasure. The imperfection of our nature precludes the possibility of our ever finding "pleasure unmixed, and without thorn the rose:" —for, even in the purest moments of delight,

> "Medio de fonte leporum
> "Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angit."

But neither have we ever seen a straight line agreeing with Euclid's definition. Our definitions at any rate agree approxi-

* Thus it is expressed by Spinosa: (Ethica IV. 20)—"Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quærere, hoc est, suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute proditus est."

mately with experience, and are merely an extension of it, and the deductions from them can be applied to experience, with as much accuracy and certainty as appertains to those of Geometry. Our definitions are, as we admitted, definitions of names; that is, of things created by our imagination; but like Euclid's they only isolate what we never find isolated, they are not inconsistent with the phenomena which they generalize. The charge of disagreement with facts might be more justly brought against the metaphysical definitions; which not only make Absolute what we know only as Relative, but refuse altogether to be bound by the trammels of experience. The scientific spirit tries to connect various facts by common resemblances, the metaphysical invents hypotheses whose truth can never be tested to account for what we know only as Facts. Incapability of disproof is surely no test of truth, unless the very meaning of truth be inverted, and it be made to signify not that which has been or is liable to become a phenomenon of experience, but that which by its nature is for ever excluded from such a possibility. Nor even granting the hypothesis, is anything really explained; the notion of an Absolute Good or of a World Soul has no more value as a philosophical speculation than the World Tortoise of the Chinese, except as a more difficult exercise of the imaginative power, and as a hypothesis more ingeniously devised to escape the dangers of experimental test. Nor can it aid to prophesy the future better than to explain the mysteries of the past. For I suppose that every Hegelian would allow that, even to it most devoted worshipper, the World Soul will not reveal its future intentions except so far as he by his own study of its habits in the past is able to prognosticate its actions. In a word his object is the same as ours, to evolve the future from the past: to interpret each fact by its comparison with others.

If then we can shew that our law agrees with experience, all ought to concede to us its truth. We have already deduced it from certain general portions of experience stored up in

axioms; our next duty will be to shew its connection with the whole remaining portion, so that its truth may be founded on the widest possible basis.

This remaining sphere of experience is two-fold. In the first place there is the whole range of special or cognate experience. Under this head come all the particular facts of psychology, and of moral action; which though as yet unconnected with higher laws, are nevertheless warranted by universal testimony. Of these our principle, if true, must be able to give an account, and on the completeness of that account its verification must depend. For still further security it must be also able to render explanation of the various philosophical theories, which from time to time have been built on these facts; to reconcile their disagreement, and to shew which part of the truth each has appropriated, and which it has failed to perceive.

Secondly, there is the great series of physical laws which form the subject matter of the various sciences. These comprise all that portion of generalized experience which is not already comprehended in or homogeneous with the axioms from which we started, and with them these axioms must be connected if they are to attain the highest certainty of which human knowledge is capable. At present our principles have only at most the strength of the axioms on which they are founded:—they are therefore open to all the criticism which Plato applies with less desert to the method of mathematics*—they are based on hypotheses. We must therefore proceed to connect them with higher scientific generalizations and with the family of natural laws. These correspond in our philosophy to the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος of Plato, with which he demands that all

* Rep. VII. 533, B, sqq. The axioms of mathematics represent a much wider field of experience than those which we have just laid down, as might be expected from the nature of the subjects of which they treat. Anybody can comprehend and admit the fact that the sums of equals are equals; but our axioms would stand but for a very short time if they must stand or fall by such a test. Yet they differ only in degree:—neither represent the *whole* sum of experience, and with this they must be connected to attain the completest certainty.

axioms be connected, if they are to be bases of true science; and as with Plato the ἰδέα ἀγαθοῦ, as the highest universal, contained the essence of truth and reality, from which alone all other truth is derived, so with us the ultimate Laws of Nature, representing as they do the greatest universality of experience, and so being endowed with the highest certainty, are the only source of truly scientific knowledge: and unless any given principle be connected with these, by a chain of unbroken links, it remains as Plato shews merely a hypothetical dogma, little better than ordinary δόξα. Perhaps in the future Plato's prophecy may be fulfilled to the letter; knowledge may be completely unified, and the coping stone laid on the finished building. Hereafter the Highest Idea may quit the realm of Poetry and Religion, and emerge in the domain of science, under the more real shape of Attraction or some other Natural Force. But at present this scientific climax only looms dimly through the mist as a loadstar of the future; and in the present inquiry we must be content if we get so far in our ἄνω ὁδός, as the fundamental physiological laws of animated nature.

These two divisions of our proposed discussion, though apparently distinct, can hardly be practically separated. In the explanation of the different special facts of psychology and moral action, we shall be necessarily led to treat of the various laws of nature, which enter into their composition:—and the relation of our own axioms to these laws will thus incidentally be brought to light. We shall therefore treat of both divisions together, and although for convenience of discussion we must first take the order naturally suggested by the former of them, we shall make this as synthetical as possible, and shall afterwards shortly rearrange our results in the form of the general experience, as one of the regular physical sciences. We shall therefore now proceed to examine separately the Facts and Theories connected with our Principles, and endeavour to shew our conformity to them; and this will be done by proving a

community of origin from laws more fundamental than either,—those of animated nature. Our ὑπόθεσις will thus be removed at least a step further back, into the region of undoubted science; though there is at least one link which human knowledge has hitherto failed to forge, and which is still needed before we can safely climb right up to the supreme ἰδέα which represents the totality of human experience. Our method will be throughout, as far as possible, synthetical; for that is at once the most suitable for combining the two sides of our inquiry, and the most crucial test of scientific perfection. No man can be said to be a scientific watchmaker unless he can not only pull watches to pieces, but put the pieces together again into a perfect watch.

PART II.

VERIFICATION BY SPECIAL EXPERIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

OF FACTS.

In selecting facts for consideration, the qualities by which we shall be guided are three in number. They are first, Importance; secondly, Celebrity; and thirdly, Apparent Inconsistency with the Principles which we want to verify. The facts so selected will be arranged as far as possible in a synthetical order, so as to shew their relative positions in the Emotional Evolution of Life, of which they are for the most part Products, and more generally in the great organism of nature, of which this evolution is only a subordinate member; so as in other words to adopt them into the family of physical sciences. Owing, however, to the nature of the object which we have in view, as involving a number of particular analyses, which it is not always convenient, or even possible, to write backwards in a synthetical form, or which do not occur for discussion in their historical order, this arrangement cannot be universally retained; and though a partial remedy for the disorder so occasioned is sought to be supplied by the concluding section, the reader will have to pardon much repetition and inconsequence, which, though aggravated by the inexperience of the author, are not altogether separable from the subject which he treats.

§ I. Of a Moral Sense.

If Good and Evil are to be measured by Pleasure and Pain, what is to become of the Moral Sense?

Here, at the very outset, we are confronted by an apparently insuperable difficulty, for all are agreed that we recognize an act as virtuous or vicious, not by any mathematical calculation of pleasures or pains, but by what seems the intuitive verdict of a faculty within us, which from the immediacy of its perceptions, has by a slight metaphorical extension, been included in the natural family of the Senses. This is a fact which we must admit not only from the strength of testimony on which it rests, but because it has been already assumed as the basis of our own system, which by defining Good as the object of Approbation, has taken that sentiment as the immediate standard of Morality. But even our previous reasoning, in which this sentiment was taken for granted and held up in the ordinary way as the basis of our ideas of virtue, led us nevertheless to guess that it is not after all in its nature a simple and indecomposable faculty like the senses, but that it is capable of resolution into constituent parts, as water may be analysed into its component gases.* In this denial, however, of intuitiveness or ultimateness to the Moral Faculty, we are apparently met by the same insuperable objection as before; that of a direct appeal to Consciousness. And to the philosopher of experience such an appeal must always be decisive; seeing that whatever argument throws doubts on its finality, must itself rest ultimately upon it, and that a result which hangs on a lengthened chain of reasoning, the strength of which can at most be only that of its weakest part, is necessarily more liable to break down than that which depends on only a single link.†

* In our First Part we took for granted the Moral Sense, and deduced from it the principle of Pleasure; in our present section we start from the principle of pleasure, and by it account for the existence and nature of the Moral Sense. Each method is the complement of the other.

† See Mr. Herbert Spencer's chapter on the Fundamental Postulate in his Principles of Psychology. The weakness of a long argument lies, not as he supposes, on the frequent use of the Postulate, (for if it is the standard of certainty, it can never introduce uncertainty, any more than equals added to equals a hundred times would remain less certainly equal than at first); but only in the multiplied danger of its misuse.

Consciousness is the source of all our knowledge, and as no conclusion can be stronger than its premises, there can be no truth which contradicts consciousness.* Whether consciousness itself be true or not is a meaningless question. If a man feels a headache, he has one, and nobody can prove to him the contrary. Consciousness is the ultimate material of which the terms of a proposition are composed; whereas truth lies in the proposition itself, or in the relation between the terms. Consciousness is the stuff out of which truth is made, and of which truth is merely a form.† Consciousness therefore is not only true, but prior and superior to truth, and consequently if we are quite sure that we are appealing directly to consciousness, the appeal is final.

In the proviso, however, lies the whole difficulty. Is it quite certain that we are not putting in the place of consciousness one of its bastard children,—some subtle unwarranted *inference* of experience, the use of which is only the more dangerous because its derivation was unconscious, and therefore incapable of being tested by the rules of evidence; and because it has now grown so like its parent as often to deceive even those who know them both, just as the Devil owes his chief power to his old angelic nature—"most damned because the likest God?" Are we sure that we are only proving a headache from the aching of our head, and not rather arguing against

* Lucr. IV. 483.—"Quid majore fide porro quam sensus haberi
"Debet? An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
"Dicere eos contra, quæ tota ab sensibus orta est?
"Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis."

See Cic. de Fin. i. 19, 64:—"Quicquid animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus." So Diogenes (X. 31) tells us that Epicurus held the testimony of consciousness (including *αἰσθήσεις, πάθη* (*ἡδονὴ* and *ἀλγηδών*) and (curiously enough after Aristotle's analysis of *αἴσθησις*) *προλήψεις* or perception), to be irrefragable. For no other faculty has authority to question it:—certainly not *λόγος*—"*πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται.*"

† Truth and falsehood lie in perception as distinct from sensation: in *φαντασία* not in *αἴσθησις* (Arist. de An. III. iii. 5, 11): in the 'sens interne' not in the 'sens exterieures' (Leibnitz, Theodicée, § 65): "comme lorsque le celebre Galilée a cru que Saturne avait deux anses."

the existence of antipodes because we are unable to walk along the ceiling? If not, we are only making prejudice irresponsible judge in its own trial;* and each prejudice, as a member of an exclusive oligarchy, is sure to acquit the rest, and so no impartial justice can be got. It is true indeed, that prejudice, like the fury Allecto, is professed to be hated alike by gods and men, and even the Lord of Hell and all the nether powers disclaim her service; yet when fair weapons fail and the enemy is gaining the day, not even divine Philosophy herself, more than Juno, the queen of Heaven, has disdained to implore her detestable aid. 'Is it not better even to be damned, if no one see 'it, than to be dragged in the triumph of the conqueror?'

'Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo.'†

'Besides, by a mere change of name from prejudice to common sense, the alliance will sound not only respectable but honourable.' This is the charge that must be brought against the Common sense 'Philosophy,' which to save a cherished dogma, called all the host of barbarian customs and slavish prejudices to its standard: which in the name of human knowledge arrayed its deadliest foes in common league to crush and exterminate its truest friend. Tyrants, whether political or intellectual, are ever prone to Medize, and human liberty and human knowledge, the two dearest possessions of mankind, have ever suffered more from mistakes and treason within, than from opposition without. Nor is Philosophical Demagogism less pernicious and shortsighted than Political. It is a gloomy time for the lovers of truth, when Philosophy, losing the guidance of a Pericles, falls into an easy self-complacency under the flattery of a Cleon; and, decrying as useless the toil and

* Cf. Epicur. ap. Diog. Laert. X. 147 (quoted in Ritter and Preller).

† Virg. Æn. vii. 312. cf. 324, sqq. The aid of even this sinister weapon could only be won by giving a false colour to the service on which it was engaged. Common sense was ready enough to prove that objects exist outside our bodies (and who denies it?) but it would be the first to laugh at the idea of their existing beyond our minds.

tossing of its former glorious career, falls asleep in the lazy Lotos land of Custom and of Common Sense.* The only hope of its reawakening from this narcotic slumber, lies in the horrible clang and jarring discord of custom ever clashing against custom; for prejudices agree with other lying witnesses in this point also, that even when they try to support each other's story and frame a consistent fable, "not even so do their witnesses agree together." Thus they happily prepare their own ruin, for "if Beelzebub be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand?"

Admitting then, as we have already done, the existence of an approving faculty, whereby Good and Evil are distinguished, and being prepared to receive its dicta with respect, let us proceed to analyse its nature and composition, and to test more strictly the method of its derivation. We propose to treat the Moral Sense as Berkeley treated the sense of sight, and as other inquirers have treated the other senses. Let us therefore help ourselves by the analogy of their discoveries in interpreting the omens which meet us at the outset of our journey.

If I ask a man who addresses me in the street how he knew that I was by his side, he answers, 'by the evidence of my eyes.' If one had asked a Greek or Roman how he knew that the sun went daily round the earth, he would have given the same answer; yet one conclusion we affirm to be true and the other false. Again no two men would make exactly the same guess about the distance of a remote object in a landscape; their agreement would only be approximate, within certain limits. Hence it is evident that neither the perception of an external fact, nor the perception of distance can be given us directly by consciousness, but must be the result of a comparison, uncertain and often erroneous, between the present phenomenon and previous experience. Hence the direct testimony of the sense of vision is shewn to be much narrower than

* The song of English philosophy on the death of Hume was a parody of that of Tennyson's Lotos Eaters. The reader's ingenuity will fill out the details.

is generally supposed, and to owe its apparent comprehensiveness to the assimilation of a number of unconscious inferences and trains of reasoning.* Now exactly the same external signs of resolvability are given by the Moral Sense.

No two men would give exactly the same moral verdict on an action or character submitted to their judgment; their agreement would be at most confined to general outlines and principles. The Greeks would have despised the unpretending virtue of the honest merchant or banker, and the plodding industry of the unartistic artisan, as qualities laudable only in the slave to whom nature had refused her higher gifts;† while we in turn refuse our highest praise to the wiles of Ulysses, or the pious revenge of Orestes; and decline to place our ideal of perfection in the strutting gait and overbearing pompousness of the μεγαλόψυχος.‡ Hence we may conclude that the perception of good, like that of distance, must be derivative not primary, and therefore liable to like confusions and miscalculations. This however is as yet but a rough conjecture, a 'vindemiatio prima' which awaits confirmation, and must be rendered more definite. To determine what is, as well as what is not, the ultimate material of moral consciousness, we must descend a little more deeply into psychology. Having there-

* This discovery was made long before the time of Berkeley, by Aristotle, who in the De Anima, see note to page (29) above, applies it, though in a vague form, not only to the sense of sight, but to all the senses. "ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθὴς,"—in φαντασία is the source of error, that is in the trains of secondary states of consciousness by which the mind recals past experience.

† See Aristotle's discussion on the virtues of slaves (if indeed they can be said to have any) Pol. I. xiii. 2. Plato even refuses the name of virtue to the temperance and justice of the ordinary citizen, which is the mere product of training and education, "ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ." 'Such temperance is merely another 'name for intemperance; such courage is really cowardice, a choosing of the less 'dreaded form of danger':—and neither can fit its possessor for any greater reward in a future life, than that of transformation into the shape "ἤ που μελίττων ἢ σφήκων," or of some such tame and harmless creatures. 'Philosophy alone is true virtue, and deserves the reward of immortality.'

‡ Arist. Eth. IV. iii. 34. The whole chapter is instructive as giving a life-like picture of the Greek ideal. Compare the Christian Model, in 1 Cor. xiii.

fore consulted the auspices and found propitious omens, let us proceed with confidence upon our journey.

All Life depends upon adaptation of an organism to external media;* and by the extent and completeness of this adaptation the degree of Life in the scale of evolution is determined. In the lowest animals organization is hardly at all developed, for they consist of little more than a homogeneous mass of animal tissue.† Their medium too, by which we mean the whole sphere of external phenomena by which they are affected, is very limited, and presents very few changes. Hence their life is exceedingly monotonous:—motion from place to place being impossible owing to their deficient organization. Thus we see how by reason of this complete homogeneity of their tissue and correspondence, their subjective existence, or consciousness, must be very uniform in nature, admitting only of difference of degree, according to the more or less successful adaptation of their tissue to the conditions of their life. This primary consciousness is, as we have seen, represented by the words pleasure and pain; and the consciousness of these lowest animals can be nothing but a slow succession of very gradually changing phases of pleasure and pain, each of which continually fades insensibly into the next. These primordial sensations, (for so we must call them for want of a better word,) can neither be localized nor even compared with others previously

* See Paley, Nat. Theol. ch. xvii. On this fact depends the usual argument to prove the existence of God from design, or final 'causes:'—the whole strength of which is produced by a mere verbal sleight of tongue; by calling an effect a cause. Any combination of laws would produce its own proper results—hence under any constitution of the universe, good or bad, possible or impossible, as it may seem to us, it would always be true that "whatever is, is right." To give an instance—the particular laws of our present universe bring about night, they also cause the phenomenon sleep in animated creatures: these two naturally suit each other, being different results of the same laws—just as any two propositions in Euclid agree together. But to say that either is the final cause of the other is to transfer an idea derived from one part of ourselves, our motives to action, to an entirely different part of ourselves, our primary laws of sensation. The earth is suited to its inhabitants because it has produced them, and only such as suit it live.

† See Mr. Spencer's account of the Amœba. Psychology, Pt. III. ch. viii.

felt, for comparison implies not only definiteness of change, but in its proper sense, change of kind as well as of degree. Owing also to the great monotony and homogeneity of their life the associative property has no opportunity of coming into play, and hence the fundamental requisites for comparison or perception are wanting. Their sensations therefore are not perceived, or known, they are only felt. They are merely vague and indefinite states of consciousness;* the rudiments of sensation, yet underlying all the later developed individual sensations: for, as we have seen, sense is in its origin one and homogeneous, and the state of consciousness which is the internal expression of this primordial sense is merely that of pleasure and pain,† the difference of the two being in degree only.

In our present developed constitution we can hardly form to ourselves an idea of this primordial sensation. The nearest resemblance to it lies in our organic feeling, which like it is a

* This word is sometimes otherwise used to express perception, or knowledge as distinct from sensation (as for instance by Mr. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 615), and we shall often have to use it in that sense ourselves. But in its natural sense it means the material out of which perception is made; the whole subjective existence. All that we want to insist upon here is the existence of such a subjectivity (or rather of its phenomena); a δεκτικὸν εἰδῶν ἄνευ ὑλῆς, (Vid. Arist. De An. II. xii. 1) anterior to perception, which though not self-conscious is undoubtedly conscious, as much as is the feeling of uneasiness arising from indigestion, the consciousness of which is often painfully real without its nature being perceived. In the succeeding discussion we use the word consciousness where we ought properly to speak only of its *phenomena*, which are all that we know of it. The primordial sense might perhaps more accurately be called irritability, but for clearness of explanation it is better to use the ordinary language. When the results are attained we may translate them into their proper expression, and so attain perfect accuracy of language as well as thought. See below, p. 50, and Note to p. 52.

† That pleasure and pain are the immediate results of the μία πᾶσιν αἴσθησις produced by the addition of consciousness to an organized body is asserted by Plato, Tim. 42 A. The Stoics held the same doctrine according to Gellius, (Noct. Att. xii. 5). "His primis sensibus doloris voluptatisque ante consilii et rationis exortum recens natus homo imbutus est." Others however held this sensation to be an ἐπιγέννημα. That pleasure is the fundamental fact of sensibility is held by Cabanis, (Rapports, II. § vi.) who says, "On ne peut concevoir sans plaisir et douleur la nature animale; leurs phénomènes étant essentiels à la sensibilité comme ceux de la gravitation et d'equilibre aux mouvements des grandes masses de l'univers."

general sensibility without any organs for discrimination or comparison.* In the cœnæsthesis too, or glow of health, in the vague sense of uneasiness and restlessness caused by disorder of the vital functions, and (more distantly) in the anomalous forms of emotion which even in ourselves we are unable to identify or recognize, we may still see a remnant of that which in the lowest grade of life forms the whole subjective existence. This primordial sensation, though the material of which all the later feelings and faculties are formed,† is originally merely the rough block ready for the artificer's tools: the later distinctions of touch and sight and smell being here an anachronism.‡ The inner life is as homogeneous as the outer of which it is the obverse.

* Maudsley, p. 120. Emotion too in general, as compared with perception or reasoning, gives us a certain vague conception of what must be the nature of its undeveloped forms.

† That we may have feeling without either pleasure or pain is held by Mr. Bain, (Mental and Moral Science, p. 217); and he quotes surprise as a familiar instance of a feeling which involves only excitement, and may be either pleasurable or painful or completely indifferent. The explanation of this will be evident when we see that all the emotions, of which surprise is one, are different agglomerations of associated pleasures and pains; and that therefore the character of the result depends on the relative proportion of the ingredients. If the two sides are completely balanced, indifference is the ultimate result: yet owing to the retentiveness and excitability of tissue, a cancelled pleasure or pain is not equivalent to the absence of either; but a state of excitement or agitation in itself painful is left behind as the result of the conflict, and this state varies in intensity and duration according to the organic constitution of the individual. There are some men who are never surprised at anything, in others great nervous excitement is caused by the least occurrence which differs from the ordinary routine of life. The case of perception is considered below;—but we may remark that even in its most modified form no act of the intellect is purely devoid of emotion. We can never think of form completely apart from its material presentation. "Gleichgültig ist die Seele nur gegan das, woran sie nicht denkt; nur gegen ein Ding das für sie kein Ding ist." Lessing, Emilia Galotti, iv. 3.

‡ The early state of man, before he was endowed with perception, is described by Prometheus:

"οἳ πρῶτα μὲν βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην,
"κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ' ὀνειράτων
"ἀλίγκιοι μορφαῖσι τὸν μακρὸν χρόνον
"ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα."—Prom. Vinc. 447, sqq.

Their senses were useless to them because they had no γνώμη (v. 457) and so

Let us now notice what takes place, when, in the process of evolution, (with the origin of which we are not here concerned), this primordial sense becomes heterogeneous, and its various divisions become localized in different parts of the tissue; thus producing a more complicated organism, and an amplification of the medium to which that organism has to adapt itself. In the first place the changes from one state of consciousness to another are greatly increased in number, rapidity, and definiteness. Secondly, the differences among these states are no longer of degree only, but are of that nature which, in speaking of the external forces on the distinctions of which those of the senses are modelled, we call differences of kind (whatever may be in reality the meaning of that use of the phrase). These differences are proportional not only to the heterogeneity of the special organs of sense, but on the progress of development, to the heterogeneity also of the various impressions derived from each. There are not only the broad divisions of sound, sight, and smell, but into each of these are introduced further variations of pitch or timbre, of colour or pungency. In dealing with this varied chaos of sensation, two properties of animal tissue come into play which had before little opportunity of shewing themselves. The first of these is a property, common in various degrees to all matter, that of Retentiveness, whereby impressions made upon the tissue remain for some time after their cause has ceased. This is the rudiment of Memory, which in this its earliest stage is a property diffused through the whole organic tissue, and not yet gathered into a central consciousness and combined with many other derived products such as it is in our later experience of it.* The second is the

no τέκμαρ of different objects. Prometheus remedied this by making them "ἔννους καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους," and by giving them "μνήμην ἁπάντων μουσομήτορ' ἰργάτιν"—whereby comparison and so knowledge were made possible. Doubtless objectively speaking the earliest sense is a kind of touch, (Arist. de An. II. iii. 2, Cabanis, Rapports, III. § vi, Campanella, De Sensu Rerum, II. xii,) but it is not *known* as such. It is not *known* at all, but it is *felt* as pleasure or pain.

* Thus Aristotle calls it a "μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος"—and Plato "σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως."—(Phileb. 34 A).

property of acquiring Habits which animal tissue possesses in common with some inanimate objects. By this property states of consciousness tend to follow each other in the order in which they have followed each other before, that is in the order in which the phenomena which they represent follow each other in nature. This is the origin of the Laws of Association* which underlie Logic and Psychology, and thus we see inci-

It is true, however, that even in the highest development the organ of each sense has a memory of its own apart from the central consciousness (v. Cabanis, Rapports, III. § vi.) Its existence in the eye has been turned to account in producing an amusing game, and may be daily tested by the image of light which remains long in the field of vision after looking at the sun: similarly a buzzing in the ear follows a loud explosion, an intense sensation being always retained longer, and more vividly than a weak one. The same property of tissue may be remarked in the permanent effects of smallpox and the scars of wounds. It is in fact merely a mode of what is erroneously called the vis inertiæ of matter. But to memory, such as we understand it as a definite faculty, many new ingredients are necessary, which are the products of Perception and Association. In the first place an advanced perception of time is implied—and in the second place a reference to self, which involves perception of the difference between the primary and secondary states of consciousness. Hence the account given of memory by Mr. Spencer (Psych. Pt. IV. ch. 6.) is imperfect. Memory is a very different thing from nascent idea, for nascent idea is not necessarily connected with anything in the past. This is shewn by the fact that we often have an idea which we are unable to connect with the past, even though we try to do so:—we fail to *remember* where or when we have met with it before. It is in these elements of time and of the perception of personal identity that the most important part of *our* memory consists—and they are so complex that they are probably confined to the highest animals, if not to man alone. Without them memory becomes mere imagination. Reason too involves something more than the mere sequence of ideas—it involves the recognition and conscious classification both of the ideas themselves and of the relation between them. It has in it an element of memory. Nay even for imagination Mr. Spencer does not properly account: for though here only the idea, not the sequence is noticed, yet the idea is *perceived* or classed, which involves reference to the past. What Mr. Spencer really accounts for is the genesis of emotion or feeling. It is true that Emotion, Imagination, Reason, and Memory, all come originally from association, which is the formative power of the whole mind; but they are separated from the common trunk at different stages, and in so far as there is any difference of meaning between the words that difference is due to the introduction of elements which Mr. Spencer does not consider. The axioms of mathematics are the common root of the science, but to say that in them we trace the beginnings of the Binomial Theorem and Taylor's series, would be untrue except so far as these are the same thing. In Retentiveness lies, as we have said, the rudiment of memory, but it is not called memory till after considerable development by association.

* See Appendix 2 on the Laws of Association. Cf. Mr. Spencer's Psych. Pt. IV,

dentally how the Laws of Reasoning being originally derived from the Laws of Nature must always be tested and corrected by the latter.*

Finally, we must observe that the Law of Evolution, which on one side expresses a growing complexity of organs, has another side inseparable from the first, which implies a growing organization or individualization of these multiform members.† By this the nervous and sensory system becomes not only more heterogeneous as we rise in the scale of life, but has a constant tendency to organization or unification. The scattered nerves become first united into various ganglia, these again into ganlionic centres or bundles of ganglia, these again finally in the highest animals into one principal centre localized in the brain.‡ By the operation of this law common meeting places of impressions are soon formed, which serve as clearing-houses and courts of register, where each department has a representative, to which its communications are sent. Hence it becomes possible

ch. iii. He does not, however, see the real nature of the property, or trace its origin. Cf. also Spinosa, Ethica II, 7, 18; III, 14; V, 11, 13.

* Cf. Bacon de Aug. Bk. I, (Vol. i. p. 455 of his collected works): "veritas essendi et cognoscendi idem sunt; nec plus a se invicem differunt, quam radius directus et refluens." So also we see how it is that each man is the reflex of his particular age and surroundings, and must be judged accordingly. Maudsley, p. 143.

† These results of the Law of Evolution are two sides of the same fact. One depends on the tendency to separation between parts whose conditions of life are different: the other on the tendency to union between parts whose conditions of life are similar or identical. By the first, each of the external forces (such as light, sound, and motion) separates the particular portions of the tissue on which it operates from the rest: by the second, these similarly affected portions tend to unite into a definite organ, which retaining its communication with the rest, but concentrating it in one fixed channel, develops a nervous system. Hence we can picture to ourselves an outline of connection between the law of evolution and the chemical and physical properties of matter, an outline which remains to be filled up by future research. But we agreed to be content if we could ascend only to the data of Physiology:—and at any rate the law of evolution stands on as strong a basis as that of heat or light or chemical union.

‡ The brain of many of the lower animals, even where the senses are discrete, consists only of sensory ganglia without hemispheres. But there is a continual tendency to organization which soon appears in a developed brain; a sensorium commune being added to the spinal chord.

to compare different sensations with each other,* and by means of Association to class together those of the same kind, and so to arrive at what we call Perception or Knowledge.† When we say we know an object, we merely mean that we assign it to a class already formed of those objects similar to it which we have already experienced. Now the first step necessary to this process, is to arrive at the perception of similarity or likeness: and this result is attained as follows. By the retentive property two different impressions are for a short time united, and a consciousness of change or of unlikeness results: but two equal changes destroy each other's effect, and so give the notion of resemblance or equality, which is perfected by the power of reversing the operation.‡ This is especially possible in the case of the bundle of similar sensations, which soon becomes associated with the same action.§ These, occurring continually together, are soon perceived to be similar, and other sensations of like nature may then be observed to be like these, and so referred to a class, or *perceived.*

At first only the most obvious resemblances are noticed,‖ but as experience progresses, wider and wider classes ever tend to be formed, till at last we arrive at those highest ideas which are

* Cf. Arist. Post. An. II. 19. *ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐγγίγνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται· ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίγνεται οὔκ ἐστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔνεστι μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψύχῃ, κ. τ. λ.* Hence the phenomena of perception, or of Psychology in its narrower sense are in the highest animals a series only; while those of sensibility or Physiology are changes both simultaneous and successive. See Spencer's Psych. Pt. IV. ch. 1.

† Cf. Cabanis, Rapports, III. vi. "La perception se fait au même lieu que la comparaison; or, le siège de la comparaison est bien évidemment le centre commun des nerfs, auquel se rapportent les sensations comparées."

‡ This is the account given by Mr. Spencer (Psych. Pt. II. ch. xxiii.) and seems attested by facts.

§ See Appendix 2 on the Laws of Association. Opposite and equal changes are, however, being continually brought before the consciousness in other ways than in this.

‖ On the Fundamental Perception of Time, Motion, and Space see Appendix 3.

coextensive with experience. These though the last in order of birth become the starting points of science;—just as men formed the idea of stones falling long before they discovered the law of attraction, yet by that law they afterwards 'explain' the former fact. Thus we trace the whole of Perception or Knowledge to this power of comparison and noting likenesses, and this we see to be coincident with the organization of consciousness into central meeting places or ganglia, in which different sensations are presented to a common tribunal and so compared together. We see therefore that Perception does not originate Consciousness; it only organizes and develops it. We therefore cannot agree with Mr. Herbert Spencer, who will not allow consciousness to the lowest animals, but tries to shew how it must necessarily spring from the growing complexity of correspondence between the organism and its medium, and the consequent need of a central comparing faculty.* As this is an important question we must examine it a little more closely.

Mr. Spencer is here doubtless using the ordinary phraseology which speaks of a consciousness existing in others similar to that which we know only in ourselves,—and transfers the processes and ideas of the latter to the former. For if he takes consciousness in its strictest meaning, as nothing more than the phenomena by which it is manifested to us, these phenomena must be resolvable into others before them, and there must be at any rate the elements of consciousness in inanimate matter. In this case the truth of what we wish to shew is self-evident, as a corollary of the principle of the Persistence of Force. But if (as is doubtless the fact) he does associate actual consciousness with its phenomena, we shall see that this does not help him, for consciousness is the ultimate idea and so perfectly

* It may be answered that Mr. Spencer only differs from us in his use of the word consciousness, which he confines to the meaning of Perception or Knowledge. But not only would this be an artificial sense of the word, as we have seen, but it is not that in which he uses it, for he recognizes a consciousness of sensation as well as of perception—deriving, in fact, the former from the latter (See App. 1.)

inexplicable.* For supposing then, as Mr. Spencer supposes, an actual consciousness external to our own, its essence, according to him, consists in change or succession. Of what? Of states of consciousness; can be the only answer. Then consciousness exists already. For that any change or succession among unconscious states can produce consciousness is inconceivable, and therefore by his own standard untrue: and it is a Hibernicism not of expression but of thought, when he says: "a uniform state of consciousness is in reality no consciousness; when the changes in consciousness cease, consciousness ceases."† Even he himself elsewhere‡ recognizes "a raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give definite forms;" but this unconditioned consciousness he curiously identifies with a consciousness of the unconditioned, the raw material with a product so exquisite and immaterial as to soar far above the solid and substantial facts which are the prison house of ordinary minds, and only to reveal itself at rare intervals 'in dim religious light' to those etherial spirits who have abjured the stubborn world of reality to seek for enchantments like Balaam and look for visions in the opened heavens.§

But even on Mr. Spencer's hypothesis that change is necessary to consciousness, no animal is totally devoid of change:—growth, development, and decay are in themselves changes, nor can the surrounding medium ever be completely homogeneous. Hence even according to Mr. Spencer's theory it would be impossible ever to draw a distinct line below which consciousness ends,—for every shade of organization is passed through from the lowest to the highest. Nay, if complexity of organization

* Cf. Leibnitz, Monadologie, § 17. Cabanis, Rapports, II. § 8 (consciousness is as inexplicable as attraction).

† Psychology, Pt. II. ch. xxv.

‡ First Principles, § 26.

§ See Appendix 1 on Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute. He confuses two meanings of unconditioned, a state of consciousness unrelated to another, or sensation as distinct from perception; and an absolute something (or rather nothing) not relative to us at all.

and correspondence be its only conditions, many plants must also be conscious.

Mr. Spencer's error seems to have arisen from his not sufficiently distinguishing Sensation and Perception, on which head his theory is inconsistent with itself. Perception, being as we have seen resolvable into consciousness of change, is of course impossible without change: but in the case of ordinary sensation, the stronger and more overpowering it is, the less is the chance of change, and so a strong sensation banishes perception altogether. But according to Mr. Spencer, sensation is a predominant perception: "when some one state of consciousness by its continuous recurrence greatly predominates over others, then there arises what we distinguish as a sensation."* Sensation therefore he holds to be subsequent, not anterior to Perception. But from this follows a very curious conclusion, as will be evident if we compare the two following passages. Talking of 'sensation,' he says, "In proportion as a state is greatly elongated,—in proportion as it occupies consciousness for a long time, in the same proportion does it become a distinct feeling."† Again, a little previously, on the subject of consciousness, he says, "Just in proportion as the variety and rapidity of the changes to which the common centre of communication is subject increase, just in this proportion must there arise a consciousness."‡ Hence, since the consciousness of sensation is, according to Mr. Spencer, the same as that of perception, the more feeling the less it is felt, and feeling altogether tends to abolish consciousness! The truth really is, as we have seen, that perception is not anterior to, but a development of sensation; the latter is simple, and ultimate, and uncompounded; the former implies relation, and is therefore complex. We feel pleasures and pains such as those of exercise or disease, but we perceive an individual noise, or smell or sight. In the one case we are simply conscious; in the other we are consciously conscious, we know what it is that we are

* First Principles, § 198. † ib. § 199. ‡ ib. § 170.

conscious of, or in other words we class or associate our present state of consciousness with others that have preceded. Finally, we may repeat that no change in anything unconscious can produce consciousness, because consciousness is entirely sui generis; it is the matter of all our knowledge, and no manipulation of form can produce matter. It is impossible that we can ever explain it, because we know and are nothing else. It is the one ultimate existence of which the rest are merely phases, the glass through which we see the universe. For in the inaccurate but powerful words of Shelley, consciousness or

> "Life like a dome of many coloured glass
> "Stains the white radiance of eternity
> "Until Death tramples it to fragments."

Mind, therefore, or consciousness can never be resolvable into changes of tissue, but must be considered as an invariable property of animal life,* and ultimately, in its elements, of the material universe.† Just as mechanical combination can never create force, but only organize that already obtainable; so a nervous system can never generate consciousness, but only direct its course and point of application. Whatever meaning we give to the phrases external world and external consciousness, consciousness is as much an ultimate property of that

* Thus Aristotle held *αἴσθησις* to be the necessary differentia of *ζῶον*—de Sensu, i. 1, de An. iii. 12. He describes well the elementary consciousness as *τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὑλῆς*. Perception as distinct from consciousness is *αἴσθησις ὅτι αἰσθάνεται*.

† This was the theory of Campanella and Telesius. Mr. Leslie Ellis thinks that it was also held by Lord Bacon. As it is a question of vital importance we have given his opinion and some further discussion of the subject in an Appendix (vid. App. 4.) It does not follow that because consciousness is fundamental, therefore the different kinds of conscious sensation, sight, hearing, smelling, and the like should also be ultimate and inexplicable. The part of these which is irresolvable is their common element consciousness; their differences being due partly to localization, and partly to the variety of the natural forces whereby they are affected, which we have good reason to suppose are heterogeneous, not in material, but only in the mode of its arrangement. The primordial sense must be considered as a vague mixture of all of these, but being alone it can not be compared with any other and so known.

material universe as attraction. We cannot even conceive matter and consciousness apart, for we have had no experience of them except in combination. Having seen therefore that the law of animal development, whereby the primordial homogeneous sensation becomes heterogeneous in correspondence with the variety of external forces, cannot originate consciousness but can only organize it; let us return to our immediate subject and endeavour to trace the psychological development as manifested in the higher animals; remembering that the end of our inquiry is to discover the origin and nature of what is called the Moral Sense.

We have seen that when the primordial sense is broken up so as to reflect the differences of external force, its parts present to the central consciousness different states which are continually supplanting each other, and so are capable of comparison. Hence, a consciousness of change, and then of reversed change or resemblance being produced, classification* becomes possible, and a new element is added to the mental Stock, Perception or Knowledge. This works not only on states of consciousness themselves, but on the changes from one to another, or in other words relations. Thus results, on the one hand, recognition of objects; on the other, argument and

* By classification we here mean *conscious* or *perceptive*, classification, such as is implied in reasoning. This is produced by the addition of a perception of resemblance to the indefinite crowd of similar objects associated with any action. This vague troop of ideas is the rudiment of general idea, but to be rendered conscious and so useful in reasoning, it must be transformed into a class whose members not only are similar, but are seen to be so.

For retention of many of these, and consequently for any intricacy of reasoning, language too or symbolism of some kind is necessary. Hence the distinction which Aristotle makes between bees or any other deaf creatures, and those which can hear so as to be able to make use of audible signs. Met. A. 1, p. 980. Hence too the idea that speech is necessary to thought, the crudeness of which is shewn by the instance of a person congenitally deaf and dumb. Words are signs of one or more particulars, which are in turn signs of the rest of the class; they are not only symbols, but symbols of symbols; hence greatly diminish the labour of thought, which, however, is possible with a less perfect system, though doubtless to a more limited extent. That classification (τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι) is the foundation of Reasoning or Philosophy is shewn also by Plato. (Soph. 253 c.)

reasoning, for the most abstruse reasoning is nothing more than a classification of Relations.

We have now therefore two distinct divisions of Consciousness: *Sensation*, which as before consists only of pleasure and pain, though now of different kinds; and *Perception*,* which classifies states of consciousness and their relations, and is therefore concerned only with change. Knowledge therefore has originally no other object than different pleasures and pains,† but

* It seems probable that Perception is absent in animals that are destitute of the cerebral hemispheres, that is in all below fishes. Reflex action and coordinated action (what Hartley calls 'secondary automatic action'; Theory of Human Mind, p. 32) are, however, possible by the sole agency of the spinal chord (as for instance in somnambulism,) and these are difficult to distinguish from the phenomena of perception. They, however, involve only the actual states of consciousness, not their relations, and so by the nervous telegraph the requisite sequences may be easily effected through associating nerves; but when, as in Reasoning or Perception, the relations or sequences also must be observed and classed, there must be some central court of register where record of previous sequences is left, some common meeting place of the various sensations involved; and this is supplied by the cerebral hemispheres. In other words it is not until we find rudiments of the cerebral hemispheres that we observe the beginnings of reason; up to that point it is all unreasoning instinct. This is strengthened by the fact that the matter of these hemispheres is insensible to physical pain, as is proved by experiments on hens and other animals, which make violent movements while the skin is being cut and the roof of the skull removed, but remain quite quiet while the hemispheres are being sliced away bit by bit. (See Maudsley, p. 51.) Dr. Maudsley gives an interesting account of the subordination of the various nervous centres: the gray matter of the hemispheres giving ideation from a combination of data from the different senses; the gray matter between the decussation of the pyramids and the floors of the lateral ventricles containing the central departments of the different senses: and the gray matter of the spinal chord governing reflex action and the sympathetic ganglia which minister to organic life. Much of this is mere hypothesis and the verification perhaps distant, but what few facts are known by anatomy and experiment confirm the theories suggested by the study of nervous evolution. To our argument here the particular physiological or phrenological hypothesis is unnecessary; it is sufficient that perception is *subsequent* to sensation, and this is quite certain. The distinction is the same as that made by Bichat (Recherches sur la Vie, V. § i.) between 'sentiment' and 'jugement': which is apparently identical with that which he makes elsewhere (ib. VII. § 3) between 'sensibilité organique' and 'animale.'

† "Strictly speaking all conscious psychical states are at first *feelings*; but after they have been experienced several times, they are adequately and definitely organized, and become almost automatic or indifferent under ordinary circumstances." Maudsley, p. 148. (cf. ib. 153). It is true that pleasure and pain is most felt on the

eventually it attends so much to the differences and resemblances that it ceases to remember the pleasure or pain: in its absorption in the relation it well nigh forgets the things related. This process is furthered by the fact that as the medium gets more extended, each part of it has less average effect upon the organism: the primary pleasures and pains being spread over a larger surface are less intense, and so obtrude themselves less. This is exemplified by the common observation that sensation and perception tend to exclude each other. A very violent sensation drives out perception, as on swallowing a hot cup of tea the pain alone fills the consciousness, and we think neither of the tea nor of the part of the body affected. Similarly a very clear perception implies weak sensation; so that when classification is rendered organic by the working of Association, and the Perception of qualities seems immediate, its elemental pleasures disappear entirely from observation. Nevertheless pleasure and pain ever remain indissolubly connected with consciousness, though their presence is often unheeded, and only the more violent forms force themselves on the attention.

What is true of these simple forms of consciousness is true of their later development. The relation of Sensation to Perception is the same as that between the faculties of which these are respectively the germs, Emotion and Intellect. For emotion is associated sensations of pleasure and pain; and intellect is associated perceptions of change and relation.* Hence by their very nature these are at once mutually exclu-

extreme verge of the correspondence, for organization abolishes perception. Yet, "no act of cognition can be absolutely free from emotion." (Spencer's Psych. § 198). The reason of this Mr. Spencer cannot see, because of his mistake about consciousness, which leads him to the theory that emotion and cognition have no real difference. Emotion is in truth no predominant cognition; it is not a cognition at all, though in some cases an organic result of past cognitions.

* We have already noticed that all relations can be reduced to change in sensation. See Spencer's Psych. ch. xxiii. xxiv. xxv. Hence to knowledge memory is necessary, but not to emotion. So transmitted emotions discover themselves in infancy, but knowledges have to be brought out by experience.

sive and inseparable. A strong emotion drives out reason, and much reasoning chills emotion; Passion is the proverbial enemy of prudence, and the most abstract sciences are the least emotional.* Yet we can give *some* reason for any emotion; and we feel *some* emotion in working a mathematical problem. Relations and the related states naturally suggest each other, nay, there is nothing in the relation beyond its two members, the change is merely a short simultaneous consciousness of the two sensations.† In every intentional act it is evident that both are involved; the end being given by emotion, the means by reasoning. Reasoning can give no end, it can only arrange, elicit, suggest; emotion can give no means, for it cannot classify or observe relations. In the building up therefore of any moral faculty, both these elements must take a part. Hence it will be well to trace a little more closely their mode of formation, and their connection with muscular activity.

When in the course of experience a certain sequence of sensations frequently recurs, the consciousness becomes habituated

* As an illustration how an abstract principle like this is capable of practical application, and as an example of the method which must be used in Applied Ethics, I subjoin a few theorems which may be more or less strictly deduced from this principle of exclusion between sensation and perception, leaving the reader to trace the proof in each case for himself. Friendship is often inflamed by anger, but always chilled by gratitude: Hot climates are fruitful of genius, but barren of science: A bleak country is favourable to virtue, a sunny one to religion: Religion has ever an 'irrational' antipathy to science: The mathematician is likely to be a better husband than friend, the poet a better friend than husband: The south is the home of great ideas, the north of their application: Hamlet was 'the Dane,' Othello 'the Moor': A great genius has generally a warm heart, but seldom a 'long' head: The tendency of modern education is to raise the practical importance of women and the intellectual supremacy of men. The reader's ingenuity will suggest to him many similar deductions, the accuracy of which he can always test by comparing them with experience.

† In the phenomena of mental and physical shock caused by unexpected news, or a sudden flash, or a cold immersion, which Mr. Spencer thinks betoken some physiological influence of the actual change (Psych. Pt. II. ch. xix.), there is nothing that cannot be explained as the effect of sudden tension or relaxation of the nerves. A great change has naturally a more violent effect than a gentle one, but change in itself as apart from antecedent and consequent is non-existent and can produce nothing.

to it, and the return of the first sensation is followed by an idea* or associative image of the others. Thus on the presentation of an object to the vision, the sight of it produces a series of associated ideas of the sensations of smell, hearing, or touch that have usually followed, and these being combined together, the whole object is said to be perceived by one of its properties, and thus by a further process of organization we arrive at what seems a direct or intuitive Perception of the external world.† Now it is implied in the division of the primordial sense that every object is specially connected as to pleasure and pain with one of our senses rather than with the rest. Also when an object is perceived by any sense, the sensations which it causes in the other senses are immediately associated, and particularly the state of consciousness connected with that sense with which the object in question is specially connected as to pleasure and pain.

Hence the idea of pleasure and pain not actually felt comes to be associated with objects, which, if placed in certain different positions, would affect us in the way imagined. The dog, for instance, associates a feeling of pleasure with the sight or smell of a piece of meat; and a man with the sound of the dinner bell. Pleasure may thus be associated through a train of ideas of any length; and hence it may be connected with the mere idea of certain objects, for such ideas are only associated sensations, and are capable of associating others with them in their turn. After a time this process becomes organic, the intermediate terms are lost, and pleasure is *directly* connected with sensations and ideas that are in themselves not distinctly pleasurable.

Now by various trains of association, various pleasures and pains are connected with the same object. These different

* Ideas are merely faint pictures, the phantoms (φαντάσματα) or ghosts of sensations: they have nothing in themselves peculiar or distinctive.

† This is the Perception of objects as distinct from Qualities, and implies a further step in the Associative process.

combinations of pleasures and pains, some of which arise before reasoning by unintentional association, but the higher of which are the results of automatization of reasoning, form the different emotions. The latter are therefore merely bundles of different pleasures and pains, bound by a common bond owing to their frequent recurrence in a particular combination; and, as the sum total of pleasure or of pain preponderates, so is the resulting emotion pleasurable or painful. Did time and the nature of our subject permit, we might attempt to verify this conclusion by analysing some of the emotions (as has been partially accomplished by Hume and Spencer*) into their constituent pleasures and pains. We should then find that the emotional part of our nature is in reality, as we have stated, the result of a classification of pleasures, of a combination of the purely sensitive and cognitive elements.† But we must now hasten to consider the relation of sensation to action, for in this relation lies the sphere of the 'Moral Sense;' and in its consideration an incidental confirmation of the truth of the foregoing theory will be presented.‡

Action is in its origin merely the correlative of sensation. Contractility and Irritability are two general properties of vital

* Psych. § 202: Essays, 2nd Series, p. 130. Spinosa also analyses all the affections into pleasure, pain, and desire, which are the primitivi affectus. Ethica III. 11, 59. He did not effect the further resolution of desire into associated pleasure, by which the physical appetite is rendered self-conscious; though he was on the very brink of the truth when he defined it as "conatio in suo esse perseverare." III. 9 Schol.

† Under the emotions we include also the Æsthetic faculties, the excellence of which depends on the close union of sense and intellect. For imagination, standing between reason and emotion, as involving perception of the associated state of Consciousness but not of the particular relation, may be described as emotional reason, or rational emotion. Hence the success of Greek and Mediæval art, which flourished when there was no gap between the facts of nature and sense, and the highest abstractions of the intellect. The hierarchy of angels and saints and the person of Him who was both God and Man did for Mediæval art what the Pantheon of Deities did for Greek, connecting by an unbroken chain their highest and lowest ideas. This is now impossible owing to the great advance of science. See Appendix 5.

‡ See infra, p. 59.

tissue,* or rather are two sides of one fundamental property which is also known under the name Sensibility,—the power of contraction under irritation, or of expressing impressed force. Irritability means merely the phenomena of consciousness, the development of which we have hitherto been tracing, though we have been throughout obliged to express ourselves in the language of the inner, and not of the outer experience. Strictly speaking we know no consciousness but our own, of which all the phenomena of experience are facts: hence in using the words sensation, and perception, and consciousness, we were merely treating of the *phenomena* by which we *infer* or associate their existence, not of any externally existent realities. Our psychological evolution ought, therefore, properly to be treated as a nervous evolution; as a development of irritability rather than of consciousness—and we may now, if we like, translate our successive steps into the proper language. But if this had been done from the beginning, there would have been little chance of making the argument intelligible, owing to the universal use of the phraseology of the inner life.†

From the primordial Irritability therefore are derived the complex *phenomena* of perception, and emotion, and reasoning.

* Mr. Marshall, in his Outlines of Physiology (vol. i. p. 101) supposes three general vital properties,—Contractility, Sensibility, and the Organizing faculty. We have seen reason to think that the last is even a less special property than the others; and in their origin sensibility is not to be distinguished from contractility by which alone it is shewn, and of which it is the obverse. He thinks contractility or vis musculosa peculiar to the muscular tissue (pp. 156—175; see also Kirke's Handbook, 553), and sensation or neurility to the nerves (p. 272), and doubtless after considerable development the two functions are kept in great measure apart, like the senses; but that both contractility and sensibility are inherent in all vital tissue to a certain extent seems true both from a priori conjecture and from experiment. See Bichat, Recherches sur la Vie, VII, § 6 (cf. ib. § 18): and Spencer, Psych. Pt. III, ch. viii. Also Bain, Senses and Intellect, 258, sqq.

† See note to page 34. The hypothesis has entered not into our thought or argument, but only into our language: except for a short time when we intentionally assumed it to combat an argument based upon it. Anybody who likes to take the trouble can translate without difficulty our arguments into the language of phenomena. See Appendix 4.

This internal development we have already examined, we must now turn to the obverse external development which takes its origin in Contractility.

The connection between these two fundamental properties is exceedingly intimate, that of ultimate identity or at any rate inseparability. For not only is contraction universally the result of Irritation, but the only evidence that we have of Irritation is the Contraction which follows, and in their early stages the two represent one and the same process. When, however, the expression in action of force impressed in sensation becomes indirect and mediate, the name of irritability is given to the *immediate* internal results of its impression, while contractility expresses the action *ultimately* expressed. Hence the seat of irritability is pre-eminently the nervous system, while contractility or the vis musculosa is the name of the special property of the muscular tissue.

Considering them however in their origin, they together represent a certain form of the transmission of force. The force impressed on the organism by the medium is transmitted in a converted form by means of contraction; as in all the other cases where the various natural forces are modified and interchanged. That the particular mode of transmission is determined by the chemical or electrical properties of tissue there can be little doubt, though physiological science is not sufficiently advanced to determine the exact derivation.* Each

* Cabanis in his Lettre sur les Causes Premières, and in several places in the Rapports, suggests the derivation of the elective attraction and repulsion whereby the sensibility manifests itself (which is the foundation of what we call design) from the "elective affinities" of chemistry; which in turn he connects with the simple attraction of matter. (See Appendix 4.) It is also the condition of life: tissue which did not manifest it would die, and the higher the grade of life the higher the degree of electiveness required. Mr. Spencer also (Psych. Pt. III. ch. viii. pp. 395, sqq. cf. Pt. IV. ch. iv.) gives facts which tend not only to derive all the senses from that of touch, (cf. Cabanis, Rapports, III. § 6), but to connect that with the oxidation and assimilation of nutritive matter. If we look at the later development of sensibility in the nervous and muscular system, it seems doubtful whether we should refer its results to chemical or electrical phenomena. Perhaps the identity of these two kinds of force may be here determined as common deriva-

particular impressed force determines the nature of its accompanying contraction. Some kinds of impressed force are followed by movements of retraction and withdrawal, others by such as secure a continuance of the impression. These two kinds of contraction are the phenomena and external marks of pain and pleasure respectively. Hence the tissue acts so as to secure pleasure and avoid pain by a law as truly physical and natural as that whereby a needle turns to the pole, or a tree to the light.* Pleasure is only a name for the force which produces the second kind of movements, and pain for that which produces the first kind; avoidance therefore is the criterion of pain, and appetition of pleasure. Continuance under the impression of the first, or withdrawal from the second kind of force, is contrary to the nature or function of tissue, and hence we see the truth of our original definition of pleasure and pain which only apparently differs from our present point of view by being expressed in the ordinary language, whereby state of consciousness is substituted for phenomena of consciousness.†

tives from the fundamental attraction. Action of a nerve diminishes its proper electrical current, the needle of a galvanometer exhibiting a negative variation. (Maudsley, 433, 447 sqq.) Pflüger's experiments by passing a galvanic current through nerves, though giving little information, are at least interesting: and there seems a certain resemblance between the effects of excitation and the results of electrolysis. (cf. Cabanis, Rapports, VI. § 3, 4: and X. ii. § 6.) It must be remembered that we are here speaking of the *phenomena* of sensibility only; of the subjective consciousness we know nothing directly, and can give no separate account: and both Cabanis and Mr. Spencer fall into grave error when they confuse the two sides.

* Mr. Bain describes revulsion from pain as a fundamental property of mind. (Senses and Intellect, 293-298: Mental and Moral Science, IV. i. 8; iv. 1); and if this is so, surely non-avoidance of pleasure is implied also as equally "in the depths of our constitution," without needing any volitional explanation. (cf. Maudsley, p. 157.) The striving after a pleasing impression or the effort to avoid a painful one is at bottom a physical consequence of the nature of the ganglionic cell in its relation to a certain stimulus. Compare also the phenomena of the sensitive plant: and the affinities of acids and alkalis. Spinosa arrives at the same result from a priori reasoning. Ethica iv, 19: iii, 28: iv, 22. See too Boethius, Cons. Phil. iii. Pr. 11.

† If it be objected that by altering state into phenomena we destroy the force of our argument, which depended on the proof that good like pleasure was a *state* of consciousness, we answer that if the word phenomena be properly understood, as

If the law which is stated above, that certain forces cause contractions of revulsion, ending in their discontinuance, and certain others movements of appetition, causing their continuance, be translated into this ordinary subjective language, it takes the following form, that action aims at pleasure and avoids pain. Hence the law of Self Conservation, or of the direction of Action, is merely another mode of expressing the fundamental property of animal tissue, which we have every reason to believe is derived from the more elementary physical properties of matter.* The course of Action is just as dependent on physical laws as that of a stone which falls to the ground. The belief in external consciousness makes no difference either way; the earliest phenomena of such consciousness are those of pleasure

including *possible* as well as actual sensations the difficulty disappears: for our reasoning is equally good whether we say that the end of action is the consciousness of pleasure, or the *internal* physiological state *immediately* following the impression of those forces which *ultimately* result in contractions of appetition: Moreover, to each individual this internal state has a subjective side as a state of conscious pleasure, (though he cannot be conscious that it has so to any other) and all a priori reasoning such as formed our First Part must appeal to this side. Again though Natural Science treats only of phenomena, each individual, who is himself only a phenomenon to science, translates its conclusions into the language of his own subjectivity, which is more intelligible to him; and science is accustomed in its explanations to do this for him. We shall therefore continue as before to speak of consciousness and pleasure instead of their phenomena, hoping that our language will not be misunderstood. If we see that the premises are accurately translated, and the argument good, the conclusions must be as true, as if the whole reasoning were strictly and fully worded: just as in Algebra or the Infinitesimal Calculus we often make substitutions for shortness and clearness in the working, resubstituting in the result the original values. Similarly here, though for each man's self, and consequently for practical purposes, the conclusions expressed in the subjective language are strictly true; yet if he wants to apply them to others, or attain scientific generality he must retranslate them into the phenomenal language.

* This 'affinitive' element in nature lies very deep, and passes by insensible gradations into mere physical attraction. It was this that Empedocles meant when he made Love and Hatred the two physical agents in the evolution of the universe. It is this Love which poets tell us is mingled with the elements of things, and sits enthroned above the world:

"φοιτᾷ δ' ἀν' αἰθέρ', ἔστι δ' ἐν θαλασσίᾳ
"κλύδωνι Κύπρις, πάντα δ' ἐκ ταύτης ἔφυ."—Eur. Hipp. 447.

It is this universal mother that Phædrus and Eryximachus glorify in the Symposium as coeval with the world, (cf. the passage quoted there from Hesiod), and inherent in the very essence of the universe.

and pain, therefore we can suppose it to exist only as pleasure and pain. In the one case we say that action aims at, or naturally results in, the phenomena of pleasure; in the other case that it aims at the actual consciousness of pleasure.

The expression of impressed force, or the connection of Action and Sensation is at first in the unorganized tissue direct and immediate, without the agency of nervous communication, or to return again to the ordinary psychological language, is unintentional or involuntary. Its hindrance produces pain, and this early attraction or appetite may be imagined to a certain extent when we consider the vague longing after something undefined which we see not only in the infant, but in ourselves, when any of the vital organs is in a morbid state.* Its completion constitutes the correspondence between the organism and medium, as we see in the cases of Reflex Action which fall under our observation. These actions depend on no motive and need no association; they are the direct result of the simplest physical properties of animal tissue.

The earliest modification is due to association, whereby secondary sensations, or (as they are called later when they become perceived) ideas, are produced. These manifest themselves as weaker repetitions of the primary pleasures and pains, and therefore are naturally followed by like results. If a particular sensation is expressed in a certain action, the idea† of that sensation is naturally expressed in a less violent form of the same action; just as the addition of a weak acid to a carbonate causes less effervescence than a strong one. The process is this:—the force originally impressed by the first sensation, instead of being all expressed in action, is partly induced by habituation into an internal channel, and so transformed into the kind of force which generally impresses the second kind of sensation, and this now produces its appropriate

* It is always in the phenomena of our vegetative life that we must look for illustrations of the early stages of animal evolution.

† Extending the meaning of idea to include secondary states of consciousness which though felt are *unperceived*.

action. Hence part of the original force has undergone two transformations instead of one; the immediate antecedent of action being the force produced by association, or in other words the associated pleasure. This is the rudiment of *motive*, which however is not generally called by that name till it is *perceived*. The same process may go on through two or more links of association; the first transformed force being again transformed internally instead of expressed, and the second again in its turn, until eventually a transformation is reached which finds its easiest way of escape in action; the immediate motive power being that transformation of force, or that associated pleasure, which immediately precedes the action. Actions of this kind constitute the lower phenomena of Instinct; and we see therefore that they may depend on any number of links of unperceived, or as we say 'unconscious' reasoning; and that their motive is also 'unconscious.' These actions stand half way between Reflex and Voluntary actions.

Now let us examine what results when perception of change or resemblance is added, and so Reasoning becomes possible. As we saw before, the sight of an object pleasant to taste associates with it the pleasurable taste: this, in turn, associates with itself the states of consciousness by which it has been attained, and the last of these results in its appropriate action. But instead of these states of consciousness following upon one another without perception of any, each becomes the centre of a minor series of radiating associations, by means of which each in its turn is perceived as an idea of a certain action.*

This under current of association must ever be subservient to the main stream, or the force is dissipated internally, and little or none is left to be expressed. 'Thinking too precisely'

* Ideas of Action are of course nothing but ideas of Sensation, for we know Action only by Sensation: we may call them ideas of Expressed Sensation. If the force which produces them is not carried on further by associative connection, it expresses itself in actual contraction. This is effected by its producing by association, conscious or organic, the state of *impressed* consciousness which usually precedes it, in sufficient vehemence to excite the accompanying contraction.

ever dwarfs action, which is thus "sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought."* The man of contemplation is rarely also a man of active vigour. When at last the train of association comes to a stop, the transmitted force takes the shape into which it is last transformed, and is expressed in actual muscular contraction. These actions are comprehended in the higher forms of Instinct, where each successive link in the train of thought is perceived, but not the connection between them.

We now come to the third and last development of associated action. Here not only is each associated idea perceived, but the change in each case is also a fresh centre of association, whereby similar changes are connected with it, and it is referred to a class. Hence the whole train is perceived not only by the classification of each of its parts with similar previous sensations, but by the classification of each of its sequences with previous like sequences: in other words it is now a chain of reasoning from the past to the present. That associated pleasure from which this reasoned train commences, is now called the *motive* (though really the immediate motive power lies in the *last* transformation which directly precedes the active expression) and the series of ideas intervening between this and the Action is called the *Means*. Hence the motive associates the means, and the motive power is transmitted through them till it is finally expressed in the Action which is appropriate to the attainment of the pleasurable state whose idea is its source.† This association of means with ends, is at first sight opposed to the natural direction which is from antecedent to consequent; but when a line of nervous connection is formed, a current may be transmitted indifferently in either direction. An effect may lead us to think of its cause, as easily as a cause associates its effect. By the sequence of action and sensation a connection is established between their ideas, which is inde-

* Cf. Lessing, Miss Sara Sampson, iv. 9. "Es wäre wenig in der welt unternommen worden wenn man immer auf den Ausgang gesehen hätte."

† This agrees with Aristotle's analysis of voluntary action. Eth. III. iii. 11.

pendent of the order of excitation. This last kind of action is that which we call voluntary; and the series of classified ideas and relations which lead to it is called Reasoning. If at any point the current is attracted in two or more directions by different trains of association, Deliberation is the result; and the eventual victory of one, and the consequent transmission of the force along it is entitled Will.*

We have therefore distinguished four kinds of Action: Reflex action, which is purely physical and independent of association, and which is the last link in all the derived varieties:—Lower Instinctive action, which is caused by the first introduction of Association, and is hardly to be distinguished in its phenomena from the last; though including a further element of 'design:'—† Higher Instinctive action, which involves Perception of qualities or objects, and of which we may see an example in the manœuvres of a cat catching a bird; and finally Voluntary or Intentional action, such as we find it in man, involving a perception not only of objects but of relations, or the power of reasoning. Though we have separated these classes from each other for clearness of description, there is no distinct line to be drawn anywhere between them. Each fades insensibly into the next. There can be little power of association anterior to Perception, for the consciousness of resemblance implies nothing more than definite change, and until the changes in consciousness are definite, association can scarcely have much effect. The perception too of changes, or the consciousness of relations among relations, must follow closely on the perception of qualities, or the consciousness of relations among states of consciousness. Hence between the first and the last kinds of action there is nothing but gradual development, and it is impossible to give a precise example of any of the intermediate stages. In the

* See below, p. 59, and note (†). Impressed and expressed force, sensation and action are always alternating with each other.

† Organic action is an instance of this, as involving association but not perception. An adult has hourly examples of it in walking, eating, speaking; in fact in every action that he does.

example which we have given of the third kind of action, there is doubtless a considerable amount of reasoning in addition to what is called Instinct, and the proportion between them is very difficult to determine, owing to the extreme delicacy of the requisite experiments, the very direction of which physiology is at present unable to determine. Evolution we must remember does not advance by stages; these are merely marks that we make ourselves, like the constellations in astronomy, for convenience of study.

Finally we must remark that the two last kinds of Action ever tend to relapse into the second, which subjectively is a mere form of the first. Association of all kinds tends to become organic. By this we mean that as the connection becomes more definitely marked and easy, the perpetual radiation which occurs as the current passes the different points on its path disappears; and the whole current passes unimpaired. First, the radiation caused by the changes disappears, and reasoning becomes instinct, as in doing a mathematical example from mere memory of the different steps. Secondly, the radiation from the different nervous centres also disappears, and the current which ends in action becomes not only unreasoning but unperceived, as in walking, or reading aloud while thinking of something else.* The current passes through undiminished in amount, and hence these actions are always better and more perfectly done than those which involve reasoning on the way;—the respiration for instance is naturally even and regular, but if a man tries to breathe regularly he will find it impossible. It is by this organized association that we have command over our limbs; or in other words that the last associative step in voluntary and conscious action, on which follows the actual expression of the force, is attained. For contraction follows only on its particular exciting sensation or idea, so this

* So with all the secondary automatic actions of the spinal chord and sensorium, such as the ordinary complex sensations of size, distance and so forth. See below, note to p. 62.

must be associated with the idea of the action before movement is possible. But as these two states of consciousness, that of the impressed and that of the expressed force are continually conjoined, their connection soon becomes organic, so that the passage from the idea of the one to that of the other is unperceived, whether it be from irritation to contraction as with the actual sensations, or *vice versâ* as here. Hence the idea of the action produces the action without the apparent intervention of any intermediate step. Both reflex and organic action therefore form part of every act even in the highest development; and the motive force or the impressed state of pleasure or pain is throughout identical, for the most complex system of association can do nothing more than transmit it undiminished and unenlarged. Pleasure is throughout the only possible cause of action, the one being merely the correlative of the other, as concave and convex. Hence as pleasures or sensations are organized by Association into emotions, action is also organized, each particular contraction being attached to its corresponding sensation. Hence each emotion has its appropriate combination of Actions,* which, if the current is not carried farther on by Association, come into play, but usually being only supplied with the small quantity of force which is radiated as the current passes the particular emotion in question, are represented under a fainter image, as what we call emotional expression—either of face or gesture. This image however is merely the combination of actions in a shadowy or imperfect form, and its existence is a striking corroboration of our theory as to the evolution of the emotions.†

* These actions soon become organically connected like their correlative sensations, so that one impulse serves to rouse them all, as with a composition-pedal in an organ. The theory of residua is however here as elsewhere very unsatisfactory: we know habituation whether of the muscles or of the nerves only as a fact.

† See above, p. 49. As the simple action becomes organically connected with the simple sensation, in the way explained above, so that the idea of the action produces the idea of the sensation: so is it with the complex action and the complex sensation. Mr. Braid found that he could induce passions on people in a state of mesmerism by

Pleasure therefore, either in its simple state, or organized into emotions, is the only motive power. Knowledge or perception is naturally unproductive, for a relation or change is nothing more than the two related states of consciousness, and its effect is the sum or difference (as the case may be) of theirs; reasoning therefore, or perception, can only arrange, organize, classify; it can only give form to the material supplied to it; it can never create or annihilate. "Διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ;" φρόνησις can give no end, it can only suggest means whereby to attain that end when supplied to it; and this is done by the very constitution of our nature developed by association, by φύσις perfected by ἐθισμὸς.* Man therefore aims at pleasure as naturally as the sparks fly upwards: and Emotion is the only active power either in the individual breast, or in the world of men around. Among its varied forms therefore must we look for that of which we are in search, a faculty which professes to supply the highest of all motives to action, the 'moral sense.' As it is a faculty of late appearance, it is probably due to the long working of association: let us see therefore what effect the continuance of this process has upon the early emotions.

Length of habituation has two effects, it increases the num-

placing them in the corresponding attitudes (Maudsley, p. 160). On this association of the idea of the sensation with the idea of the action depends the whole power of painting and sculpture; which employ the ideas of facial expression and gesture to excite in the spectator the emotions which they depict. If we remember that these are figure and feature in the making, we shall see how a man's appearance and physiognomy is determined largely by his character. This was recognized by the Greeks more than by us. Apollo was at once the god of wisdom and of beauty, and Cyrus was chosen king among his fellows for his handsome face. Plato too connects beautiful minds and bodies, and this was stereotyped in the Athenian name for a gentleman, καλοκἀγαθὸς. Mr. Spencer thinks they were less confused than we by intermixture of race, stability of traits being proportional to pureness of breed. cf. also Cabanis, Rapports, I. § iv: VI. § i. The connection of action and emotion is also shewn by the fact that if much force be expressed in action, the emotion becomes less intense. Hence the soothing effect of a good cry on long pent griefs; and of angry gestures and words upon a fit of passion.

* See Arist. Eth. X. viii. 3; V. ii. 5: II. i.

ber of trains connected with each object, and also the length of each. If we suppose the simpler emotions to have by this time become organic or apparently simple states of consciousness, a continuance of association tends to connect them together in bundles, as they themselves were originally bundles of elementary pleasures and pains. Hence the Emotions become organized in their turn so as to form higher emotions, and eventually, when association has completed its work, this organization ends in one supreme emotion, which is the head of the emotional or sensitive side of the consciousness. This is the eventual result of the first process, whereby the number of trains is being continually increased; each bundle becoming organic only to become a member of a bundle of similar organic bundles, which in its turn is subject to the same process until we arrive at one supreme bundle of which all those below it are organized members.

Turning next to the second effect of prolonged habituation, we find that with objects or actions with which pleasure was at first associated and which so were called pleasurable, further association often connects a subsequent pain which increased experience has shewn always to follow upon the immediate pleasure. This pain often more than counterbalances the preceding pleasure; hence when it is taken into the emotion, that emotion becomes one no longer of appetition but of aversion: and the object or action is remembered as one not to be sought after but avoided. It cannot however be called painful, because it causes immediate pleasure, so a new name has to be invented, and it is called Bad or Evil. Similarly many things which are immediately associated with pain, are found to be eventually followed by pleasure which more than counterbalances the pain, and as this experience becomes consolidated by the power of association, they attract rather than repel, and for a name whereby to distinguish them, are called Good*: so that Good

* This corresponds to the third or highest meaning of Good mentioned by Plato in Rep. II. p. 357

and Evil are correlative terms like Pleasure and Pain, and mean respectively the greatest total Pleasure, and the geatest total Pain. Now this experience when once acquired and made organic is never lost, but by virtue of hereditary transmission descends from parents to children. But, as in the case of the simpler Emotions, only the results survive, and not the means whereby they were arrived at; so that in a short time the words Good and Evil come to be quite separated from Pleasant and Painful ;* nay, as might be expected from their origin, they tend to acquire exactly opposite meanings, for Pleasure and Pain come to signify only *immediate* pleasure and pain, and the final reckoning is often considerably at variance with the first item, as in a race the man who leads for the first lap seldom wins in the end.

The two processes which we have traced lead to exactly the same result, that of associating a greater number of consequences, whether subsequent or collateral. Hence Good and Evil result from both, and the Emotion whereby they are felt is produced by an organization and completion of the other Emotions, and connects them together just as they were themselves formed by prior connection of simpler elements. Good then and Evil are the object of the highest or architectonic Emotions, and preeminently of the highest of all which is the ideal perfection of our moral nature, and the object of which is Perfect Good: —for if it existed, it would combine all consequences, and so attain perfect correspondence, and perfect virtue.

Here then we have discovered the origin of an Emotion the object of which is Good and Evil. The bond which connects this together, becomes as we have seen eventually organic, just as in the case of walking or speaking.† So it is used for a

* Hence as Maudsley observes it is children and savages that best exhibit in a naked simplicity the different passions that result from the affection of self by what when painful is deemed an ill, when pleasurable a good. Later the ideas are separated.

† When we call an object by its name we do not consciously go through the whole classification involved, but missing this out proceed straight to the name, its

long time without inquiry, and when people at last turn to ask its real nature nearly all trace of its origin is lost, and unless closely examined, the states of consciousness which reveal it appear the immediate verdict of a hitherto undiscovered sense. The same is the case with regard to what are called necessary truths, for which men might just as well have invented a Mental Sense; and also with the perception of distance, and form, and extension. In all these cases what was originally the result of experience or association has become by continued repetition organic, and so apparently immediate. This then is the origin of the 'Moral Sense.'

Let us sum up shortly our conclusions. Consciousness, an ultimate property of living tissue, is identical in its early stages with pleasure and pain, and is the immediate antecedent of action. When in the course of evolution the organism becomes heterogeneous in its parts, this consciousness is also broken up

tessera (v. Bacon, Nov. Org. i. 14): and if it were not necessary for each individual to go through the process of learning names, and there were not more languages than one, we should doubtless have heard of a special sense of names. Yet even in our present instance every child learns a great deal of his 'moral sense' from education: and each age, nay each nation, each class, each school has a moral sense of its own. Naming, however, being less *immediately* dependent on a law of nature, being more 'accidental' (as we call it) and more liable to fluctuation, has less tendency to become organic and so has to be continually repeated anew. The hereditary transmission of organic connection varies inversely with the intelligence of the animal: it is much more noticeable for instance in the pointer than in man. Indeed it is evident that the less opportunity for radiation of association the more is the likelihood of its cohesion and therefore the less chance of its being completely got rid of. In man it is probable that even the actions which involve distance are only gradually acquired: but this is not so in many animals. "The young swallow can seize its prey with as accurate a skill as the old one after a life experience; and there is a fish that spurts a drop of water at the little insect moving above the surface and fails not to bring it down." (Maudsley, p. 105.) This gives some explanation of the broad distinction which has been made between the Instinct of animals and the Reason of man. In cases of insanity men become more like animals, losing much of the radiative power and becoming more receptive of organic connections. In the case of ordinary men the hereditary influence in most cases does not seem much stronger than as it is expressed in the words of Aristotle. "*οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτὰς τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.*" Eth. II. i. 3.

into species, which following each other and for a short time coexisting produce a consciousness of change, and so, by help of Association, give birth to Perception and Reasoning. This applied to Action makes intentional the previous reflex movements, whereby the organism adapts itself to circumstances, or, in the language of the inner life, aims at pleasure; and thus a conscious pursuit of motives by the use of means is occasioned. By a further process of Association this becomes organic, or instinctive, and so upon the early and simple Emotions, a further accretion of associated motive is deposited, whereby in time they are all brought into mutual contact, as the islands first formed in the estuary of a river become mere hillocks in the rising continent. Each, itself an organism, becomes a member of a higher organism continually rising into a unification of the whole emotional nature, as a pyramid rises from story to story until the great apex stone unites the whole into a completed structure. As the pleasure which was originally associated with ends becomes by habituation connected with the means by which those ends are attained, the elements of emotion are lost sight of in their fused alloy, and men take pleasure in virtuous actions for their own sake;* and the rules of virtuous conduct are transformed from calculations of pleasures into dicta of a so-called Moral Sense.†

The Moral Sense therefore is merely one of the emotions,‡

* This is sometimes carried to excess, as in the parallel case of Money. The mistake of the ascetic is the same as that of the miser, the substitution of means for ends. As might be foreseen, this diseased excess of Association is only developed late in life: the young love neither money, nor virtue, nor knowledge apart from the pleasures that each respectively procures.

† The ultimate identity of these two is seen by Aristotle, where he shews that the actions of the good are the truest examples of self love. He says, "δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος (ὁ ἀγαθὸς) μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται." Eth. IX. viii. 6. 'He gives up small pleasures for great, suffers even death itself,' (ib. ix. 1.), "ἀντι πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλὸν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει."—'sacrifice is only refined selfishness.'

‡ Cf. Spinosa, Ethica IV. 8. "Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est, quam lætitiæ

and differs from the lower species only as secondary automatic actions differ from primary, in that it has passed at one time through the stage of intention or reasoning, while the simpler emotions are probably anterior to, or at any rate co-eval with Perception. Thus though its history is different, its ultimate nature is identical with theirs; the sounds and sentences of waking life are there, but the sense which once filled them is vanished.

If we classify the Emotions in the order of their evolution, according to the intricacy of the combination which they involve, the Moral Emotion comes naturally last of all; being evolved from the rest, and organizing them on the model of their own organization out of the elementary pleasures and pains. Hence it only makes its appearance late in the world's history: we hear of Anger and Fear and Love ever since we have any record of man's existence, but the Moral Emotion can only claim a life of some two or three centuries: nay, there are still some who doubt its personality. Man at any rate is the only animal who possesses it in its latest development: for even in horses and dogs we cannot believe that it has passed the intentional or conscious stage, such as we see it in a dog who relinquishes a bone at his master's behest, balancing indeed conflicting emotions, but with an immediate reference to the

et tristitiæ affectus, quatenus ejus sumus conscii;" or rather, as he explains, it is "lætitiæ vel tristitiæ idea, quæ ex ipso lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu necessario sequitur." It is in fact an associated pleasure. Spinosa's method naturally prevented his tracing the details of its history. That the emotions however are all combinations of pleasures and pains, he assumes in his definitions; see also III. 59. In the Tractatus de Deo et Homine, II. 2, sqq. he gives a derivation of all the Emotions from the three modes of thought—opinio, fides and cognitio clara. In that treatise we differ from him in two points; first by denying that any Emotion in its organic form implies a judgment: and secondly by denying that *all* of them ever did imply one at all. The simpler emotions always, and the complex on their becoming organic, are in nature identical with their elements pleasure and pain, consisting only of one term in which subject and predicate are not separate but fused into one. Feelings may be described, as I believe Herbart suggests, as judgments anterior to the separation of subject and object; what we call sensations as distinct from perceptions. Into the simpler this separation never entered, from the more complex it has been eliminated by association.

result. Good with them has no artificial meaning, it is simply identical with the greatest pleasure. So it is that a conscious aiming at pleasure in man is often ignorantly stigmatized as a lowering of himself to the level of beasts.

Even in man the ultimate organization is by no means attained; much is left still isolated and independent, and the bond which unites the rest is rather the lax tie of federalism than the firm constitution of an empire. The Moral Emotion, such as we now have it, is but a faint foreshadowing of that which we have described above, as the largest tribe foreshadows the nation: and its complete development is the ideal of moral progress, the ultimate perfection of our emotional nature.

The very universality and imperialism of the pretensions with which this Emotion of Emotions awes men's hearts, entails a certain vagueness and indefiniteness which is a great element of weakness in actual conflict, where, as in the struggle of politics, distinctness of policy carries immense weight. This weakness is increased by the larger amount of argument embodied in its constitution. A man who conquers his anger or desire at its behest is said to act reasonably, because to its production a more developed and farsighted reasoning was necessary than to that of its fellows;* and some trace of this reasoning is nearly always left in its present imperfect form, which, by causing hesitation and indecision, often leaves an opening to a resolute enemy. Hence the Moral Emotion is not only the latest but often also the weakest: yet its strength grows with its age, for its cause is that of human progress. Man is at present passion's slave, because he is so only in part: he feels his servitude to one master because it reminds him of his dis-

* This is what Plato means in the Philebus when he makes Good consist in the union of Pleasure and Intelligence, the determination of the Indeterminate: and what Aristotle means when he places the ὀρεκτικὸν or Emotional part of our nature half-way between Reason (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) and Sense (τὸ ἄλογον), and when he derives Virtue from the union of φρόνησις and φυσικὴ ἀρετή. Virtue, he says, is One, its different words being merely applications to different circumstances of this calculative or reasoning power. Eth. I. xiii. 18; VI. xiii. 6..—See Plato, Prot. 356, sqq.

obedience to the rest; he regrets having yielded to one desire because he has been so prevented from gratifying another. Only by complete and perfect obedience can the yoke fall away; —for the cause of repentance is never the attainment of *some* pleasure, but always the non-attainment of more; not the satisfaction of one desire, but the inability to satisfy all. The highest virtue therefore consists in being led not by one desire but by all; in the complete organization of the moral nature.

In the history of the Moral Emotion as treated in the preceding pages we have an illustration of the great principle on which all progress depends, that what is conscious in one age becomes unconscious in the next. The result of reasoning is the indirect establishment of a relation between two things,* and association renders this in time direct. The telegraphic message which once went a long circuit and lost much in radiation on the way, goes now straight and whole, and 'reason' takes the place of reasoning. As the formula, the proof of which is carefully studied by the schoolboy, is taken for granted by the mathematician; as the word, the spelling and shape of which takes years to the child to learn, is written without a thought by the pen of the essayist; as the somnambulist treads in security the path to which his feet are accustomed; as everywhere

"Men rise on stepping stones
"Of their dead selves to higher things;"

so the intellect of humanity, ever engaged in building for itself "the world's great altar-stairs," thinks not of that which is already built, but of the difficulties in front; and not enduring the delay of dragging each stone laboriously up the stairs that are finished, has constructed a mechanical arrangement of cranes and pulleys whereby it can procure fresh materials for the building without continual journeying up and down. Occasionally, however, when the edifice has grown to a great height, some ominous creaking or cracking at the summit suggests

* H. Spencer, Psych., Pt. II. ch. vii.

the necessity of going down to strengthen the foundations; and then suppose the ladders by which the lower steps were ascended (and these are much the loftiest, for there was less fear of falling then, and the materials were within easier distance) have fallen over, and are out of reach! All that remains is to catch hold of them as well as we can from our present position; it is impossible to go on until we have by some means or other scrambled down and examined the foundations.

Long ago this has happened with regard to Ethics.* The general rough hewn conclusions of man's early experience, stored up unconsciously in the minds of generations, and extended as far as possible by analogies and metaphorical fancies, served for a long time pretty well in practical life. But at length the edifice began to shew signs of weakness: the foundations were immediately suspected. Man must know how they were made by the good old stonemasons, his fathers. So human intellect began to descend: Socrates came down a step or two till he had left the clouds behind and come well in sight of the bottom,† and Aristotle went on still farther: we

* What follows is of course metaphor, not history. The process described was not intentional or self-conscious at all; it was only part of the general development of human intellect. See below, § 8.

† Cic. Tusc. v. 4. He took up the Sophistic reaction from the old unreasoning belief, and its expression "ἄνθρωπος μέτρον ἁπάντων," and deduced from it the first condition of knowledge, γνῶθι σεαυτον. If we can know only ourselves, let us in heaven's name set about knowing that. But Socrates, and still more his pupil Plato, made the mistake of confining self to the narrow secondary self, and supposing that this self contained knowledge, latent and innate, which needed only eliciting; instead of recognizing in it only a reflection, imperfect and often misleading, of the other primary division by which it is ever formed and corrected. Hence they tried to study the image from the shadow, and to make philosophy deductive while as yet there were few materials for deduction. They thought they had reached the bottom, when they had only come a little way down, and by the trouble they took to strengthen the top they only increased its weight, and so rendered the weakness of the whole building more evident and alarming. All that science and philosophy can do is to arrange states of consciousness and then use their arrangement: but the arrangement can neither be found ready to hand without their making, nor can it be carelessly patched up with analogies and metaphors and such like guesses. If men get tired of arranging, and think they will sit down and survey their work, as a man going up hill turns wearily to gaze upon the view already won; or if, like a

moderns got down some way lower, and we thought we were getting to the bottom, when lo! at the top of a very deep step there was no ladder to be seen; and since then we have been shaking our heads and wringing our hands at the top, and some have even gone up again in disgust and tried to continue their work among the clouds: but the wisest have been groping about with ropes and drag-irons for the lost ladder. One or two have actually hooked it and brought it almost to the top, when it has slipped from their grasp: but at last, by watching their endeavours, we have succeeded in securely fastening it, and making a safe passage to the step below. So we have got down from the step Moral Sense to the step Pleasure, and from it we can see our way to the step Physical Law. Here we are on a level with the whole landscape of nature, and below there is nothing to be seen; so we must now be at the bottom. Still there are several awkward jumps that we have to make, and the path is not quite clear all the way, so there is much that remains to be done. Come down then, you who have good eyes and strong hands, and help

schoolboy learning mathematics, they get impatient at the continual bookwork, and seek amusement in a few examples, there will soon come an example which does not come under the classification already made, and which cannot be solved by the rules already learnt, and then comes the temptation to save themselves the trouble of toiling on at their arrangement and of learning new rules, by making a guess at the solution on a vague analogy of previous examples which the present seems to resemble. If they yield to this, the answer is soon found to be wrong; and some Brummel's valet comes down from the chamber of philosophy holding the disgraced speculations in his hand, and, half pleased with the rich waste which he carries, says to the expectant world, 'These are our failures.' There are many 'failures' in the toilette of truth, and at every stage the same sceptic valet carries them off, and throws them away. That is his only work, and the other servants hate him as a standing reproach to their unskilfulness, but this very hate stimulates them to fresh exertions, that their lord may be quickly dressed, and shewn in triumph to the world of courtiers without. They have now seen the futility of their old careless and indolent attempts, and have set themselves in good earnest to their work. So may we hope for better progress, and for fewer of the old disheartening interruptions.

It must be noticed, to guard against error, that by the descent spoken of in the text, we do not mean deduction. It is only in fact a further process of induction, as is explained in § 4.

to strengthen these foundations of our common building. It may look a rude and unpolished country that we must sojourn in, and the climate is not so soothing or ethereal as that above, and much bad company seems to be living here who have evidently fallen down from idleness or accident, not descended in order to build higher:—but if we are ever to live in security above, we must assuredly not neglect the foundations; and he is no real lover of Truth who cares in whose company he finds her. Did not even that step just above, when so many people were standing on it, seem of doubtful strength, and ready to give way in several places? Lose therefore no time, but come down and help.

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§ II. Of the Social Relation of the Individual.

There is a question which will naturally suggest itself to the reader of the foregoing pages, and which he might express as follows: When you assert the end of Action to be Pleasure, do you mean the pleasure of each individual actor, or do you follow the modern utilitarian philosophy in fusing together all the possible pleasures of mankind, so as to measure the goodness of an Action by its furtherance of the universal happiness? This question it is now time to answer; nor can the solution long remain doubtful, when we remember that our whole system has been based on the constitution of each individual organism, independently of external consciousness altogether. Good has been shewn to follow immediately on the adaptation of an organism to circumstances; it is evident therefore that external objects can affect it only in so far as they form part of these circumstances. Hence it follows that the pleasure and pain of others can come in only incidentally; from the fact that each man is not an isolated unit, but a member of society. But further, this social medium itself is after all nothing but a part of the individual affected by it; it is one division of that

primary side of his nature, by which the other side, the emotional, the intellectual, the moral is being continually moulded and fashioned: and even if we take the narrower meaning of self, the pleasures and pains of others cannot possibly affect a man's actions or emotions except in so far as they become a part of his. If man aims at pleasure merely by the physical law of action, that pleasure must evidently be ultimately his own; and whether it be or not preceded by phenomena which he calls the pleasures and pains of others, is a question not of principle but of detail, just as the force of a pound weight is unaltered whether it be composed of lead or of feathers, or whether it act directly or through pulleys.

The principle therefore is clear enough, that the happiness of others can have only an indirect influence upon the good of each individual. But it is equally clear that this indirect influence must be of no mean extent, and that it is now our duty to try and trace its history. For it is by setting before our principle data of this kind, and testing its operation by an already ascertained solution, that we are now seeking to verify its truth. Now to trace the influence of social relations on any given individual would be both impracticable, owing to the impossibility of ascertaining the requisite data, and useless for verification, owing to a like impossibility in determining the correctness of the answer. The only data that we are able to observe are the general elementary attributes and the early history of mankind as a whole, that is to say, of the average normal human organism; and the only facts with which we can compare the answer are in like manner the general complex attributes of mankind as we find it in its developed state, or of the majority of the present members of society. And although the method and principles of science are universally applicable not only to our sensations but to our ideas, yet those deductions alone are practically valuable, which can be applied to cases of actual experience. Though we might (for instance), if we liked, construct an arbitrary individual with definite

faculties and medium, and deduce from our construction the particular forms into which his emotional and active nature would be developed, such a task would be valuable only as a mental exercise, and would give no opportunity for testing the accuracy of its conclusion. Let us therefore take only the more general properties of the human organism and medium, and applying to them our principle of moral action, compare the result with the broad ideas of virtue and the ordinary motives to action which we see prevailing in the world. In the present and succeeding sections we shall dwell particularly on certain peculiarities of the medium whereby each human organism is surrounded, and trace their influence on his moral development; and then proceed in the fourth section to follow the same method with regard to the evolution of the organism itself; remembering that this division of our subject, adopted only for simplicity of reasoning, has no correspondingly clear demarcation in the actual course of evolution. We are unable to follow the complex thread of nature except by artificial disentanglement of its interwoven fibres.

One of the principal points of difference between the circumstances in which the human organism is placed and those which form the medium of other animals, is the long period of helplessness of the infant, which has to be reared and protected for many years before it is able to support itself. The result of this is that the family is kept together for a much longer period than in any other case: and even when the necessity at length disappears, its members have grown so accustomed to mutual intercourse that they naturally still remain united. Even the death of the head does not always suffice to separate the junior members; the eldest naturally stepping into the unoccupied place, and succeeding to its former functions. That this was actually the fact in the early history of mankind, may be concluded from observation of such relics of social antiquity as we find in the Indian clan villages and the customs of other undeveloped peoples; as well as in the historical testimony to

the universal distribution of the gentile and tribal system. Of a still earlier state of complete isolation such as was imagined in the metaphysical fiction of a state of nature, neither history nor science gives any warrant: nay they decidedly negative its probability. Hence to the human race the earliest Good was inseparably bound up with what we now call the Family Virtues. Inasmuch as each had a distinct position in the Family, and yet the family was nothing but its collective members, the Good of each was simply the share of each in the general good.* This involved mutual kindness, forbearance, justice, and so forth; which thus became integrated with the virtue of each individual. Justice and kindness would form no part of the morality of an isolated being, because they imply in their very nature the presence of others; but they are means whereby the member of a family adapts himself to the circumstances in which he is placed. They are not at first immediately productive of pleasure, but through a little present sacrifice they ensure a final return of enjoyment or at any rate preservation from evils greater than themselves. Hence they are in the true meaning of the word, Good; and after a considerable course of experience of their effects, the pleasure which they are found to secure becomes associated directly with the means which attain it, and the virtues become pleasurable for their own sake alone.

But these emotions not only become crystallized and organic: they soon become further modified and enlarged by new social development. We noticed above how the family grew into the tribe by its non dispersion on the death of its head, and the hereditary devolution of chieftainship. The state is in its origin merely an extension of this; for it is nothing but a family which has become too large to live together, and which consequently takes the form of a number of households united

* These shares need not all be equal—for the recipients are not units but members of an organism; hence their meed is proportional to their function.

under a common head, the eldest member of the eldest branch. Another though less ordinary source of the state lay in the voluntary union of several distinct families, such as we find in the triple stem of early Rome; but in the Greek state, the normal form, descent from a common ancestor among the gods and demigods was ever regarded as one of the strongest bonds of union, and the highest incentive to patriotic ardour.

The formation of states was especially favoured in those times and countries in which agriculture was substituted for pasture, and occupations became separated and localized. But they seldom long retained their early shape; nay, the central government often underwent so many changes from its original form that its birth became lost in antiquity. Thus the Greeks referred the state with its accompanying art, morality, and even language, to the creation of an ancestral lawgiver, some Solon or Lycurgus: in Asia the founder appears as a deity, such as Menu or Zoroaster; while in modern Europe he has been transformed into a metaphysical abstraction, such as the Social Compact or the Divine Right of Kings. As man passes from one stage of progress to another, he is ever journeying through a mighty telescope which magnifies the objects in front, but diminishes those which are behind:* hence he is ever liable to think too little of the supports and successes of his earlier efforts, so that his past life soon fades entirely from his memory, and has to be repainted, if at all, from the colours of his imagination. So those who have disdained to borrow facts from fancy, have been obliged to take the State, as they have taken the Moral Sense, and the various so-called Faculties, as an ultimate fact incapable of resolution; and thus they have failed to discover its true import, as the fruit of natural law,

* In a declining age these glasses are reversed; the future looks small and distant while the past is magnified and brought nearer. And it is in such an age that men naturally look back and love to paint their past career. Hence while the ignorance of early social and political facts is due to the forgetfulness of prosperity, the grandeur of the conceptions which seek to revive them comes from the sadness and regrets of adversity.

and an inevitable phase of human development. For the law which formulates the rise of the state out of the family, is no isolated fact, but a branch of the universal principle of organic development whereby the homogeneous becomes heterogeneous and the simple complex; the law of the division of labour, and of the integration of faculties. By the operation of this law, the earliest assemblages of social units, growing in time organic, become units for association under a higher organism, which tends perpetually by such successive stages to grow wider and wider, until finally, like a freezing globe of water, it comprehends the whole mass of material which is subject to its influence. Thus the units of society have on the one hand a continual tendency to grow fewer and larger, the motives to union on the whole preponderating over those to separation; and their inward constitution becomes, on the other hand, more heterogeneous and complex, as their different parts become more accurately adapted to the special circumstances of their respective media. Organization extends itself both upwards and downwards, each process being essentially dependent on the other; thus each individual unit becomes at once more distinct from his neighbours, and more intimately bound up with them in a common bond of membership: as he becomes more unlike his fellows, so is he more dependent on their reciprocal connection.

Thus as the family grew into the state, the End or Good of each individual became largely modified, by the extension of the medium to which his actions had to be adapted. While the name of the family and certain of its more special functions were transferred to the separate households which sprung up within its limits, the more important of these functions went in uninterrupted succession to the state, in which the 'persona' of the old family was continued, and which was thus the natural heir of both its rights and obligations. Man thus became a member not only of the family, but of the state; and so wider conceptions came to be formed of his nature and duties. Hence this is the period at which we find the rise of general principles

of conduct, and consequently of general theories of morality. Thus the empirical maxims of common interest, which had been handed down in the family, like the dicta of conscience in each individual breast, as won from the wisdom of all ages, came to be arranged in a more or less scientific shape; and taking a coercive form because of the inability of the lower classes of mankind to raise themselves to the average level of prudence necessary for the common well being,* were put forward as Laws for the regulation of life and manners. Thus also we find the philosophical exponents of this social era building up systems of human ethics from a consideration of the needs and functions of the state. The conception of man as a member of a state was the first sufficiently general to admit of philosophical treatment; hence abstract systems of morality are never met with until this stage of development is reached: but henceforth they follow, as a line its parallel, the continuous social evolution, bearing testimony to that perpetual assimilation of man's thoughts and reasoning to the external phenomena of his life, on which his whole mental and moral perfectibility depends.

Moral Philosophy and Law, the two products of that stage of social progress represented by the state, react powerfully upon the circumstances which gave them birth. For inasmuch as

* Plato, Legg. IX. 875, A. C. That the will of the wise man coincided with Law was the great doctrine of the Stoics, though they inverted the cause of this connection. Law is only the most convenient substitute for wisdom, as is well put by Plato (loc. cit.): "*ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶ νοῦν οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἀληθινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν· νῦν δέ—οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ βραχύ· διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ'ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ.*" Cf. Polit. 294, A. The answer of Aristippus too deserves to be remembered, who when he was asked what advantage philosophers had over other men, replied, "*ὅτι ἐὰν πάντες οἱ νόμοι ἀφαιρεθῶσιν ὁμοίως βιωσόμεθα.*" So says Ralpho,

"Oaths were not purposed more than law
"To keep the good and just in awe,
"But to confine the bad and sinful
"Like moral cattle in a pinfold."—Hud. II. ii. 197.

Hence Laws are mostly negative: they have no force till they are broken. (ib. 279.)

they treat of general principles whose sphere of application comprehends and transcends all the petty experiences of daily life, they create an idea, whose very vagueness causes awe, of an unseen unity and interweaving of the various actions of each individual in his total life, and of the lives of all in a common thread of existence. As history advances, men's actions are more and more governed by ideas; because the whole experience of mankind is ever becoming more organized, and the growing immensity of the past, awing men's minds through the ghost-like disembodied spirits of dead facts, is gaining an increasing preponderance over the vanishing present. But even in the early stage that we are considering, such an idea as that we have suggested has no small influence on action, filling up the deficiencies of each individual experience, which would otherwise cause perpetual disturbance in society, and require the more objectionable remedy of incessant punishment. This idea however is not produced by general speculations only; it is in great measure the result of the hereditary transmission of past experience, whereby alone mankind does not die with each generation but is capable of progress and education. Thus each man is enabled to act not by his own observation only, but by the whole past experience of the world, which is stored up in his mind in the shape of Ideas and Emotions. The lessons of no one lifetime could have taught the Spartan to die at Thermopylæ, or Regulus to prefer death to a Roman's dishonour.

Thus we have seen how partly through his own experience, and partly through the experience of others, the emotions and moral nature of each individual are gradually modified by the change in his social medium arising from the continued enlargement of the family circle, and the consequent formation of the state: and every reader of Greek or early Roman history will immediately feel that the results which are thus naturally suggested by the principles whose truth we hold, are, so far as we have had time to carry them, in complete harmony with what we know of the character of these ancient nations.

But the process of development in the social medium does not end here, and it is now time to turn to its later phases; in considering which we shall be spared the necessity of repetition, if we bear in mind that much that has been said above applies to the whole history of evolution, and not to that portion only on which we have been hitherto engaged, which is nothing more than a sample of the rest. Thus we find, in turning to the next phase of social history, that just as the organism of the state was formed upon the old family units, so upon this in its turn a still higher organism is superimposed, the organism of the Empire or Nation. Even in their details the two processes are analogous. For just as the original family was composed not only of parents and children, but of dependents and slaves deprived of their freedom by the accident of capture or of birth; and as the state included not only the tribes and gentes who boasted of a common stock, but a number of domiciled foreigners who soon received a share in its privileges and burdens; just in the same way the Empire or Nation, which is nothing but a family of states as a state was a family of families, is composed not only of the parent state and its colonies, but of others subjugated and reduced to obedience by force or policy. Hence, as in a family the children, so in an Empire the colonies are the real source of rejuvenescence and strength: a conquered country is ever like a slave untrustworthy, and eager for an occasion of escape, unless it be adopted to the common government and interests. Such is the normal mode of formation of an Empire; but inasmuch as the higher grades of organic life are ever less stable and more fluctuating than those which depend on fewer conditions, so we find among the list of empires many of spurious and artificial origin which for a time are liable to be mistaken for true nationalities, though their bastard extraction is soon revealed on the sudden extinction of their vitality by the disappearance of the particular phenomena which called them forth. Among such we may mention the

Mahometan Empire of the seventh and eighth centuries, the product of a fanaticism that hoped to wade through slaughter to heaven, which waned as soon as wealth began to quench the fire of bigotry—the sun from which its splendour and its warmth were borrowed; or that of Timour and his Mongol hordes, who were indeed united by community of interest, but only by such as binds together a band of adventurers, or inspires harmony into a gang of banditti. Of similar instances there is no lack, but there is seldom much difficulty in separating the base-born from the true, the meteor that flashes through the heavens from the planet rolling in its orbit. Not only however is there considerable liability to sports and degenerate varieties, but even in the regular channel the force of nature's forward striving grows fainter as the stream expands. In the first place, as the channel gets wider its sides impose far less restraint upon the gentler current. Thus for example that necessity of infant nurture which was so effective a bond to family life, is greatly relaxed in the case of the wider family, the Nation. A colony is dependent on its mother state only in a much less degree and for a much shorter period of its career than the child on the parent: so that in many cases it breaks entirely away from her, and becomes a separate unit of society. But secondly, organization becomes not only less necessary, it is also much more fraught with difficulties, seeing that the material with which it has to deal is infinitely more extensive and more complex. The self-sacrifice needed for an Empire is not only larger than that required for a State, but its advantages are less obvious, and indeed partially obscured by the very virtues which it has itself created. Enough of obedience is taught by the Family, to serve its own purposes and those of its successor the State, owing to the influence of a strong central authority upon the weak will and easy teachability of youth; but there the lesson naturally ends, and by the very force of its expression takes a form hostile to further progress, the early notion of Patriotism being altogether exclusive, and identifying

the love of one state with the hatred of all others. A state can neither see its own interest so readily as a single paterfamilias, nor, if it sees it, can it act so readily upon its determination. These difficulties have for the most part, as in Greece, prevented the natural growth of empires out of states.

One instance, however, of such an empire has actually occurred, and has left an indelible stamp upon the world's history; for ideas once roused are imperishable, and posterity cannot rid itself of them even if it will. In the history of Rome we recognize the counterpart of the growth of the State from the individual: first, the small family circle near home, with a few client and slave states to perform the menial offices of the community; then, as the multitude of children and dependents outgrows the limits of a single household, the state emerging from the family as the head of a number of province houses, each administered by a petty model of the great central government: then a modification of the constitution to suit its new position, and we have before us a true picture of the Roman Empire. Yet even in this single example, organization was checked prematurely in its course and unable to arrive at its natural limit, the comprehension of the whole of the human race. This would have been necessary for complete success, and it is to the failure of Rome in fulfilling this her mission, that must be attributed all the troubles and vicissitudes of the later Empire. Yet though she had to atone for that which she did not by her death, that which she did has secured for her a posthumous immortality. Though for her shortcomings she was denied entrance into the Promised Land, yet she led her followers to the brink, and like Moses from the top of Pisgah she was allowed a distant vision of the glorious future into which by her exertions her seed was to enter. For though she failed to realize the dreams of her poets and make her empire coextensive with the sun's, yet in those very dreams half her task was accomplished. Though there remained nations who refused her tribute and lands untraversed by her armies, yet

the intellect and aspirations of humanity were by her made one; and he who has conquered the affections has done more than he who has enchained the body. So when we speak of the dismemberment of the Roman Empire, we mean only its apotheosis to the world of living spirits; where, cleansed from the impurities and foul accretions which embarrassed its incarnate action and dragged its body to the grave, it rules the world it could not conquer, bearing on its standard not the eagles of Latium, but the mighty emblem of Humanity, and demanding obedience in the name not of the Roman Senate, but of the universal Brotherhood of Men.

In tracing the history of Rome, we have been necessarily led beyond an example of the rise of ordinary empires, to think of that higher organization, which rising above nations as they above states and families and individuals, comprehends at last the whole sphere of humanity in one living organism of society. Thus we have reached the limit of an inquiry, in the course of which we have seen how the medium and therefore the end or good of the individual has been extended ever outwards and outwards, till at last it touches the boundary of the human species.

In the early days an individual was connected only mediately with the member of another family; that is, only so far as that his end was bound up with his family and that other families were part of the medium to which his own had to adapt itself: and still more indirectly was he connected with the inhabitant of another state or empire. But as the state grew out of the family, and the nation out of the state, the social and political medium of each man was widened; and when at last the idea, if not the reality, of a Universal Empire is attained, each of its citizens is brought in idea at least (and for action ideas are often better than facts) into immediate contact with the rest, or in other words, with all the other inhabitants of the globe. Thus the end of each individual has gradually become universal, and as far as Moral Philosophy is concerned mankind is henceforth under a single administration.

Practically, however, so enormous an organization is found impossible. Hence since the fall of the Roman Empire the world has been in an anomalous position. 'State' (in the old sense of the word, in the only sense in which it is important in Ethics) there has been none. Man is indeed a citizen of the world, but the world has no government. Human society is in a state of development corresponding to that of starfish or centipedes; one animal but many ganglionic centres. It does indeed give a trace of cerebral hemispheres, of self-conscious unity; but this germ is quite undeveloped and has little power of co-ordinating motion. The present governments are deputies of an invisible legislature, imperial provinces of an ideal empire. This empire has indeed a code of written law, which secures justice among its constituent peoples; and a viceregal committee of appeal in the republic of European nations: but the majesty of its actual presence is enthroned in the misty future, from whence only stray gleams of light sometimes fall on the hopes and aspirations of men, to remind them of its presence and power, and to cheer them through the misrule and petty squabbles of its underling lieutenants. Hence each of us has, like Marcus Aurelius, a city such as Rome, the home of the Antonines, but as men our city is the world: the world, past, present, and future, with all its children of every age and every continent and every colour. This is indeed an Idea, but all motive is Idea: and the highest idea of human unity marks the completion of that portion of the development of human virtue, which is due to the continuous social evolution of mankind.

Now, therefore, we are able to answer the question with which this section started. Our system considers the good of each individual as consisting in a certain harmony between the two sides of his nature; and therefore holds that this Good can be affected only through some change in either one or both of these, the inner organism and its surrounding medium. On this hint we have (briefly indeed, but we hope suggestively) traced

the series of changes which occur in the medium owing to the position of the individual in society; and we have thus succeeded in accounting for the phenomena which present themselves in actual experience, and to which the objection implied in the question owed its difficulty. The individual ever acts to secure his own pleasure; but that has varied according to the characters that he has successively assumed: first as a unit; then as a member of a family, of a state, of a nation; and finally, as a member of society in general, of Adam's family, a man. His virtue thus developed by reason has advanced in generality, so that at last the more perfectly each attains his own interest and the more pleasure he gathers to his own store, the more certainly does he secure the universal happiness of mankind. If a man aims, as Spinosa remarks, at doing real good to himself, he will then be sure to do most good to others.*

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§ III. Of the 'Unselfish' Emotions.

In the preceding section we have sketched the general outlines of that phase of moral development which is due to the social evolution of the human medium, and have seen how the conception of virtue is gradually enlarged from the crude maxims of the savage to the cosmopolitan sympathies of the present age. But in order to meet the obvious objection that men were benevolent and just, long before they felt that humanity is one; and because truth is more significant in her plain working-dress than in her regal robes of magnificent abstractions, we must enter a little more at detail into the history of some of the special emotions which are included in this phase. Each of these probably has a physical groundwork,

* Ethica, IV. xxxiv. Cor. ii. So ib.:—"Homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus ea necessario agunt, quæ humanæ naturæ, et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est quæ cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt."

some "elective affinity" of animal matter,* which stamps the character of its action towards external objects, and which we suppose to be subjectively presented as some special state of pleasurable or painful consciousness. These particular sensations being the continual accompaniments of certain objects or perceptions, come by the process of association to be reproduced in idea whenever the perceptions or their ideas occur: and these earliest associated pleasures and pains are the rudiments of the different emotions.

There soon comes however a further process in the formation of these emotions, in which they are integrated and individualized by the various combinations of causes and the multiplication of effects; and it is to this their later stage that we wish here particularly to refer.

We have seen that the earliest social state to which science and history alike point is that of Family life; it is here therefore that we must look for the origin of the simplest social emotions. Now under the family regime, since both the medium of all the members is much the same, and the conditions of their action are mutually dependent, the pleasure and pain of each is both coordinately and reciprocally connected with that of the rest. Hence when any member sees the marks of pleasure or pain in others, he naturally associates with them a like affection in himself. This, by the primary law of Habit, holds equally good in those cases in which no actual pleasure or pain follows to himself. Hence on the perception of emotional phenomena in others, the idea of a similar sensation in himself immediately follows; and this soon becomes disconnected with that primary sensation of which it was originally an anticipation.

* Thus Mr. Bain (Mental and Moral Science, p. 243) reduces Sympathy to the sensuous relation existing between parent and child, and this may to a certain extent colour its character. But emotion is pleasure not actually felt but associated; and each of its present forms is exceedingly complex and interwoven, so that the separate threads are very difficult to detect. In the same way the Iliad is a series of combinations of the alphabet, but the part due to each letter cannot be separated from the rest.

Nay, how do we 'perceive' external feelings at all? We have seen that there is a Law of Habit, called the Law of Similarity, under which is formulated the tendency of like to suggest like among sensations. Hence the phenomena of pleasure or pain in another, even if he be not immediately connected with us, rouses in us the idea of similar phenomena in ourselves. It is not that the sight of pain reminds us of human frailty and weakness. That is a poetic generalization of what is indeed true, but only a late discovered truth; and in the earlier stages of development the painful idea which follows on the perception of pain in others is merely the association with the phenomena of our own bodies, with which those 'perceived' are classified, of the pain usually connected with them, and without this classification and sympathetic pain, 'perception' of the external pain is impossible.* When the associations become organic, the terms and bond of connection remain, but the reasoning disappears, and sympathy becomes direct.

By these two processes is developed a kind of reflex sense, in which are reflected, as in a mirror, the pleasures and pains inferred from surrounding phenomena. This is what we mean by Sympathy, which on the disappearance of the intermediate links of association is formed into a definite emotion. Consciousness of course remains, which, as identical with the Primordial Sense, is the material of all Emotion; but self-consciousness disappears as the organization becomes organic, because self-consciousness is the result of reasoning, which having completed this portion of its work, passes on to the rest, rising ever higher and higher, and descending deeper and deeper, like one who heaps up a mountain or one who bores a shaft into the earth, ever using the results of the past as a standing place on which it may continue its labour.

The history of Sympathy as thus evolved shews it to be far from one of the earliest emotions, inasmuch as reasoning of at

* Cf. Spinosa, Ethica, III. 27. So 'perception' is here only indirect, requiring an association beyond the usual classification; and in this lies Sympathy. See note to App. 4.

least a simple form is implied in its origin. It cannot at any rate, as implying an object, be anterior to perception; nay, to us, t involves a definite conception of external minds and bodies. This is just what might be expected when we remember that the social phenomena on which it depends affect only the highest animals, and in their full extent only the highest of all, man: and is also corroborated by the comparatively late appearance of the sympathetic affections in the human infant. Anger, Fear, Desire, Hope, all precede the social feelings, both in the world and in the individual. Two other remarks on sympathy follow from the preceding discussion. The first is that its sphere is necessarily confined to experience.* Dido's analysis of her own feeling, "haud ignara mali misersi succurrere disco," gives the true history of the whole emotion. Hence the need felt of a Deity who with omnipotence to heal united the human nature which could feel our sufferings; not one "who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities," but one "who is in all points tempted like as we are,"—"a *man* of sorrows and acquainted with grief."† Hence the revolt of religion from Greek philosophy, which had substituted a number of superhuman abstractions for the hierarchy of the early polytheism with its one foot on earth and one in heaven, and the glorious reconstruction of the bridge over which men's aspirations may cross the deep and dark river of ignorance, into the happy pastures of the heavenly country. The second remark is that it is only in the narrow sense unselfish; that it is at bottom a more complete organization of selfishness than those emotions which preceded it. The apparent foundation for the contrary opinion lies in the eventual disappearance of the intermediate links of association; whereby an action of sympathy wears the appearance of being caused di-

* "The child is unable to enter into the joys and griefs of a grown-up person: the humble day-labourer can have no fellow feeling with the cares of the rich: the man without family fails to realize the feelings of the domestic circle."—Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 277.

† Heb. iv. 15. Isa. liii. 3.

rectly by the affections of others, and so loses its selfish look. Yet though the painful or pleasurable idea in our own consciousness follow so closely as to be indistinguishable from the like affection which we perceive in others, it is ever this idea which is the immediate motive of the resulting action: for, as we have seen long ago, action follows not on perception whether strong or weak, but on sensation only; a perception therefore can influence action only by producing an appropriate sensation. Now we can perceive or infer the sensations of others; but we can feel only our own.* Sympathy is therefore nothing more than 'a readjustment of self love.'

From Sympathy comes Benevolence by a very easy transition; for the associated pleasures and pains of sympathy tend by the ordinary physical law to produce actions, on the one hand of appetition, on the other of avoidance. The individual therefore acts in such a way as that others shall manifest as much pleasure and as little pain as possible; in other words he does benevolent actions. Benevolence is thus nothing more than the active side of sympathy,† and being inseparable from it, as the outward expression from the inner feeling, is the unfailing test of its real existence. The organic form of this

* How can Mr. Bain reconcile his theory that "the disposition to sympathize does not depend on the motives to the will, the pursuit of pleasure, and the revulsion from pain"—with the fact that sympathy is an act of the will and reacts powerfully upon it? If the total result of a sympathetic action were pain, (according to his view), no such action could ever be performed. This position may be "indispensable to the vindication of disinterested action as a fact of the human mind;" but if so, its absurdity is only a further proof that there is no such fact in existence. (v. Mental and Moral Science, 281, 447). The argument which he derives from Hume (*ib.* p. 604) that public and private interests are sometimes opposed, and that we prefer the former, merely gives an instance of what happens in every deliberate action, that there are opposing motives or ideas of pleasure, and that whichever turns out the strongest wins the day. Mr. Bain's theory takes action from the sphere of law to that of chance, and makes virtue depend not on reason but on good luck; for it would be of little use to found calculations or reasonings on what would be at best only a probability. For our view of 'disinterestedness' see note to App. 7.

† Thus Spinosa defines it as "cupiditas ex commiseratione orta" (Ethica, II. 27. Schol. 2); sympathy in readiness for action. He defines sympathy as "tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit." (*ib.* 22. Schol.)

emotion, in which the element of self disappears from immediate consciousness, comes, as we see, somewhat late in the scale of evolution; and the still further integrated form, in which not only the connection of self with others, but the link between the pleasure perceived in others and the actions securing its enlargement is eliminated, so that pleasure is associated immediately with benevolent actions and benevolence becomes pleasurable for its own sake, is as yet by no means universally attained by humanity, but is only possessed by a few individuals whose moral natures are highly developed. Most people do a kind action, if not because they expect a return of the kindness, at most because they like to see happy faces around them, or for another incidental motive, which, as it enters largely into the composition of all altruistic emotions, we will now proceed to consider.

The pleasures of sympathy prompt us to aim at the pleasure of those about us not only directly by our own actions, but indirectly by the actions of others or of the percipients themselves. Hence we try to encourage virtue in others, not only on account of the pleasure which it directly confers upon us as part of the medium with which its actions are in harmony, but on account of the sum total of pleasure which it produces around us and which is reflected in us through sympathy. Hence virtue is on all sides praised and rewarded, while vice is blamed and punished. This is especially the case with those virtues which tend most to the good of others; hence a benevolent act, in addition to the immediate pleasure which it confers on the recipient, evokes an expression of approbation or pleasure from all who witness it, and thus the reflected pleasure of the actor is greatly increased, and the motive to action consequently reinforced. This love of praise enters in some degree into almost every emotion, and of many it is the principal strength. By it the actions of a body of men are made to suit their circumstances and combine for the common weal: hence from it spring codes of honour, the rules not of universal morality but of that

of a particular class or age or country, which is like a picture or caricature seen from a single perhaps ludicrous aspect, and so often distorting the proportions and falsifying the true perspective. Still though often misused, praise and blame are the great motive powers in the development of morality; for it is through them that a man is assured that he is performing his proper office in the organism of which he is a member. If the regard for them become exaggerated, it is sure soon to be checked by one of the constant reactions against hypocrisy and Pharisaism by which the world is ever infusing new vitality into its moral creed and rebelling against tyranny in its emotional organism. In ordinary times however it plays a large part in the Benevolent and other Emotions, and cannot be omitted in any account of their origin.* It is noteworthy that it is itself a compound emotion, for in addition to the sympathetic element of reflected pleasure traced above, much of it is due to the desire of confirming our good opinion of ourselves; some also to the love of power or influence, or the idea of sundry pleasures and pains which we feel able to produce.†

From the common root of Sympathy many more complex Emotions are derived. Love for instance, which in its wider sense‡ is originally the association of many pleasures with one individual, such as a mother or child, is developed by the

* Dr. Mandeville has so much exaggerated this influence of Praise on virtue as to make the whole of morality to depend upon it; and so to be nothing but an artifice of political skill. This suggests a truth, which we shall work out later, that all moral systems have some foundation of truth, and that their errors are those of one-sidedness. What is wanted is an organization of all.

† Cf. Spinosa, Ethica, III. 53, 29.

‡ We do not here mean only the physical appetite which unites the sexes, the development of which is traced by Mr. Spencer (Psychology, § 202): but the emotion which Spinosa defines as "lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ" (Ethica, III. 13, Schol.). This is no universal feeling, as might be fancied, but one of somewhat exotic growth. "Tel qu'on l'a depeint," says Cabanis, "et que la société le présente en effet l'amour est sans doute fort étranger au plan primitif de la nature." (Rapports, V. xiv.) Friendship, which is love without its grosser parts, is perhaps the purest and most refined of all the more common emotions, and the capacity for it in its true sense is much rarer than is generally supposed.

habit of continual sympathy, and again mixed up with other complex emotions, some of which have travelled from the same source by a different path. One of these latter is Gratitude, which in its origin is simply the associating with the idea of a person the pleasure which he has conferred upon us. Combined with this however is a slightly painful feeling of inferiority, or an association of the previous state of pain from which we were raised by the beneficent act. This painful idea is often very great, so that it has been remarked that the doer of a benefit is more bounden by the memory of it than the receiver, as with mothers and children. Its addition causes the original difference between gratitude and love; so that many small kindnesses cause love, but a few great ones gratitude.

In both love and gratitude there are two other elements, each of which has been at different times made prominent to the exclusion of the other. In the first place gratitude has been defined as "a lively sense of future favours," which (when slid out of the magic lantern of wit) means not that it is a simple "mercatura seu aucupium," a commercial speculation in hope of heavy interest, but that it involves a strong element of anticipation, an assumption that the future will resemble the past, and that both the nature of the benefactor and his relation to the actor will remain unchanged. The second element is the natural corrective of the first, and is equally characteristic. This consists in the wish to return benefits. The more strongly we associate pleasure with a person, the stronger is our sympathy with him: hence Benevolence is more directed towards him than towards the rest, and a return of kindness is suggested. Hence arises the reciprocity of benefits between friends, whereby love receives continual accessions of strength, and the burden of gratitude is relieved.

We have here merely taken a few instances of what may be called the Family Virtues, but it is evident that all the rest might be similarly treated now that the most difficult are disposed of. Hence we see how they all originally spring from

associated pleasures and pains, their various modifications being tempered by the circumstances of their birth. It must always be remembered that by the process of development these associated pleasures lose their intermediate terms and become organic emotions: also that when they are once formed they may be applied whole to objects and persons other than those by contact with whom they first took their origin.

Let us now pass on to consider the effect of the State in creating emotions. Perhaps its most important product is the development of the hitherto imperfect idea of Justice. In the Family there was little notion of justice beyond the irresponsible verdicts of the head, who was governed in his decision more by caprice and immediate expediency than by general conceptions of human nature:—

"θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
"παίδων καὶ ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν."

Generalization had however proceeded so far as to see that the preservation of the family demanded that none of its members should be allowed to usurp pleasure at the expense of the rest beyond his proper share. Hence came the old notion of retributive justice: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth:—

"δράσαντα παθεῖν
τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ."

What he had taken in an unjustifiable manner must be taken from him again, the stolen pleasure must be compensated by an equal pain. This instinct was of course confirmed by the fear inspired by the usurper, nobody knowing who should be the next victim; and by the natural jealousy or painful feeling of inferiority which results from each man's comparison of himself with the offender. Thus arises a conception of fairness, ἰσότης or equity, which demands the impartial treatment of all alike. The circumstances of the state naturally develop this first rude idea. Society is now more organized, and above the early broad distinctions of man and woman, parent and child, ruler and ruled, a number of classes spring up, all subordinated to a common centre. Each of these classes has a special function to perform

in the organism, and the rules by which the government regulates their conduct vary proportionally to this function. Hence in place of the old ἰσότης, which applies only to a number of units, a new and more definite conception of justice arises, which consists in the performance by each part of its special function, without interfering with the rest, as we find it for instance in Plato's Republic.* This is simply the application of the old principle to the new conditions, the old units being replaced by members of an organism. Hence Justice as before consists in the maintenance of internal relations; it is the condition of the preservation of the State organism, and so to uphold it becomes one of the main duties of the central government, just as the head provides for the welfare of the body, by preventing one member from injuring another. And later, when the State becomes itself a member of a higher organism, when eventually mankind is regarded as one, the conception of Justice is also widened, and then emerges not only the justice between one

* Rep. iv. 433, 441, D. Since Justice exists only in the State, it is not surprising that Plato fails when he tries to trace it in the isolated individual. Not only is man never isolated, but when we speak of justice (as in the case of all other abstract names of virtues) we merely mean a tendency to do just acts, and we do not call any acts just but such as have reference to our intercourse with others. Hence the second kind of justice of which Plato speaks, between the different parts of the individual organism, is merely metaphorical (see Arist. Eth. V. xi. 9): yet though the term applied to it is misused, its existence is an important element in the moral character, for it is merely the negative side, or condition of virtue, whereby no one faculty is suffered to prejudice the rest, and disorganization is prevented; as positive virtue is to develop organization, and so attain the end of the system, pleasure. The later conception of justice or equity noticed in the text is well expounded by Aristotle (Eth. Nic. V. iii. sqq.), and contrasted with the old indefinite notion which merely implied obedience to the established law (ib. i. 12, sqq.), and which had been generalized by the Pythagoreans (whose morality was simply the expression of early Dorian politics) into the doctrine of ἀντιπεπονθός—"εἴ κε παθοι τά κ'ἔρεξε, δίκη κ'ἰθεῖα γένοιτο," and which he himself elsewhere (Pol. II. ii. 4) recognizes as the true principle of *political* justice Such a standard, he says, is insufficient to settle the relation between the members of a state, for it looks upon men merely as units and not as members of an organism with distinct functions and dignities (Eth. V. v. 1—4). So also his notion of ἐπιείκεια or Equity is as a supplement to law where the latter fails in minuteness of distinction ("ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου," ib. x. 6), and consequently as an advance upon the ordinary conception of justice (ib. 7).

man and another considered as members of a common class, and that between class and class as members of a common state, but international justice between state and state as members of the great commonwealth of nations. Justice throughout differs from benevolence in being only negative: it enjoins to abstain from doing what would be an infraction of the principles on which society is based, to confine oneself to one's proper share of the general good. In process of time this share, to which each is entitled by the organization of society, comes to be looked upon as a 'right' inherent in the individual instead of being merely the result of his social position. But Right is merely a relative term implying rival rights: and when it is said that a man has a right to do as he likes within certain bounds, all that is meant is that the constitution of society forbids any restrictions but those imposed by itself, as otherwise disorganization would ensue. The eye has no inherent right against the eyelid to see anything it likes that does no harm to the body; it is merely that the interest of the organism forbids the eyelid to be continually interfering with vision, and therefore restricts that interference to certain prescribed cases. An isolated individual takes whatever he can get:* the word Right has no meaning when there is nobody to impugn it; it is only when desires come into conflict that the state steps in and determines the allotment to each, in order that society may be able to exist. Rights therefore are like Laws, on which they are founded, and "until they're broken have no force;"† and though in one sense they are natural, inasmuch as the organization of society follows the laws of nature, they belong not to individuals but to members of society. Hence it is an anachronism to say that society depends on a surrender voluntary or forcible of natural rights; far from taking them away it is the only source from which they are acquired. This then is the nature of Justice, a

* Cf. Spinosa, Tract. Pol. II. § 3,—"Totius naturæ et consequenter uniuscujusque individui naturale jus eo usque se extendit quo ejus potentia;" and Tract. Theol. XVI. § 3, 4. Cf. Plato, Gorg. 483: Rep. 338, c: Theæt. 172, b: Legg. 890.

† Hudibras, II. ii. 279.

virtue which, as we see, belongs not to man as a unit, but simply accrues to him from his position in society.*

There are many other Emotions which follow on the development of the state. Patriotism is a conspicuous example, the distinctive part of which is simply an extension of self-love and conceit, or the feeling of superiority arising from a comparison of oneself with others; for when man becomes no longer an individual but a member of an organism, he identifies himself with that organism, and wishes to do good to it as to himself. Still later this becomes a feeling of pride in human nature as distinct from the brute creation,† and perhaps may turn eventually into conceit of our own planet, or solar system, or milky way, as better than the rest: the elder emotions, selfishness (in the narrow sense), family pride, patriotism and the like, still of course remaining by the side of the higher, seeing that we are always *more* nearly connected with ourselves than with the state, with our country than with our race, with our race than with the universe. But we will not stay to consider these other emotions, having taken justice as a sample, both because it is the most important, and because our object was to shew the genesis not of all, but of those which from their apparently unselfish nature seemed to controvert a theory which derives them all from individual pleasure.

It has been the custom of empirical morality, to compare together all such virtues as those we have been considering, which aim at pleasing self through pleasing others;‡ and to

* Spinosa, Tract. Pol. II. § 23:—"Justitia et injustitia non nisi imperio possunt concipi. Nam nihil in natura datur, quod jure posset diu hujus esse et non alterius; sed omnia omnium sunt qui scilicet potentiam habent sibi eadem vindicandi: at in imperio," &c. cf. Lucr. V. 956, sqq.

† To this unnamed emotion is traceable the prejudice against the admission of brutes into the charmed circle of reason and intellect, which humanity has arrogated to itself as an inalienable birthright. As the Greek refused the name of virtue to the barbarian or slave (Arist. Pol. I. xiii. 2), so does the Christian refuse it to the horse or dog. The reason given is the same in both cases: the slave had no power over his actions, an animal is destitute of 'will.'

‡ "The self-love of some men inclines them to please others."—*Swift*, Thoughts on Various Subjects, iii. 402.

argue therefrom that there is a higher virtue which comprehends them all, and by sharing in which they gain their value. This ideal of virtue, called Self-Denial, is spoken of with peculiar reverence by all who profess to hold an 'elevated' system of morality—(elevated on the back of the passions which it spurns, and preserved from falling only by the 'mean and beggarly' facts which it contemptuously tosses away),—and is in particular the favourite idol of an ascetic and therefore imperfect Christianity. Yet it has been clearly shewn that this in itself is no Good at all: it is merely the means to Good, and that only in certain cases. For seeing that Self-Denial yields immediate pain, its only justification can be that it prepares the way for future pleasure or for the avoidance of pain greater than that it now inflicts. Only the most unreasoning fanatic would pretend that to inflict pain on oneself, or on any other being, is good in itself apart from the consequences; and *he* would say so only because he is surreptitiously looking at remote not proximate consequences, and because he forgets the pleasure of fanaticism itself.* If self-inflicted torture did not seem to him on the whole preferable to its absence, in other words, if he did not expect from it gratification in some shape, he would not choose it. For every reasonable act has some motive, and motive is anticipated or associated good: now self-denial brings immediate pain, hence to excite appetition it must be associated in the mind of the actor with ulterior consequences, whose good more than outweighs the present evil. Punishment is self-denial in a state, inflicting pain in the hope of preventing it; yet no one has ever considered punishment as a virtue in itself.

It is quite true that the higher or more philosophical morality is, the more self-denying it becomes; because it

* "There is a pleasure sure
"In being mad, which none but madmen know."
Dryden, Spanish Friar, II. 1.

The question of self-denial is treated at some length in reference to the ordinary theology in App. 7.

comprehends so large a sphere of consequences, that the future continually outweighs the present. But this is only for the moment: in the long run it is the vicious man who is the most self-denying, the virtuous the most truly selfish.* In the wish to be selfish there is no difference between man and man, each is perfectly selfish so far as his light goes; the apparent difference arising from an arbitrary use of language whereby we often confine the word 'self' to a very small part of the pleasures of life, to a self within the true self, and from the fact that the proportional weight of various pleasures differs in different individuals. Again, there is another sense in which the highest morality is the most self-denying, in that it conduces most to the happiness of others; but this as we have seen is because the more advanced the organism the greater number of organic emotions are formed by reflexion of the social medium, the immediate object of the actor being ever some state of his own consciousness, in this instance the satisfaction of these emotions, or the enabling them to perform this function of adaptation to surrounding circumstances. Each man, knowing only himself, can be influenced by himself alone; and his perceptions of phenomena provoke choice or aversion only so far as they involve immediately or by association pleasant or painful states of consciousness, and the effect of organization is only to change the second mode of connection into the first. The practised writer despises not the scribbled pothooks and grammatical solecisms of his child as if he could do more by his skill than more intelligibly and accurately express his thoughts, as if his flowing hand and elegant diction could think as well as speak; the pedestrian spurns not with disgust the totterings and tumbles of the infant, as if his well co-ordinated movements could do more than convey his body more easily from one place to another; yet the charitable 'Christian' moralist anathematizes the 'selfishness' of the drunkard and the debauchee, as if their actions were not merely lispings and false concords of morality,

* Hudibras, II. ii. 133. Plato, Prot. 335, E. Arist. Eth. IX. viii. Supra, note † to p. 64.

but some abominable heathen jargon, which could never be drilled into any virtuous orthography or prosody at all. He boasts the high born blood of his morality as if it were not only a little bluer than that of the vulgar herd of sinners, but a supernatural ichor which disdains the veins of aught but deities, and yet (horrible impiety!) as if it owed this divine quality to his own transcendent merits and exertions. Yet the difference between virtue and orthography lies only in the comparative intricacy of the studies, one of which may be perfected by a few years' instruction, while the other is the life problem of the whole human race; for the rules of grammar are artificially limited and conventional, but the rules of morality are made by nature and eternal.*

* Though modern moralists have forgotten this, it is not for the want of having it clearly put before them, for it was thoroughly explained by the Greek philosophers. It could never be more forcibly stated than in the doctrine of Socrates that virtue is knowledge. This aphorism however, which was too closely adhered to by Plato, (though in the Protagoras, s. f. and in Legg. II. 662-3, he gives a sketch of the deeper doctrine), was soon seen to be insufficient, as ignoring altogether the motive to action. The defect was supplied by Aristotle, who shewed that pure knowledge cannot of itself produce action (Eth. Nic. VI. ii. 5), but that the motive power in each case is supplied by ὄρεξις (ib. 4). Still he also saw that though desire was thus necessary as the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, yet its introduction made no practical difference, inasmuch as it always followed the law of knowledge, being either ἀγαθοῦ or φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. It gave indeed the force, but did not alter the direction of its effect. Hence he held that all vice is due to ignorance of either the universal or the particular, or to temporary forgetfulness in which we may be said at once to know and not to know (ib. VII. iii. 5, sqq.), and that in no instance can action help following knowledge (ib. 9). So the good man differs from the bad only by his superior knowledge (III. iv. 5), the bad erring only because he mistakes pleasure for good (ib. 6, cf. i. 14). A student of Aristotle may object to this statement of his views that he expressly proves virtue and vice to be voluntary (III. v.). This is to entirely mistake his meaning: he only shews that virtue and vice must be on the same footing, and concludes that they are both what we should call involuntary, for they are in our power only in so far as they result from a ἕξις which is produced by our previous actions, (which have themselves a similar origin), or in other words only in so far as their immediate antecedents are internal and not external (ib. 20). This is exactly the explanation which we have given below of the nature of the will and its apparent freedom (§ 5). Everything is ἑκούσιον which proceeds from knowledge and of which the antecedent is internal (III. i. 20), and the addition of deliberation gives birth to what we call the 'will;' but this 'will' has no self-motive power, it is merely a phase of the natural process of action, and has nothing to do with the determination of the end (ib. III.; ii. 11, 19; VI. ii. 5).

This suggests a remark with which we shall close the section. It is that in the above discussion we have been obliged to describe connectedly a process, of which only the later phases can be observed by each man for himself. The formation of the simpler emotions is antecedent to all history, whether of the individual or of the race; and when once formed and made organic by the habit of ages, they are handed on ready made by hereditary transmission without power of alienation or disclaimer. So a child born at the present day has at birth a number of emotions applicable as occasion shall serve; and withal a tendency to further organization, which is guided in after life partly by instruction and partly by experience. This not only appears in the capacity of forming more complex emotions, but in the rudiments of a higher organization which connects emotions together as members of a wider system, and thus suggests the final ideal of moral development as a complete organism of motives, a perfect correspondence of action and sensation. But the original and only material of emotion remains pleasure, dressed up however in so many shapes and disguises that it requires some research to recognize its fundamental identity.

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§ IV. Of the Relations of Mankind to the Universe.

Since the Good or End of Action of each individual consists in a correspondence between his organism and its medium, it may be extended by amplification of either of the two members of this relation. This double thread however we can unravel only in thought, for not only are the two fibres inseparable in each individual state of consciousness, but such is the complication of their mutual interweaving that no phenomenon can be referred to the single influence of either. Circumstances create philosophical ideas, which react again upon them and upon each other; as, for example, the great idea of the Roman Empire, the universal brotherhood of men, was perfected only by Stoicism and Christianity, its concrete philosophical pro-

ducts. Ideas again give birth to circumstances; as in the case of scientific instruments, or of religious wars. Hence it is equally true that man creates his own destiny, and that he is the creature of circumstances. Still sometimes one and sometimes the other comes apparently first, and for clearness we are obliged to widen artificially the division so suggested. Now, since all continuous change which is not evidently periodical or rhythmic, is comprehended under the formulæ of evolution, and its sensible progress measured by the outermost rim of nature at any given time; it is evident that the medium of an individual can be permanently altered only in and through its highest sphere, the human race and its constitution, just as the surface only of water is visibly affected by its rise or fall; and therefore that the moral evolution, so far as it depends on the medium, is concerned only with the varying relations of the individual with his fellows. This we have considered in the two preceding sections, by shewing how humanity has been developed from a number of homogeneous units into a heterogeneous organism, confining ourselves to the most striking feature of this development, its social and political aspect.* This change, internal as regards the race, is external to each individual; that which we now proceed to trace touches primarily the individual, and the race only through him. The former affected action by giving new circumstances to which it must adapt itself; this, by changing the power of adaptation to the old. These changes are by the universal law of Evolution contemporaneous; for organization advances both in generality and in speciality, both in comprehension and in minuteness, and so produces on the one hand a Grand Etre of Humanity, on the other a Bichat or a Newton.

If we turn now exclusively to the individual development, the same double process is still apparent. The human intellect has

* It would be interesting to work out other sides of this universal progress; such as the material or industrial, with the effects of the division of labour in promoting wealth and all its consequences; and the intellectual, with the organized commonwealth of intellect which individual development has rendered possible.

become at once more comprehensive and more complex; its ideas are wider, its observations more minute. Division of labour and centralization are the marks of intellectual as well as of political progress. In this we see the twin birth of Philosophy and Science, which are not only thus united in their source but intimately connected throughout their after history. For as is the regulating state to the labourer or manufacturer, guiding their mutual relations though dependent on their support; as is the central brain to the scattered departmental senses, drawing its material and aliment from them, but re-digesting and distributing it with a view to the advancement of the whole organism; such within the sphere of the intellect itself is the relation of Philosophy to Science. Philosophy draws its material from the sciences, and supervises their respective functions; it is in fact the Science of the sciences, the Architectonic of Nature, Epistetics;* like Plato's Dialectic or Bacon's Philosophia Prima. Now as in the former sections we dwelt more on the integrating than on the specializing tendency; on the organization of humanity rather than on the minute division of labour: so here also we shall consider the philosophic rather than the scientific element. The reason is that we want, not to examine the intricate special conditions, which though important to individual application are immaterial to principle, but rather to eliminate the particulars and estimate the general result. We must remember, however, that the two are correlative, and that without the special subdivision there could be no progress in generalization, as without facts there could be no theory. For as the state presupposes a certain division of labour, so philosophy implies some advance in science, or at any rate in experience of particulars and their comparison, which experience becomes truly scientific only when it is adopted by philosophy.

* The science not of Knowledge (Epistemonics) but of Things known. The two are however identical in data, differing only in their standard of classification, and if this identity had been kept in view, much groundless and so insoluble difficulty would have been avoided.

For a long time in the history even of civilized man there was a total absence of philosophy. Knowledge was in much the same state as society; a number of isolated bundles or families of facts, each sprung from a common origin, and reinforced not only by natural affiliation but by analogical adoption or the forcible conquest of argument, and therefore naturally keeping together under the supremacy of the most important or typical of its members, which acted as its symbol or representative in all foreign relations, but without any complex internal organization or any confederation with similar families outside it.* Nay the analogy is still closer: for the common source of each of these small classes of facts is, (by comparison with each man's own actions, from which he first derived the experience of change in phenomena), referred to a personal consciousness or Fetish, who controls the phenomena which he begets much as the father of a family his children. Soon, as the family grows into the state, so does the Fetish become subordinated to the higher conception of Deity, and by a further process of development, the idea of an organized unity of nature is symbolized as a hierarchy of ascending divinities under the presidency of Zeus or Jupiter. Thus the first misty germs of philosophy take the form of religion† or of poetry: for fancy ever soars higher than facts, adapting phenomena to its ideas rather than correcting itself by each new experience. Hence it is not till after a considerable time that the notion of impersonal law becomes prevalent. This at first appears as a modification of the religious creed by the birth of a new deity more stable than the

* The family stage was the earliest in knowledge as in society. An isolated 'state of nature' would be impossible, because facts are known only by their resemblances. A fact is as much a πολιτικὸν ζῶον as a man; it would die if alone. With the family therefore its history must begin; and from this point, its development is a facsimile of the political, until it culminates in universal empire.

† The early office of religion in accounting for the external phenomena which are out of the control of the observer is well described by Lucretius, V. 1182, sqq.; ib. 1217, sqq.

rest, (as in the Greek conception of Fate);* but on further progress Philosophy tends more and more to shake itself free. The conception of Law once formed becomes gradually wider and wider, as more extensive uniformities are daily discovered. The first few glimpses indeed of the unsuspected order of nature intoxicated the youthful spirit of knowledge, unsaturated as yet with facts and inexperienced in the toilful drudgery of observation, and filled it full of immature hypotheses and foolish fanciful visions of the goal to which even yet our practised eyes can hardly reach.† These soon ending in contradictions, (for each thought tried to prove itself by the only means in its power, disproof of all the rest),‡ had to be swept entirely away as only impediments in the future path. Hence came a natural disappointment and despair; the first hopes being dashed, the child pettishly gives up the problem, and in feigned derision asserts one solution to be as good as another. The age of the Sophists was thus a critical time for philosophy: but soon good sense returned, the momentary fit of sulkiness was over, and the human intellect readdressed itself to its task with all the vigour of a fresh start. But the past lessons were not forgotten, and the solution of the universe being seen to be as yet chimerical,§ philosophy prudently determined to begin at the necessary starting point, man; and to proceed systematically and soberly on its course. Thus human nature

* See Æsch. Prom. Vinc. 517; Her. i. 91.

† It is a characteristic fact that the birth place of this premature nature philosophy was also that of the most purely imaginative or emotional poetry.

‡ Thus Zeno tried to bolster up the Eleatic system by shewing through his famous paradoxes the irreconcilability of the rival system with the ordinary phenomena of motion and the like. This was the origin of dialectic or Eristic, which was thus naturally at first destructive, there being plenty of paper houses to pull down but little solid material ready hewn for building.

§ See Plato, Phædo, 96, sqq. Even the nature philosophers themselves, such as Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, all saw the weakness of their position and the impossibility of a successful solution of the universe from the data they then possessed. This we find expressed in their unanimous doctrine of the hopelessness of attaining truth. (cf. Cic. Ac. Quæst. i. 12.)

was the motto of the Socratic philosophy, and in this field its great triumphs were won. The great genius of Aristotle widely enlarged the bounds of philosophical inquiry and brought under scientific treatment subjects hitherto considered alien thereto; a genius unhappily too overpowering both for its contemporaries and for its immediate posterity, whom it obscured by its shadow and outpaced by the rapidity and length of its strides. So in despair of emulation philosophy became disheartened and weary of further toil, and nothing more was done but the arranging and rearranging of the possessions already won, as a merchant tired of trade spends his lazy hours in continual transference and reinvestment of his fortune, lessening thereby instead of increasing his store. Thus was it till the second revival of science and philosophy in the 16th century, when a wonderful infusion of fresh vigour was caused by the adoption of the enormous mass of unassimilated facts which had all the time been silently accumulating in the experience of mankind: just as a decaying empire is revivified by the infusion of fresh barbarian blood. Since that time the two have steadily advanced hand in hand up to the present day.

Turning from the outer history of philosophy to the inner, two points are most prominent: its starting point, man; and its tendency to ever increasing generality. Man, the latest product of time, the ultimate birth of nature, is the starting point from which the mind sets off in tracing nature's steps back upon herself, in analysing the universal synthesis.* In

* This I am aware is not the historical order of science (which is on the whole rightly given by M. Comte), but it is the order of arrangement both of each science and of philosophy the supreme science. Organization is not a single process, it is special as well as general, thus preparing the materials for its higher action; and the historical order of these special organizations is not that which they assume in the completed organism, but depends on the comparative aptitude for organization of the various portions of the material to be subjected to it, or in other words on the comparative simplicity of the subject matter of the separate sciences. When however the separate sciences have in this way become sufficiently advanced, philosophy proceeds to arrange them in their order of perfection and preeminence: it therefore takes the highest and last in order of birth first, and proceeds downwards in its arrangement, thus in fact reversing the historical order of evolution. The synthesis

resolution we naturally start from the most complex, our elements becoming simpler and more extensive as we descend, until at last we get to the primary elements of all, the original germs of evolution. Thus nature grows ever more conscious of itself, and the ideal is merely a return through self-consciousness to the primordial elements of the universe. Man is placed on the summit of the first or synthetical evolution, and at the base of the second or analytical; at the meeting point of two eternities, through one of which he has travelled from the unknown past, and through the other of which he must travel to the unknown future. The first step, therefore, in this great work of analysing the universe is to connect the individual man with those around him to whom he has the nearest likeness. Thus a distinct class is formed, which is in turn capable of being brought into relation with other classes similarly constituted, until at last a further step in generalization is attained; which forms the starting point for a renewal of the same process. In this way man has been in turn connected with his family, his state, his nation, and his race; so that finally a general conception of man as a member of humanity* supplants the early exclusive morality of the Greek or Indian; but as these changes are accompanied closely by the social evolution, partly produced by it and partly in turn producing it,

of science is the work of nature; its analysis that of the mind rendering nature self-conscious. Hence the true meaning of the separate sciences and their relation to action can be ascertained only by analysis: emotion can only be expanded outwards, by shewing the connection of man with each successive concentric ring of phenomena. The same is true of each individual science: the facts are collected upwards in order of simplicity, but coordinated downwards by analysis, the higher being resolved into the lower. Thus a general law is discovered which runs through all, and may now be applied deductively or synthetically; nature being made self-conscious by analysis is now in a position to rethink her unconscious operations. And just as the particular sciences aim at the discovery of law among their special facts, so does philosophy look for the law which connects *its* facts, these very sciences. Thus we see how the historical order of the sciences is the reverse of that in which they are treated by philosophy. They are collected in one order but used in another. (See note to p. 106 below.)

* Cf. Marc. Aur. VII. 13. Each is not a μέρος but a μέλος "τοῦ ἐκ τῶν λογικῶν συστήματος."

and we have already examined them under that head, we shall here pass them over in silence.

But the progress of generalization does not end here. During the time that the general notion of man has been slowly forming, other clusters of facts have been similarly detaching themselves from chaos, and consolidating themselves into definite classes, like nebulæ into planets or sensibility into ganglionic centres. These tend to form further unions among each other, analogous to the approximation and eventual fusion of ganglia into a brain, so that after a time the whole material becomes organized under a limited number of important centres, under which all the lower classes are duly subordinated. Such a stage was reached when it was customary to speak of nature as divided into four great classes,—of Inanimate objects, Vegetables, Animals, and Mankind; and to map out the departments of the various sciences, (as of neighbouring landowners who are strangers in birth), and so reduce phenomena to a few independent categories. But this stage is as evanescent as those which preceded it; though to many it may wear the appearance of finality, because it is that at which they themselves have arrived. For the fault of most men, nay, of most historians of philosophy, is to make their present age and state of thought the climax of their system, forgetting that the road stretches in front as well as behind, and that as the past has died to give them birth so their only business in life is to make way for the future. They are indeed spectators who have secured a certain window or hustled into a certain position in the line along which life's procession passes, but the mysterious object of its journey is not to do them honour, nor the magnificence of its pageantry for the dazzling of their eyes. Yet most men see no more than the actual landscape before them; they are bounded by their own petty horizon as by a smothering curfew, and if they raise their eyes from the ground, they think that all

> "Those mighty spheres which gem infinity
> "Are only specks of tinsel fixed in heaven
> "To light the midnights of their native town."

These great classes then of ideas which mark the centipedic or vermiculose era of philosophy, soon begin to converge: their edges become less sharply cut and shew a tendency to fade into mere shadows; and shortly connecting streaks and fibres make their appearance, which rapidly multiply like the shooting ice pictures on a window in winter, until the interstices are spanned by countless bridges, and the whole organism thrills with a single pulse. This final unity of knowledge under one mighty organization, through every member of which the truth circulates as the blood through the human body, is as yet not fully realized ;* but universal analogy promises its fulfilment, and we

* Truth is now. as Milton says, torn into a thousand pieces and scattered to the four winds. Her friends, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, go up and down, gathering limb by limb as they can find them. But not yet have they found them all, nor ever shall do till the final perfection of man's knowledge in Deity. Then at last they shall be brought together every joint and member, and shall be moulded into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection. (Areopagitica.) The history of philosophy, as partly traced in the following pages and as still in progress, bears a striking analogy to Laplace's theory of the universe. First a homogeneous nebula vague and formless, in every part of which self is equally diffused ; then a motion or rotation caused by the outer portions all pressing inwards round the gradually concentrated nucleus of personal existence; then a number of concentric rings breaking off successively as the central activity becomes too rapid, some of which retain much of their old nebulous nature, but most of which become, like the central mass, consolidated into a definite shape, and, throwing off satellites in their turn, revolve in orbits of slightly varying eccentricities and inclinations round the central force which regulates their movements, until at length a maximum of specialization and complexity is attained; then a gradual weakening and final overpowering of the centrifugal force by the attraction of the central mass, and a successive falling in of the various comets and planets, whereby the heat and vigour of the sun of self is fed, until at last all are reabsorbed in a self-conscious unity, and in a sense the universe returns into itself. So true is it that evolution is everywhere the same, and that from one part of it we may read the history of all. We may notice that the religion of each age is the foreshadowing of its future, or the ideal completion of its present tendencies. Thus in the era of differentiation, while the planet sciences were in process of formation, polytheism was the world's religion ; but the moment the maximum is reached and the era of redintegration begins, monotheism and eventually pantheism, or the reabsorption of everything into self, becomes the natural ideal of its hopes and aspirations. The end thus returns to the beginning, and self is again diffused through the universe. But the internal distribution is not the same ; we have no longer an indeterminate nebula, but a self-conscious organism. The beginning was chaos; the end is Deity.

have advanced sufficiently far to see it dimly before us. In order to understand this, let us trace more definitely the successive steps of the process of which we have hitherto described only the outline.

We saw that the centre or nucleus round which each man's philosophy and emotion must congeal, is himself; and we traced the formation round this centre of the widening sphere of mankind. When this is completed, the next step is to enlarge the globe so formed still further, by taking in and assimilating the next circumscribing ring of phenomena, which has already been prepared for unification by the long working of organization within it. This ring is manifestly the animal world, and it may be said to be now almost completely incorporated with the central mass. The study of natural history and physiology has shewn that the laws of human nature are not isolated, but are merely sections of a wider code, that of animal life. Whether we hold or not to the historical doctrine of evolution, it is impossible to deny that at the present time the animal world forms a continuous whole, an ascending chain of which no considerable link is lost. We have given a short survey of the various stages in this development from the psychological point of view and in the subjective language in our first section: and for a physiological account of the same in the objective language of phenomena we need only refer to the works of almost any eminent physiologist or natural philosopher of the century. Let us now consider the influence of this scientific fact upon the subject of our inquiry, morality.

If the animal world be an organism of which man is a member, the good of man, which is relative to his position in the universe, becomes merely a portion of a wider Good, that of the animal world, and the broad principles of morality must be not only human but animal. From Aristotle's day to the present, it has been customary to confine the names of morality and virtue to those actions which are intentional;—nay, even to a smaller class than this, to those which are deductively intentional,

which can be put in the form of a practical syllogism, shewing that they involve a conscious application of past experience. But, (as even in the present essay we have partly seen), this power of reasoning from experience is now proved to be a result of the development of animal life; and therefore such morality as this produces differs only from that of the lower animals in being more developed. Hence we are led to look for our first principle of Ethics in the common properties of animal life; and in our previous discussion we have found reason to think that the immediate basis of morality is to be sought in that property which is apparently the most distinctive of all, the correspondence of an organism and its medium, the correlation of organ and function. That this correspondence is always passively conscious, we have every reason to believe; but for active or perceptive consciousness, and for the secondary sequences of association which seem to be in our own power as having their seat in our inner selves, considerable complexity of organization is necessary. Hence action from association or experience, or what we call reasoning action, is only possible among the higher animals; and, vice versâ, the more advanced the mental development, the wider is the sphere of phenomena that can be represented in muscular expression.

Science having thus brought men to believe that morality is coextensive with the animal kingdom has made it actually coextensive therewith. This new sphere of application of the Law of Habit, in which man is enabled to think of himself not only in connection with his fellows but with the inferior animals, enlarges his conception of virtue, and so that virtue itself. For a new conception or idea is an addition to the intellectnal organism; and since good consists in the due performance of its function by every part of the organism and the furtherance of its natural expression in action, every fresh conception of good involves an extension of good itself. This is what is meant when men talk of the responsibility of knowledge and intellect, and of duties increasing with increasing light. But it may be

said that though man's knowledge is ever growing, his real good must have been always the same, and may be in fact something quite different from that which we now think it to be. This involves the confusion of relative and absolute good. Of absolute good we can only form a vague and imperfect idea; we picture it to ourselves in the Deity; but what morality is practically concerned with is the good of man as he is, and as we know him, the highest indeed of animals but still an animal, and not yet perfect. This we find to lie in the adaptation of his faculties to external laws: if therefore the faculties have increased, his good has increased also. Moreover, inasmuch as he stands at the summit of nature, and as progress affects only the highest part, it is only by his own development individual and collective that any such increase is possible.

Morality then being seen to extend to the limits of the animal world does actually extend so far—at least as to its general principles; for the application thereof to each man's individual actions has nothing to do with aught but the particular conditions of his own constitution and circumstances. Applied Ethics, if it be supplied with proper principles, cares nothing to know whence they were derived, or whether or no they are applicable to any other spheres of phenomena than that to which it is its duty to apply them: any more than the navigator or accountant deems it vital to the accuracy of his calculations to ascertain the truth of Mr. Mill's suggestion that there are possibly planets in which two and two make five. So that which is important in practice is not the new generality and applicability to which these principles attain, but the new ideas and emotions which by the process of association they beget in our minds, and which henceforth form part of the data in any reckoning of virtuous action. In other words, science affects moral action not through the animals and other objects to which its principles are applied, but through the man's self whom it teaches to apply them thereto; not, in fact, by its relation to his thoughts, but by its relation to his actions and feelings.

Thus we have advanced one further stage in our onward course, the steps of which we promised to trace; we have taken in one great concentric ring of phenomena, and incorporated it with ourselves; whereby we have made ourselves much bigger and more imposing, and have widely enlarged our notions of morality and of our duty in the universe. Yet how shall we be able to complete our promise so confidently made? nay, how shall we be able to advance another step in safety? For see you not, reader, how Science, our faithful guide, by whose aid we have marched on so boldly as yet, now waves her hand to us mournfully in token that she can accompany us in person no longer, but can only point out our journey from afar? What say you? shall we try to remember her instructions and continue our endeavours, or shall we sit still and wait for the heavy waggon loads of facts, and for all the sumpter mules and feeble walkers to come up? If we go on, we must remember that with the slowness of our 'impedimenta' we rid ourselves also of their safety; in abandoning the immediate company of facts we expose ourselves to the charge of dreaming and of building castles in the air. Yet if it be allowable (as who can doubt?) to extend to the future not only the statical and rhythmical but also the purely dynamical laws of the past, not only the law of gravity but (so far as we can trace it) the law also of progress,—we must needs anticipate a still further adaptation of our inner sequences to the physical laws of nature, a still further assimilation of the universe by our minds. Hitherto this process has been advanced by a continual organization of our inner nature, which, as in every age it becomes more perfect, intimates the existence of a similar organization in the universe, to correspondence with which we are perpetually approaching. Once man was considered a singular phenomenon in the universe; reason and instinct were held to be separated by a broad and impassable gulf: now the animal kingdom is shewn to have one nature, as a great class containing many species. This again however has in its turn become a unit or singular

phenomenon; or if it be in some measure connected with the vegetable world,* there is at any rate a chasm, of which few pretend to see the bottom, between the world of life and the world of death, things animate and things inanimate. Hardly in such phenomena as those of crystallization and chemical or electric affinity is there more than a very faint symptom of relationship, and the results of the most special science which comprehends them both were for a long time decidedly opposed to the theory of their connection. Here then is an apparent breach of continuity, a broad boundary stream that must be forded before any further advance can be made: here we feel the want of our heavy engineering train. But that it is fordable few men of science would doubt: nay that it *must be* fordable any man of comprehensive mind will admit, when he reflects that otherwise the two great laws of evolution and of the persistence of force must fail, the latter of which at any rate is the expression of the very nature of his consciousness itself.

It is hard to see what reason can be given for the contrary belief. I suppose no one will now contend that life is anything in itself apart from living matter, some foreign substance added *ab extra* which has the unintelligible power of affecting matter without being of like nature with it. Life, if considered as apart from living matter, is a mere metaphysical abstraction, an ens rationis or modus cogitandi; and living matter is hourly becoming inanimate, and inanimate again transformed into living.

But it may be said that the addition of consciousness makes the difference. Here again it is difficult to see from what school of philosophy the objection can come. For there are but four possible theories on the subject of consciousness. A man may either hold with the materialist that consciousness is matter; or with the idealist that matter is consciousness; or with the present writer and others that the two are identical and inseparable,

* Not perhaps concentrically, but at any rate as a second stalk from the same root. Even in the animal world itself, the hypothesis of many births of living tissue, not of one only, seems the more probable both a priori and a posteriori.

the one being, if we choose so to express it, a property, or (more strictly) a copy of the other; or lastly, with the ordinary so-called 'common sense' that they are two independent entia each having a separate existence. From the first three theories it is manifest that no such objection can arise; and the last can give no reason for the introduction of consciousness at one stage of the evolution of matter rather than at another. If a man believes in the existence of consciousness in any object that is not exactly identical with himself, he has no right to draw an arbitrary line at any particular degree of difference, and to assert that within that line is consciousness, but without it none. How then are we to account for the ordinary belief that the limit of animal nature is the limit also of consciousness? Simply by the fact that below this is the first great gap which we notice in our first cursory survey of the universe, and that here therefore is a convenient point at which to draw the line which our theory requires us to draw somewhere. Below man there is an earlier and apparently considerable division; and there accordingly it used to be the custom to mark off the sphere of another metaphysical entity, which was thus supposed to exist only in the human race, and which was called Reason; and even yet the ignorant and superstitious imagine this as a kind of mysterious vapour which disdains to take up its abode in any earthly tabernacle save only in the human body. This gap however was not thought to be sufficiently great to exclude the passage of the less pretentious and commoner entity consciousness; and therefore it was only a philosopher like Descartes, that seeing the unreasonableness of the distinction so implied, professed the doctrine of the automatism of brutes. But no better argument can be given for the exclusion of consciousness from inanimate matter than for the exclusion of reason from animals; and as we have seen the one prejudice give way to science, we may feel sure that in time the other will do likewise. Supposing then this chasm to be bridged, let us see how the additional breadth of conception so resulting would

affect man's view of himself and consequently his moral nature.

When by the progress of science man recognises the universal diffusion of consciousness, he will arrive at no metaphysical doctrine of Spinosism,* but merely at the perception of a general law which holds among the phenomena presented to him, or in other words, his states of consciousness. Thenceforth, when he perceives in objects external to his own body certain phenomena which by an organic association he calls consciousness, (and which are only certain arrangements of that true consciousness as forms of which they are presented to him), he will look upon them, not in the old way as isolated and singular phenomena, but as connected in an unbroken chain with all the rest of his possible sensations, as in fact an integral portion of those sensations as a whole, or, as he terms it, of the universe.

For even now, since these phenomena, when occurring in connection with that external object which he calls his body, are irresistibly connected by association with certain well known sensations, and they with the string of ideas by which in his experience they have been always followed, these same phenomena when occurring in connection with other similar external objects, especially those which he calls other men, are likewise associated with the same sensations and ideas. And inasmuch as the connection between these phenomena of his own body and his sensations is warranted by the most universal experience that he possesses, (for the sequence of action on feeling is, as we have seen, the most fundamental law of animal life), he is already utterly unable to rid himself of the association between the per-

* All objects of knowledge are phenomena: some phenomena being seen to differ in a certain way from the rest are classed together as 'mental' phenomena, and are looked upon as marks of mind, which is thus closely associated with them. As the conception of physical law widens, these marks are more and more closely connected with the rest of external nature, and at last seem to be part of it. Thus the sphere of mind must necessarily also widen, until at last, when every part of nature is seen to be potentially a mark of it, mind (by association) fills the universe. But remember it is our own mind and our own universe: we can know nothing else, and therefore nothing else can to us exist. (See Appendix 4.)

ception of them, whether in himself or in others, and the whole series of sensations and ideas which forms his consciousness; and so each man sees in others an image of himself, not of his bodily form and movements only, but of all the rest of his conscious states, of which these are what he calls the results. Thus the belief in other minds and consciousnesses necessarily flows from the experience of each man, and the more the external phenomena with which he connects them resemble those which he looks upon as their marks in himself, the more irresistible does the connection become. Hence it is now impossible to imagine our fellow men as unconscious, easier to think so of animals, easier still of plants, and at present very hard to think the contrary of inanimate objects. As soon, however, as science has taught a man that there is nothing in the phenomena of animal action which is not also present in the phenomena of vegetable and inanimate nature, that which is associated with the former will soon become associated with the latter: if he sees that the phenomena of his own action are bound up in the laws of the material universe, the consciousness which he is unable to separate from the former will be connected by a chain growing ever stronger with increasing knowledge, with every object which he sees around him. The stronger the similarity the stronger the association; but if there be any similarity there is some association, and all association must be weak before it can be strong. At present there is great apparent dissimilarity between the worlds of life and death, and thus there is a vast amount of prejudice or reversed association to overcome; but as man sees in nature more and more analogies to himself, and eventually views it as a great organism of which his own body and actions are merely members, so must he at last by the very laws of his nature look upon it as a great living mass of consciousness like his own. If all the universe is of the same nature as each man's self, then it must be to him necessarily conscious; for from himself he can no more separate consciousness than colour from sight or sound from hearing, and

therefore that which is like him must be conscious also. Thus as man is ever putting himself into the bodily forms of other men, so will he eventually put himself into the universe. His early experience makes him place his soul in his own body, his latest expands its habitation to the extremest bounds of nature. Hence we see how by this ultimate organization of knowledge, this complete correspondence of thought and phenomena, of secondary and primary states of consciousness, man will know and therefore feel himself all one: his inner and outer self, his ideas and sensations, his mind and the universe will not touch each other in one or two salient points only, but will meet along their whole line and become merged into each other; the copy will be a perfect representation of the original, mind will be a complete reflection of nature, and there will be but one law in the universe.

The perfection of knowledge is the perfection also of morality; —for knowledge moulds emotion, and absolute virtue is nothing but absolute correspondence with nature, in action resulting from thought. As yet, alas! we are very far from the end—nay, we seem hardly to have started at all. Science is as yet unable to give a broader foundation for morality than the animal world: pleasure is a word which we never apply but to animal life, and there is no name, hardly an idea, by which to represent to ourselves its simpler elements: nevertheless, if our aspirations be just, the principles of morality will hereafter not be the byelaws of an insignificant species or genus, but coeternal and coinfinite with that imperial code which holds the planets in their courses, whose 'voice is the harmony of the world,' and whose 'seat is the bosom of God.' Even now is there not a wonderful harmony between the deepest feelings and nature? Look, reader—

"how the floor of heaven
"Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
"There's not the smallest orb that thou behold'st,
"But in his motion like an angel sings,
"Still quiring to the young eyed cherubim:—

"Such harmony is in immortal souls." *

And how is our fancy tuned to hear this universal melody? Is it not by the instructions of Philosophy, the mistress of Heaven's nursery, who is daily

"rearing with celestial aim
"A [illegible]e seraph in our mortal frame,"

and fitting us for the company of Deity? Let us then strive our utmost to do her bidding, lest the day of our apotheosis be delayed. And it is no common melody to which she bids us listen,—no 'lean and flashy song' to catch the ignorant bravos of the multitude; but the fivefold harmony of nature pouring in not from ears only but from all the orchestra of senses; the genuine music of the spheres which 'draws the low world in measured motion,' and to which the poet's mind is ever warbling a soft harmonious accompaniment, practising as it were the parts of that magnificent symphony which is to be.† The highest virtue cannot be deaf to this harmony of itself and nature: 'the man that hath not' this 'music in himself,'

"That is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
"Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils;
"The motions of his spirit are dull as night,
"And his affections dark as Erebus:"

he is at best only a man; he has as yet no spark of the Deity. Surely it was no meaningless fancy of Heraclitus when he said that each individual mind must feel itself a part of the universal system;‡ that if men live ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν, their light is darkness and their sense foolishness. For is not the light

* Merchant of Venice, V. i. Cf. Marc. Aur. IV. 23, "πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει ὃ σοι συνάρμοστόν ἐστιν, ὦ κοσμέ, κ.τ.λ." So ib. X. 6. For a poetical expression of the Religion of Nature see Shelley's Queen Mab.

† "Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
"Are sweeter."—*Keats*, Ode on a Grecian Urn.

See Milton, Arcades, 61, sqq.; Hymn on the Nativity, 93, sqq. Cf. Plato, Rep. 617, B; Tim. 47, D: and Boethius, Cons. II. Met. viii;—

"O felix hominum genus,
"Si vestros animos amor,
"Quo cœlum regitur regat."

‡ Thus he called it "ἡ ἐπίξενωθεῖσα τοῖς σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα."

of the world the life of Him, of whom are all things and we in Him; of Him which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him;* of Him, whom, with a vague but true prescience, we conceive as at once the source of morality and the creator of the universe?

For in the remoter sphere of Philosophy, on the verge of nature's confine, where giant forms loom vaguely through the thickening mist, Religion takes up her abode. At first, as we saw, before the sun of science had risen, Religion ruled the whole domain; and even at his rise he seemed but a brighter speck of hardened fog; but soon he shook himself clear and stood out well defined, a globe of fire with a circle of blue sky ever widening around him; and so the mist gave way on every side, retreating further and further from the central heat. Thus Religion has gradually relinquished the rule of nature to Philosophy, and confines itself to those outermost portions to which the rays of science cannot reach, the extreme past and the remote future. The dominion of 'providence' is ever receding, and the efficient connection of the Deity with the universe is now divided in the minds of thinking men between the two offices of First and Final Cause. God is ever the Alpha and Omega of existence, but the intermediate letters are no longer a disconnected series, but are strung together into a mighty Alphabet of Nature, a single Catenary which hangs from heaven. Religion is therefore still with us what it was to the Greeks, the veiling of a vague belief about the hitherto undiscovered secrets of nature in the form of a myth; only with us the Unknown is removed farther away. We know indeed more than they, but only to see that an infinite region remains beyond; and nowhere is man content to profess ignorance, preferring even agreement in error to restless uncertainty.†

* Zech. xii. 1; John i. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 6.

† "Lorsque dans les choses de la nature dont la connaissance ne nous est pas necessaire il y en a dont on ne sait pas la verité, il n'est peut être pas mauvais qu'il y ait une erreur commune qui fixe l'esprit des hommes, comme par exemple la lune à

Nay more, some things, as beginning and end, are not only unknown to us, but *unknowable;* yet even here to round off our knowledge, we propound a verbal answer to the mystery which our reason cannot pierce, "an unimaginable lodge for solitary thinkings;"* and by referring all to the action of an incomprehensible Deity we fancy that we have solved the difficulty by the very words which pronounce it insoluble. To explain creation man exemplifies it: he creates a creator. Then when he has made him, he falls down and worships with all the pomp of sackbuts and the rest, saying, Be thou my God. For if his idols be broken man bows to idola, and his mind is a subtler workman than his hands. So these unfathomable depths of nature become the source of a certain spurious religion which dwells in creeds: we may best call it the Religion of Ignorance; for it lives only where we know nothing, and its favourite strongholds lie where knowledge is for ever impossible.

But there is another religion besides that of creeds, a religion not of words but of ideas and aspirations,—not of the darkness but of the twilight; and as in this lies the only motive power, so to this we must look for the advancement of morality. In this aspect Religion is a consequence and an embodiment of the universal tendency to progress, a vague foreshadowing of future knowledge. It is thus a dream of perfection, an inexpressible straining after evolution for which all creation is ever groaning and travailing together. In this sense it is in no way antago-

qui on attribue les changements de temps et le progrès de maladies." Pascal, Pensées, I. x. 17. Yet error often obscures the search for truth, and an immortal lie entailed on ages is a dear price to pay for present relief. See Religio Laici, 273.

* Keats' Endymion, Bk. i. Cf. Lucr. V. 1210, sqq.—

"Tentat enim dubiam mentem rationis egestas,
"Ecquænam fuerit mundi genitalis origo;
"Et simul, ecquæ sit finis, quoad mœnia mundi,
"Et tanti motus hunc possint ferre laborem:
"An divinitus æternâ donata salute
"Perpetuo possint ævi labentia tractu
"Immensi validas ævi contemnere vires."

This he says produces the idea of a creating and ruling Deity; and so ignorance is enshrined above knowledge, as if men thought that the less they know the higher the truth.

nistic to philosophy, but is rather an extension thereof warranted by philosophy itself; an anticipation as philosophy is a record of experience.* Yet this true spirit of Religion is ever in danger of being mixed up and contaminated with the dogmas and formulæ which the Religion of Ignorance is ever forcing on men's lips,† for half knowledge is very hard to separate from ignorance assuming knowledge. Thus in contradiction to its nature, it is perpetually embroiled in the anathemas of opposing schools and the warfare of creeds, and loses its credit from the ill repute of its involuntary associates; so that Science, its own parent, has often been driven to disown her offspring and to shudder at the very mention of its name. In history only can its true work be appreciated, for time is the great purifier of truth. By process of time the earthy matter with which the stream was discoloured falls imperceptibly to the ground and is forgotten, but the clear pure water flows on in widening banks towards the eternal ocean in the future. The real course of Religion is marked not by the blazing holocausts of rival sects, or the bones of martyred armies; not by the naked orgies of Ombi or Tentyra, or the theatrical magnificence of silken pageants; for these are but as bubbles bursting on its surface and leaving no trace behind them: but by the series of lofty thoughts and noble actions, to which the highest minds of all ages have been led by the conception of an ideal future and of a Being more perfect and holy than themselves. These die not with the circumstances that occasion them, for their real source

* Cf. Rom. i. 20.

† This confusion of the elements with the end of our nature is the same which led Rousseau (through the Stoics) to the conception of an early ideal state of nature. The identification of God with an external First Cause is like the doctrine of a golden age—a looking at the past in the light of the future, and thus a reversal of the true method of science. Except so far as the end is in a sense a return to the beginning, (an idea which it does not comprehend), it connects God with the most imperfect instead of with the highest form of existence. (See Appendix I.) It degrades him to a mere Deus ex machinâ, and is thus open to all the criticism applied (somewhat falsely) by Plato to Anaxagoras' concepton of νοῦς. (See Phædo, 98, C. sqq.)

is human nature itself, and they descend to its successive generations. They are the steps of the evolution of man: little glimpses into futurity which light him ever onwards to perfection.

Hence it is that all the highest and most general principles of morality have come from a religious source. The brotherhood of mankind was only half intimated by the Roman Empire; it first appeared as a truth of religion rather than of science. The half experience of universal empire putting on a religious dress soon led to the acknowledgment of its complete truth, as a prophecy works its own fulfilment. It was from religion again that men first learnt to abhor the torture and abuse of animals to an extent far beyond what would be dictated by consideration of their direct usefulness to mankind: an anticipation which science has been somewhat late in verifying. It is to religion, lastly, and its sister poetry that man owes a vague sense of his connection with nature, symbolized in the belief in a common creation: a doctrine which science can hardly yet claim for its own, but eagerly waits for as its promised heritage.

Thus it is through religion that science influences morality, so that by its means morality is ever in advance of science as man's future is in advance of his present. Hence comes the intimate bond between religion and morality, which makes each to be judged by the other: new maxims of virtue are nearly always introduced by a new religious system, and no theology can subsist unless founded on a basis of morality. But the real life-giving source of both is ever the same, and they can rise only with it: without knowledge the virtuous man is a well-tamed animal, without knowledge the theologian is a pedantic riddle-monger.

So the religion of the present must be the science of the future, and the virtue which seems at first heroic and divine must be the common standard to posterity; for each age contains the prophecy of the next, and it speaks by its religion. On the truth of its prophecy the life of each religion depends; for its thoughts which are verified are woven into the thread of the universal evolution, but those which are disproved are thrown away and forgotten.

Thus the old polytheism was continually stretched and moulded to meet the growing exigencies of science, until at last its form was seen to be altogether irreconcileable with the doctrines of philosophy, and it was cast off like a serpent's skin to be more fittingly renewed. Then came the rise and fall of several provisional systems, each of which gave only a partial answer to the universal problem, but which served to bring to light the principal difficulties requiring solution. First, there was the question of the relation of the Deity to man. Owing to the confusion, which we noticed as unavoidable in early civilization, between the Religion of Ignorance and the Religion of Aspiration, it seemed necessary that the Deity should be at once creator of the universe and the ideal of humanity: at once the absolute being of metaphysics and endowed with the human sympathies of the old hero divinities: he must be at once God and Man.* Secondly, there was the question of the relation of man to his fellows. The old deities had been mostly family eponyms, or, at widest, patrons of particular states or tribes, and no stranger was admitted to their worship;† now however that the progress of

* Hence too the need was soon felt of an angelic and saintly hierarchy to replace the old ascending scale of divinities. See App. 5.

† See the story of Cleomenes at Athens, in Her. v. 72. So too Ajax exhorted the Greeks to pray to their Gods for victory, but in silence and secrecy, so that the Trojans might not hear and plagiarize their devotions: "σιγῇ ἐφ' ὑμείων ἵνα μὴ Τρῶές γε πυθῶνται." (Il. vii. 195.) So it was also with the Jews; Jehovah was "the God of their fathers," and fought for them against the Gods of the nations round about, like the Greek and Trojan factions of Olympus in Homer. He was therefore very "jealous" of their undivided worship; and the greatest crime a Jew could commit was to 'go a whoring after strange gods.' For completer security against such impiety, foreign marriages were strictly forbidden (Ex. xxxiv. 16: cf. 2 Cor. vi. 14); and correlatively the offspring of such marriages was refused admittance to the congregation of the Lord to the third and in some instances to the tenth generation (Deut. xxiii. 3, 8; Ezra xiii. 1). The Romans again had not only national Gods, but worships peculiar to each gens, family, and even household (lares and penates); nay, each individual was supposed to be under the protection of a separate private Deity (Genius or Juno), to whom sacrifices and libations had to be constantly made. This extraordinary exclusiveness of religion was partly the result and partly the cause of its being localized in particular places and buildings. The early Gods were all ἐπιχώριοι—"Di patrii indigetes." The God of Israel dwelt in the tabernacle and afterwards in the temple; in Jerusalem "the holy city:" and to the latest times of

events had expanded tribes into nations and states into empires, a dim foresight of the unity of mankind glimmered in the foremost minds, and must needs embody itself in a universal religion peculiar neither to Spartan nor Argive, Greek nor Roman, Jew nor Gentile, but to be preached in every land, to every creature, rich and poor, philosopher and peasant. If the world was any longer to believe in God, he must be one God and the God of all the earth, and he must also be no respecter of persons. Thirdly, there was the question of the nature of the universe. Now as to the absolute origin and end of this universe science had made no fresh revelation, because as we have seen these are subjects on which knowledge is impossible, and therefore the old verbal solutions which the Religion of Ignorance demanded might be retained; but the particular form in which they were expressed needed variation, owing to the change which psychological observation had produced in the idea of Cause. Thus the story of creation must be put into a shape which might in substance be adopted by the current philosophy;* and the

Judaism, as it was considered the profoundest national humiliation that strangers were come into the sanctuaries of the Lord's house (Jer. li. 51 : Lam. i. 10 : 1 Mac. iv. 45 : 2 Mac. iii, (the story of Heliodorus), especially vv. 38, 39 : ib. v. 19), so also was it the most signal mark of triumph over their enemies to 'pull down their altars and burn their carved images with fire' (1 Mac. v. 68, &c.). Thus until the revelation of a universal brotherhood of humanity in Christ, the whole world except the Jews "being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise," had no hope and were without God in the world (Eph. ii. 12); and although the middle wall of partition was broken down by Christ (cf. Gal. iii.; Eph. ii.; Rom. ii. iii.), there still remained and even yet remain many traces of the 'God of all the earth' having formerly been the God only of a peculiar nation and country. For Christianity, like the Roman Empire its type, retained under its universal organization the traces of its local and national origin. Did not St. Paul, the preeminent apostle of the Gentiles, long to be in Jerusalem for the feast? Were not rivers of Christian blood poured out to keep the 'holy places' from being defiled by infidels? The idea of local worship was also fostered by innumerable shrines and pilgrimages, and on the loss of Palestine Rome tried to set itself up as the favoured dwelling place of God. Even now and in Protestant countries, the vulgar conception of God is of a Being who dwells in churches turned towards the East, rather than of a Spirit whose temple is the hearts and minds of men.

* The Mosaic cosmogony was immediately adopted under the passive form of Emanation by the reigning school of metaphysics. Neo-Platonism has its only

attributes of omnipresence and infinity must be distinguished from and added to the notion of a First Cause. God must be the immanent soul as well as the creative hand of the universe.

These, the principal results to which the course of knowledge pointed, were incorporated into a new great system of religion, which was forthwith substituted for the scattered reasonings which had suggested it; for it embodied them all, and filled the whole sphere of human knowledge. Not only in its principal features but even in its minor details did it follow the bent of the philosophy which it extended; as an instance of which we may notice the account which it gives of the origin of evil, a picture of a state of early happiness in which we easily recognize the natural ideal of the philosophy of a declining age.*

So religion once more flew ahead of science and for a time monopolized the whole field of human speculation. Meanwhile however science as before kept creeping up, and verifying the accuracy of its past prophecies: and at length it became again severed from religion, in so far as its later experience was at variance with its former anticipations. The separation when once made grows ever wider and wider; for creeds remain immoveable, but science is ever marching onwards. For religious

importance as shewing the connection of the old philosophy and the new religion. Marcus Aurelius too and the Stoics had a strong belief in the unity of the universe. He says, (vii. 9) "*πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπλέκεται καὶ ἡ σύνδεσις ἱερὰ καὶ σχεδὸν ἡ οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· συγκατατέτακται γὰρ καὶ συγκοσμεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν κοσμόν. κοσμός τε γάρ εἷς διὰ ἁπάντων, καὶ θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς, λόγος κοινὸς πάντων τῶν νοερῶν ζώων, καὶ ἀλήθεια μία· εἴγε καὶ τελειότης μία τῶν ὁμογόνων καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου μετεχόντων ζώων.*" Vid. etv. 8. This principle he also applies to moral precepts (vi. 38, 42; x. 6, 11; ii. 9; iv. 40). Hence the Stoic universe was the *Διος πόλις*, of which God was the permeating soul and life (iv. 23; v. 21; vi. 5, 42), and their morality was to live as becomes a member thereof (x. 6). This went beyond the Christian philosophy, and was too far in advance of the science of the day to take real hold upon men's minds.

* Thus Boethius, the last of the ancient heroes of philosophy, writing in prison under a barbarian ruler of Rome, his only crime love of its old institutions, argues directly from antiquity to happiness:—"Deum rerum omnium principem bonum esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit: omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse clarucrunt."—Cons. iii. Pr. 10. We find exactly the same in Lucan, and in the Stoic writers Epictetus and Aurelius.

systems are like beacons which the traveller sets up on each hill summit that he passes to light him on his way to the next: they remain immoveable where he left them, their light growing dimmer and dimmer in the distance; not like the lantern which he carries in his hand, which gives indeed a less magnificent halo light, but which is the perpetual source of their successive illuminations. Thus science has again outgrown its past, and is turning its gaze only on the future: the light of the last beacon is waxing faint in the distance, and who knows how near is the hill top on which the next shall be lighted?

We dare not attempt to sketch the outline of the coming creed, but we may at least try to shew what of the old must be retained, and what direction any change must take.* We have likened a change in religion to the casting of a slough, a throwing away of old forms of belief which have grown too small to dwell in and which time has made too hard to admit of expansion. Man's spirit bursts the concealing cerements which have petrified into a prison around it, and emerges a butterfly while men thought it a dull dead chrysalis. What then is the weakness of the present form of Christianity? Is it not in its rites and formulæ, its creeds and articles, its dogmatism and its orthodoxy? Where on the other hand is its strength? Is it not in the grandeur of its conceptions, of its morality, of its human ideal; in the boundless catholicity of its spirit, which rejoices more over one earnest inquiring mind that has seen even a little corner of truth, than over the ninety and nine orthodox who have never seen it at all for themselves, but adorn their vacant walls with its portraits and pedigree, as a symbol of respectable descent; and who talk with complacent pity on the miserable present and future damnation of those who sweat and labour like true children of Adam for their daily sustenance of faith, and cannot boast the patronage or security of an hereditary connexion with heaven.

* Inasmuch as positivism claims to have regenerated religion, I have thought it worth while to discuss the validity of this claim in an Appendix. (vid. App. 6.)

That we may speak more definitely, let us take each of the three great questions which we referred to above as being answered by Christianity, and see how far its answer in each case has been verified, and how far it requires to be remodelled. Taking first the problem of human nature, we recognize the immense debt due to Christianity as having first propounded the great idea of a universal humanity, an idea which the progress of science has tended only to make clearer and more definite. Mankind is the first great ring of phenomena which each individual incorporates with himself, and the globe so formed becomes the nucleus for further assimilation. Thus the Christian doctrine of human nature, by which, as the basis of its moral code, it has principally influenced action, must ever be incorporated in future religions; but henceforth as a starting point rather than a goal. What religion praises in one age it commands in the second, and tolerates in the third. It was once a rare, nay an unheard of virtue to love one's neighbour as oneself; but henceforth it must be an elementary maxim, a part of the very accidence of morality. For each individual is no longer merely a man; he is a living creature, nay, he is a part of universal nature. This leads us to the second problem, that of the nature of the universe and its connection with man. As this is intimately mixed up with the third, that of the relation of man to the Deity, it will be well to consider them together. Now we have seen that the doctrine on this head is referable to a twofold source, the one part coming from the true or prophetic religion, the other coming from that which we have designated the Religion of Ignorance. It is evident that the latter portion can be in no wise influenced by the advance of science, for on that which is unknowable *per se* knowledge can make no impression. The conceptions of a first cause and final effect are as impossible now as ever: they can be attained by no increase of our present knowledge, but only by a total change in the nature of knowledge itself. Hence the verbal formulæ by which men fancy they express them,

unless they are altogether abolished, (which is unlikely owing to the natural impatience of ignorance), will be modified only so far as to suit the imagination springing from a wider experience;* and we may expect the reproduction in some form or other of the articles which treat of the creation of the universe and of the ultimate abolishment of time and space. But of the universe as we know it science is able to speak to us; it has taught us much and we foresee that it will teach us more, and on the expression of this our anticipation will depend the characteristic doctrines of the new religion. At the foundation of Christianity the work that science promised to perform was the unification of humanity; and this work it has completely executed. It now points out in the future, as its next task, the unification of the universe; and this must stamp the character of the religion of succeeding ages. As the Christianity of the past was preeminently a religion of humanity; so must its successor in the future be nothing less than a religion of the universe.

Let us next see what form this is most likely to take, and how it will affect the formulæ of the Religion of Ignorance. At the commencement of the present era there was, as we have seen, a great gulf between man and the animal world, and still more so between man and the lifeless universe. Hence God, who is ever the ideal of humanity, was naturally considered as external to the universe, and was pourtrayed in the functions of creator and ruler. To animals and inanimate objects He was only the condition of existence, by man alone could His true essence be known: He was a God only of mankind, and cared for the rest of creation solely on man's account. Henceforth, however, religion must express the unity of man with nature; so whether as Cause (which must be homogeneous with effect), or as Ideal, God can no longer be separated from the universe, but must be identified with that complete organization of pheno-

* See note to p. 129. Our notion of effect is now only as a redistribution of cause; so both the first and final cause of the universe must be itself.

mena, that ultimate harmony of natural laws, which we picture to ourselves as the perfection both of the world outside us and of its reflected image, the human mind. The Deity will be pictured on the one side as a completely developed and perfect Cosmos, in which there shall be no clashing of opposing forces, no struggles of rival functions, but in which each part will be in perfect correspondence with the rest and in perfect subordination to the central organism; in which therefore there will be one life, one common existence, without parts and indivisible: on the other side, as a completely organized Mind, in which there shall be no imperfect adaptation of part to part, no undue development of one portion rather than another, and thus no fancied limitation of existence to certain special patches of phenomena; but which shall be equally extended on every side and equally harmonized in its every function, infinite because there can be nothing beyond it, and absolute for the same reason because coextensive with existence. These pictures, though apparently two, are really one: for in the conception of God the distinction of mind and matter must disappear. To our present experience the two seem different, because, owing to the imperfect organization of our nature, the laws of the one part are not in complete conformity with those of the other; the primary sequences being called the universe, the secondary mind: but when, as in a perfect Being, these two not only approximate but coincide, the distinction vanishes, and matter and mind become synonymous. It matters therefore little whether we speak of the Deity as an Omniscient Mind or as a Self-Conscious Universe. Mind and matter, the subjective and objective language, are like a curve and its asymptote running as far as you can see them apparently parallel but coinciding at infinity. The universe is the asymptote, and mind is the curve continually approaching it. At first one small speck of phenomena forms the germ from which organization spreads, and the reflected images thereof, which are the earliest rudiments of what we call mind, are naturally connected with it and localized

in it; soon however, as organization spreads and wider spheres of phenomena are assimilated, mind becomes associated with and thence localized in a perpetually widening circle, of which we can conceive no ultimate limit. This connection of association is only an inaccurate reproduction of the sequences of nature, and in a perfect being this inaccuracy vanishes; and so belief is merged in existence and sympathy in actual consciousness. Mind is nothing but imperfect matter, and when by the completion of development its faults finally disappear, mind and matter become one: not two attributes of one substance, but one undistinguishable ultimate substance, which cannot be perceived because there is nothing outside it, unknowable because coextensive with knowledge. Hence we attain to a new view of the Omnipotence of God:—for inasmuch as his thoughts are the laws of the universe, phenomena not only follow immediately on his thought but are actually identical with it. Now power is measured by the strength of the connection between mental and phenomenal sequences: therefore if these become coincident, power becomes infinite. Hence also we see new meaning in the Omnipresence of the Deity in space and time. He is present throughout the universe because He is the universe. Man in a certain sense is omnipresent, for existence is coextensive with knowledge; but owing to the uneven development of his inner nature he seems present in one part more than in the rest; so he localizes his mind in a body, and measures his existence by its birth and dissolution: but a being to whom existence is not only coextensive but identical with knowledge, and whose inner nature is perfectly organized, is present in all parts and at all times equally, and his individuality is lost. For individuality is the result of imperfection: a perfect being has nothing outside him, is in fact Infinite. Omniscience again is but another side of omnipresence. God is all because he knows all, for knowledge made perfect is merged in existence: and foreknowledge is nothing but existence in the future, time and space, sequence and coexistence, being merged

into each other with the worlds of which they are the forms,* so that the life of the Deity can be described either as one all spreading Now or as one eternal Here.

Hence again we may understand how the Deity is at once the ideal of morality and the ideal of happiness. Perfect morality is nothing but perfect happiness, and both result from the complete adaptation of action to circumstance, of mind to nature. When these two sides of our nature become not only parallel but coincident, morality and happiness become not only infinite but merged into the harmony of nature of which they have hitherto been the reflexion, the subjective and the objective now being one. Then at last Virtue, having finished its work, fades into the felicity of perfect existence.

Thus in the future expression of man's idea of the relation of the Deity to the universe we may anticipate a strong leaning to Pantheism. This tendency began, as we have seen, even in Christianity. The change in the conception of cause which was the product of Greek philosophy demanded a modification of the early doctrines of external agency and efficient creation. Hence the disappearance of dualism from the Christian cosmogony: God evolved the universe out of himself—He did not fashion it out of a co-eternal raw material. And as the beginning of the universe was in God, so its end is to be its reabsorption into him. Hence also the conception of Providence was no longer one of direct external interference, as in the old mythology, but of an indwelling Spirit, the sequences of whose thoughts are represented to us in the events of nature; in

* As to the relation of Time and Space and the history of their perception see App. 3. We are of course as yet quite unable to realize their union, for their separation is coextensive with our developed experiences. But in explaining creation and dissolution, (two insoluble problems), analogy points in the former case to the separation of space from time in the divine consciousness, in the latter to their reunion: and we thus modify the phraseology of our solution to suit the aspirations of our latest knowledge. If we could wholly conceive God, we should be God; whereas the very essence of religion is that it is something above us and our knowledge. 'If God could be known he would be no longer God.'

whom everything that is lives and moves and has its being. The whole tendency of later experience is to confirm and expand this Pantheistic belief. Cause is now seen more clearly than ever to be necessarily of the same nature with its effect; for the effect is merely the cause in another shape, the same forces distributed in a different way. The true cause of a phenomenon is not its occasion, but the whole mass of previous conditions on the combination of which it immediately follows. Thus the cause of the universe at any moment is itself in the moment immediately preceding; the sum of forces remains the same, though their relative distribution is changing.* God then as the cause of the universe must be the universe; if its first cause, He must be its elements; if its consummation, He must be its final perfection; as its disposer, His thoughts must be its laws. So the Ideal of humanity must henceforth impersonate the unity not only of mankind, but of the whole universe; he must be a Being in whom all nature meets.

Now of the Christian Trinity, God the Father, so far as he is separable from the other Persons, is the God of the Religion of Ignorance, of whose attributes and nature science can only tell us that they are for ever unknowable until our faculties cease to be imperfect; the God of creeds and dogmas, of churches and sects, of orthodoxy and heresy: and as long as these exist so long will they cling to their source of strength, so long will the attributes of the First Cause form part of the articles of faith. God the Son is the God of human nature, the head of all the nations of the earth, the impersonation of universal humanity. Hence he is the natural centre-point of the Christian system, as the prophecy of the immediately succeeding age; and the true object of Christian worship. God the Holy Ghost is the God of

* "A primâ descendit origine mundi
"Causarum series: atque omnia fata laborant
"Si quidquam mutasse velis."—*Lucan.*

Everything is "ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων συγκλωθόμενον."—Marc. Aur. V. 8. So too, looking forwards, our every action, nay, our every thought, is indelibly recorded on the universe for ever.

the universe, the inner Spirit of nature. His attributes are but dimly hinted in the Christian system, because the belief which they foreshadowed was in the distant future. He proceeds from the Father and the Son, though some have said from the Father only; for the idea of a personal Humanity necessarily precedes that of a personal Nature. Hence his worship has hitherto had little meaning; nay if grasped by some higher intellects it has been looked upon with suspicion and held to savour of heresy. Henceforth however the Third person of the Trinity must be the central figure in Religion. The purely human ideal has become too narrow to satisfy the highest aspirations, though it will still remain the great motive power with the majority of mankind. It must therefore be subordinated in its due place; and man must be transfigured not in his relation to his fellows only, but as a member of the universal organism of nature. Rather we might say that the Second and Third persons must coincide: the form of the one must be expanded to the spirit of the other: the body of man must be absorbed in the great body of the universe. Hitherto Pantheism has been the religion only of the greatest minds; but as by the process of evolution the great minds of one age become ordinary in the next, as the foolish son may use the wisdom of the father, the great mass of mankind must soon be fitted to receive it; and though its infancy will doubtless be harassed by all the persecutions by which the prejudice of ages ever attempts to stifle the dawning of a higher faith, it must ultimately prevail and reign its appointed period, until its errors have in turn to be corrected by advancing science, and its dim prophecies be swallowed up in the light of reality. Then its now imagined forms must in turn give way to a higher religion, which perhaps now our minds are unable to grasp, but which shall speak to posterity in language as life-like as this religion of the universe speaks to some of us now, or as the Christian ideal to its early worshippers. For each religion is but the dream of its age, and dreams can never go far beyond knowledge; but knowledge

has come yet but a little way and stretches forward into an illimitable future. Nay even if the dream contain the perfect truth, no man can be sure that he reads its meaning aright; still less can he hope to give it articulate expression, to pourtray the future in words borrowed only from the past. "So runs my dream," he may say, "but what am I?"

"An infant crying in the night;
"An infant crying for the light;
"And with no language but a cry."

No man can be dogmatic who remembers that our present ideas cannot be wholly true, that they are at most only approximations to truth. We can see only backward plainly; the future is at best deep enveloped in mist. And after all it is not by its outward formulæ that the active influence of Religion can be measured. Words do but chill the warmth of feeling: and in feeling lies the only power of action. It is not in the particular form which the Religion of Ignorance gives to its creed, whether it be Pantheistic or Platonic Christian, or Mosaic, that the true vitality of Religion consists. This is merely a name or symbol in discussion, and a name can neither add to nor take away from that which it is used to signify. But to feel himself one with nature; to see in himself that—

"One God, one law, one element
"And one far off divine event
"To which the whole creation moves:"

to expand his consciousness beyond the petty prison house which fetters it, and feel the universe throbbing in his soul: to lose his individuality in the infinite laws of nature, and raise himself to the aspiration of Deity: this, not his creed, is a man's true religion.

"Erfüll davon dein Herz, so gross es ist,
"Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist,
"Nenn' es dann, wie du willst,
"Nenn's Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!
"Ich habe keinen Namen
"Dafür! Gefühl est alles;

"Name ist Schall und Rauch,
"Umnebelnd Himmelsgluth."*

But such religion (it will be said) can only be that of the few, and can never affect the general standard of morality among men. To this we answer that all religions are religions of the few: because it is only the few that ever have religion at all. Not one man in a thousand professed Christians feels the true meaning of the doctrines which he repeats;—yet Christianity is the religion of the civilized world, and morality has been almost recreated by its influence. The religion and the morality of mankind is ever determined by that of its foremost members: the rest follow obediently behind them and imitate the movements of their lips.

In all that has been said above there has been nothing but a sketch of the history and future of Natural Religion; there has been no reference to the existence or non-existence of a Revelation as a basis of faith. The belief in this must of course rest on the evidence of its having been given, a circumstance which (though likely to have been invented in any case) involves in itself nothing impossible. To inquire into this would be here manifestly impertinent, and I wish distinctly to disclaim any such intention; but there are two points commonly ignored by those who have undertaken such inquiry, and which, as bearing on our general subject, it would seem advisable to notice.

The first point is this: that no revelation can be received which contradicts universal experience, inasmuch as this is the highest criterion of certainty which we possess. A revelation must necessarily pass through our senses to reach our under-

* Goethe, Faust. In the same poem he describes the pantheistic aspiration in the following noble lines:—

"Erd und Himmel wonniglich umfassen
" Zu einer Gottheit sich aufschwellen lassen,
" Der Erde Mark mit Ahnungsdrang durchwühlen,
" Alle sechs Tagewerk im Busen fühlen,
" In stolzen Kraft, ich weiss nicht was, geniessen,
" Bald liebewonniglich in alles überfliessen:" &c.

Cf. Marc. Aur. VI, 38, 42; X, 6, 11; V, 8; II, 9.

standing, and it is absurd to place an inference from one or two special sensations above those drawn from the whole past experience of humanity.* If universal experience be contradicted, there remains no longer any proof either of the accuracy (or rather consistency) of sensations, or of the truth of the principles of reasoning by which sensations are made to yield their meaning. If such a revelation be true, the method by which we learn it is invalidated, so we have no reason to believe it true; and what *is* truth but universal belief? If it be true, then all our knowledge is fallible, and this 'truth' is as likely to be false as not. We may go further than this and say that whatever contradicts universal experience can not possibly either be true or exist; for truth and existence are ideas created by our own mind by the medium of experience: they can therefore have no possible connection with what is consonant with neither. The celebrated aphorism of Tertullian, "mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est quia ineptum est: et sepultus revixit, certum est quia impossibile," is worthy alone of the fanatic who pictured among the delights of heaven the vision of heretical babies a span long crawling and frizzling on the floor of hell. Faith is nothing but belief with a grander name, and like all other belief must follow the ordinary rules of evidence. If faith be above and independent of reason, there is no longer any standard whereby to judge the relative truth of opposing creeds. Each has as much claim to supremacy as the rest. For why should one sect claim a monopoly of orthodoxy, and say

> "Solis scire deos et cœli numina nobis
> "Et solis nescire datum?" †

* Leibnitz (sur l'entendement humain, iv. 17) says, that such a belief would "renverser les fondements de nos connaissances et rendre toutes nos facultés inutiles." See too his essay "sur la conformité de la foi avec la raison" in the Theodicée. Even Coleridge admits that a doctrine which contradicts any universal principle contradicts itself, (Aph. ii. on Spiritual Religion); and Jeremy Taylor says that 'whatever is against right reason that no faith can oblige us to believe.' —Worthy Communicant, iii. 35.

† Lucan, Phars. i. 447.

Why should there be such a charm in the accident of birth in a certain age or latitude? Why should salvation lie in a white hen? If the truth were so, a man would take his father's God like his property, "all by the same blind benefit of fate," and, if saved at all, would be saved "in his own despite, because he cannot help believing right."*

So a religion that refuses to admit the interference of reason, puts itself at once out of the pale of competition; it may burn and curse and massacre, but it cannot argue; it may even create enthusiasm and give birth to great ideas, but these, as mere suckers and unnatural growths, must soon wither away and leave no permanent good behind them; nay, in so far as they suck the sap from the true stem and misdirect the energy and aspirations of mankind, they weaken the tree and retard its growth.†

We must however draw a distinction between what is contrary to our experience and what is beyond it. We may not be able to understand a proposition, but we may also not be able to deny it or prove its opposite. If a doctrine be irrational, it is necessarily false: if it be incomprehensible, it is indeed unmeaning and impotent, but it bears no evidence on its face either of truth or falsehood. For we have no reason to

* Absalom and Achitophel, i. 537.

† It is curious how all religions admit reason a certain way,—so far as it does them good; but after a time draw a stern line and forbid a man armed with arguments and logic to go further; for that the rest is the realm of faith, where no form bearing the aspect of reality must pass.

"Quisquis es armatus qui nostra ad limina tendis
"Fare age quid venias: jam istinc et comprime gressum.
"Umbrarum hic locus est, somni noctisque soporae;
"Corpora viva nefas Stygiâ vectare carinâ."—(Æn. vi. 388.)

It is indeed true that some by use of reason, 'dis geniti,' have tried to hurl the three crowned (if not three headed) portitor of purgatory "ipsius a solio regis;" and others have dragged 'the lady of heaven' from her throne; so it is natural that a church whose credit rests on the belief that these are the powers that rule our happiness, should grow suspicious and refuse to credit the profession of each curious Æneas, "nullæ hic insidiæ tales:" but opposition avails not long, the passage is soon forced, and resistance abolishes the right to quarter.

suppose that there may not be innumerable other laws and regions of phenomena besides those which our senses enable us to perceive, and which are now as incommunicable to us as colour to a man born blind, seeing that we have no ideas or language except those of our own experience.* These phenomena and laws may however come very rarely into contact in some part of their operation with those which form the rest of our experience, and being there transformed may work what seems to us a miracle, or an exception to a certain special class of experience which forms part of nature as we know it.† But though we may be warranted in believing facts which are at variance with any one part of experience because their truth is testified on evidence still more certain than that which contradicts them; because in fact their denial involves a greater inconsistency with all experience than their truth; this can never be extended to doctrines which contradict the whole or even the greater part of our knowledge. We may believe a so-called 'miracle' because it varies only from that particular class of natural phenomena in which it works, and does not (as we have seen) necessarily involve a reversal of the whole; and because the arguments in its favour, the evidence of sense or the trustworthiness of testimony, rest on a broader foundation of experience than that represented by the class in question: we may in fact (and must) apply to miracles the ordinary criterium of belief; but that we

* "Un homme inspiré de Dieu ne peut point communiquer aux autres aucune nouvelle idée simple, parcequ'il ne sert que des paroles ou d'autres signes qui réveillent en nous des idées simples que la coutûme y a attachées, ou de leur combinaison: et quelques idées nouvelles que S. Paul eut reçues lorsqu'il fut ravi au troisième ciel, tout ce qu'il y en a pu dire fut que ce sont des choses que l'œil n'a point vues, que l'oreille n'a point ouïes et qui ne sont jamais entrées dans le cœur de l'homme."—Leibnitz, Sur l'entendement humain, IV. xvii. With a "revelation originelle" such as that to St. Paul we are not here concerned.

† Thus Spinosa (Cog. Met. II. xii. § 7) says, "plerique ex prudentioribus theologis concedunt, Deum nihil contra naturam agere, sed supra naturam; hoc est, ut ego explico, Deum multas etiam leges operandi habere, quas humano intellectui non communicavit, quæ si humano intellectui communicatæ essent, æque naturales essent quam cæteræ." Leibnitz triumphantly proves against Bayle the distinction between what is above and what is contrary to experience.—Theodicée, § 63.

should believe in a dogma which takes away the standard of belief altogether is a tenet not only irrational but self-contradictory.

These considerations lead us to the second point which we have to notice with regard to a revelation, which is this, that assuming God to be a supernatural and supersensible being, He can never be revealed to us in His real nature, but only in relation to our experience and faculties at any given time. Hence the Deity and his attributes can be described only by negatives or as an idealization of human nature. For conception or imagination, being simply a re-arrangement of phenomena, can in no way be affected by that of which the elements are not contained in experience. Hence any idea we try to make to ourselves of God can only be an idealized figure of humanity; yet, if our assumption be true, this bears no greater resemblance to his real nature than scarlet to the sound of a trumpet. As an example of this we may take the creative function, which is one of the prominent attributes of this conception of the Deity. We have never had experience of anything without an antecedent, so that the law of persistence of force underlies the whole of our knowledge; nay, as Mr. Spencer has shewn,* it is involved in its very nature, being nothing more nor less than the persistence of consciousness itself. Hence if we are told that God made the world, and try to conceive it, we find ourselves carried only one step back. The original difficulty recurs as strongly as ever, and we are constrained to ask 'who made God?' and to answer that He is self-existent is simply to repeat words whose meaning is totally unintelligible.† Thus God as a supersensible being is entirely incommunicable to us; the

* First Principles, § 61.

† This truth is recognized throughout the sacred writings of Christianity.—"Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" (Job xi. 7). "To whom will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto Him?" (Isa. xl. 18). We may try to pull down the Deity from his sublimity, "σειρὴν χρυσείην ἐξ οὐρανόθεν κρεμάσαντες;" but we fail, be-

words which express his nature are "unspeakable and not possible for man to utter." Inasmuch therefore as existence which cannot be known forms no part of ourselves or of our medium, it must at least be immaterial to us, and its assertion inoperative on our actions; and consequently its influence on morality is completely eliminated. All, therefore, that can really be revealed is the direction in which to look for God; or, in other words, the direction of human development. It can therefore be nothing more than an anticipation of and guide to natural religion, as that in its turn is the precursor of philosophy. In science it must eventually end; and then prophecy is merged in fact and hope swallowed up in possession. This is the final promise, that, though "it doth not yet appear what we shall be," we shall at last be made perfect and like God, and so able to conceive and know him. When that which is now but a vague anticipation gives place to actual knowledge; when the day dreams of faith are waked into vision; then man will have attained his ideal perfection; then "we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is."*

cause our minds are necessarily confined to earth, and cannot climb to where the first link of the chain must be fixed:—

"ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἐρύσαιτ' ἐξ οὐρανόθεν πεδίονδε
"Ζῆν, ὕπατον μήστωρ', οὐδ' εἰ μαλὰ πολλὰ κάμοιτε."

Hence it follows that the theory of the evolution of organic from inorganic nature is no more atheistic (even in the ordinary sense) than that of creation. Nay, in substance it is not inconsistent even with the particular Mosaic account, which tells us that "God formed man of the dust of the ground" (Gen. ii. 7), and said to him "Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return" (ib. iii. 19). The very order of evolution suggested by science wonderfully corresponds with that described in Gen. i. and Prov. viii. 23, sqq. (especially according to the true meaning of these passages in the original); and the actual words of successive creation are only apparently inconsistent with science, for He who created the formless universe created also its later states, as the father begets not the embryo only but the child and the man. As to the main principle, philosophy and the Mosaic cosmogony are at one. Science can never contradict the assertion "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth:" for science is of the universe, so outside it she cannot go. Beyond the first day she is dumb,—she cannot even interpret.

* 1 John iii. 2. See also 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 2 Cor. iii. 18; Ps. xvii. 15. So also Spinosa (Ethica, iv. 28) says "summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summa mentis virtus Deum cognoscere."

§ V. Of the Will.

The evolution of the Will need not be treated at any great length, inasmuch as it is not only in itself simple, but has been very excellently traced by Mr. Herbert Spencer,* to whose exposition the present writer can add little or nothing. That conscious action implies a motive or cause is almost a truism; and therefore the sphere of the will lies if anywhere in the selection of motives. But this selection is shewn by Mr. Spencer to be merely the natural selection of the strongest. For although in order to shew the falsity of this result you choose to act on an apparently weak motive, this is immediately made the strongest by the addition of the fresh wish of proving yourself in the right. It is in fact almost self-evident on reflection that a man takes that course of action which, all things and all collateral consequences (so far as they present themselves) considered, offers the greatest attraction to him; or, in other words, that action always follows the strongest motive. Men even grieve and lament only because of the relief or diminution of pain which grief occasions. Thus when Constance is taunted by the king for being as fond of grief as of her child, she warmly dilates on its power in partly recalling the pleasure of its object. "Then have I reason to be fond of grief," she exclaims, and proudly sets her sorrow on a throne before which kings may come and bow.† For it is as true of emotions and feelings as of men that even when naturally detestable "they do look well favoured when others are more hateful: not being the worst stands in some rank of praise."‡ There is a choice even between Goneril and Regan, and no man says 'I'll go with thee,' unless he also thinks 'Thy fifty yet doth double five-and-twenty.' This following of action on the strongest motive is indeed nothing but a result of the fundamental connection

* See Psychology, § 206.

† King John, III. iv. Cf. also her speech to Death, beginning "O amiable lovely Death:" and ib. sc. i.

‡ King Lear, II. iv.

between the irritability and contractility of animal tissue, for, means being as we have seen associated with ends, the nervous current, the direction of which is naturally that of its strongest part, is soon conducted outwards into its appropriate action; each term in the sequence being the natural physical product of its immediate antecedent. So action follows motive by a law just as necessary and universal as that by which a stone falls from the hand or the sparks fly upward.

But it will be said that we thus merely move the question a step backward, and that by throwing new weight (as in the instance suggested above) into any motive we can at any time make it the strongest. To this we answer, No; the new wish, by adding which we secure the victory (and no wish can be conquered but by another),* is itself produced by motive, or in other words follows by association from something which has preceded. The question resolves itself simply into this: Have we any power of altering the succession of our thoughts? or—Do our thoughts follow each other according to fixed law, or arbitrarily and at random? The unhesitating voice of science replies—Law reigns through the universe, chance and free will are mere soubriquets of ignorance. 'Nay, but surely,' an opponent will say, 'you do not deny that I can think of anything I choose?' Not at all; we even go further, and say that you cannot think of any thing which you do *not* choose either consciously or virtually; but what we deny is that you can choose any thought without its being suggested to you by a preceding train of association. It is not indeed always that these trains can be re-

* "Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectui coercendo." Spinosa, Eth. iv. 7. Cf. ib. ii. 48, 49. This is the doctrine maintained by the Stoic Chrysippus in his answer to the supposed case of the ass of Buridan. The same was held by Socrates ('virtue is knowledge'), Plato, Epicurus, and nearly all Greek philosophers. See Aristotle's discussion of *ἀκρασία* in Eth. Nic. VII. iii. In judging of another's feelings we must remember that his actions are a better test than his words (including under action that part of it which is absorbed in emotional expression): his words tell what he wishes others to think, his actions what he thinks himself.

traced; but that is only because no man is sufficiently acquainted with the particular constitution and past history of his neighbour's mind to be possessed of the requisite data; and because even in his own mind many of the links have become so organic, or the stream through them is so small, that they never come into consciousness at all. An absent man who walks abstractedly till he finds himself at a place which he recognizes well enough, though he cannot remember how and whence he came there, knows very well that he must have come from *somewhere*, and that too by the natural use of his legs and muscles; and does not, because of his intermediate forgetfulness, suppose himself gifted with a fairy cloak or sandal by means of which he can transport himself at will, in defiance of space and time, to any country of the earth. Who too has not noticed in talking to a friend, especially if the tastes of the two be similar, wonderful coincident flashes of thought about matters apparently alien to the last subject of discussion, and for which neither of them can give a reason? Who has not in some slight degree realized the voiceless conversations so well exaggerated by Edgar Poe? It is in this power of following unheard trains of thought that the sympathetic influence and universality of great poets and orators consists. A man has more power over his audience if he adopts and utilizes than if he thwarts the natural current of their thoughts.

'But though this is all very true,' an opponent may say, 'it does not touch our position, for while we claim a constant power of will and self-determination, we admit that we use it only occasionally, and that in ordinary cases we follow the suggestion of the moment and the trains of thought which you have been above describing.' To this we answer that we know no instance of a law of partial application, which acts in some cases and not in others; and moreover that such an idea being opposed to universal experience is not only untrue but inconceivable. Action then must be governed by law either in all cases or in none; and if it be admitted that it is so governed

in some, the apparent exceptions to it can be due only to our ignorance of the data or to the opposition of some conflicting law. We may indeed, if we like, give to those sequences in which one train of thought supersedes another the name of 'will,' as distinguished from those which are regular members of one continued train; but their nature and foundation must be the same in the one case as in the other; for the second train must have some origin like the first, and can only conquer by its superior force.

'Does not Design prove will?' another may say. A tree then wills; the sun and the stars will: for what is design but conformity with the laws of nature? A final cause does indeed affect action, as we have fully admitted, but only by becoming an efficient cause. We say a madman exhibits no design in his actions, simply because, owing to a faulty formation of his brain, the correspondence of his ideas and natural events is imperfect or altogether wanting.*

It is perhaps here necessary to note the singular and inconsistent theory of Mr. Bain, who, while recognizing our inability to alter any train of thought, claims for 'volition' the power of governing attention, or of dwelling on any particular state of consciousness so as to exclude others.† Surely it is evident that if thoughts always follow each other by the laws

* In the above discussion I have left out of consideration, as not affecting the question of will, those ideas which spring from the organic or vegetative functions of the brain in the assimilation of food to sustain the nerves and recruit the waste occasioned by thought. (See Maudsley, pp. 23, 42.) That these are equally dependent on physical laws with the others is very evident.

† Senses and Intellect, p. 559: "I know no fact that would tend to shew that one thought can be made to succeed another by mere will:" but volition works indirectly (1) by the stimulus of excitement; (2) by controlling the intellectual attention. "The power of will," he says, "over the trains of thought by these indirect means may be considerable. We may not at once determine what thoughts shall arise, but, of those that have arisen, we can determine the attention upon some rather than on others; the withdrawal of the attention from any one will nullify its power of farther reproduction." (Mental and Moral Science, p. 158.) If we have power over the attention we must surely have power over thought; for what is attention else?

of habit or association, the strongest for the time ever filling the consciousness, the continuance of one only proves that for the period of that continuance there is no other strong enough to turn it out. If the 'will' has no power of altering the laws of association, how can it have power to suspend them? We can no more suspend the law of attraction than we can alter it; in fact suspension implies alteration. Conflicting associations may indeed produce suspension or equilibrium, as do conflicting attractions, but the laws remain the same and in force. The other element in his theory, that to which he refers this power of willing, 'Spontaneous Activity,' looks, unless explained, like a contradiction of the law of cause and effect. For no motions can originate in *purely* internal influences, because all internal impulses are ultimately derived from external sources. Beginning with the act of conception in the mother's womb, the body can add nothing to what it receives (for whence could such addition come? what is it but what nature makes it?); it can only arrange and reproduce. To the believer in Spontaneous Activity of this kind or in the Freedom of the Will the argument to prove the existence of a Deity from the necessity of a First Cause can have no meaning. He must draw a broad line between a natural and a supernatural world, the one following laws, the other entirely independent of them: and what connection can there be between the two? The Greeks indeed considered τύχη a cause by itself, and so to them spontaneity might have seemed a cause too, (though if they had considered it they would have seen that it was merely a name for *absence* of cause); but we now believe that τύχη is simply another name for a physical cause of which we are ignorant, and surely it does not follow that because we do not know a law that we never can know it, that in fact it does not exist. Either then the so-called spontaneous actions have a cause or they have no cause: if they have a cause they are not spontaneous, they are not even internal; if they have no cause they are God, and are totally removed from the domain of science and experience. All that Mr. Bain proves is self evident:

namely that many actions result from no *conscious sensation;* such are the reflex actions of vegetative life and those which have become organic by habit. But it remains true that all actions follow either immediately or through association upon an external stimulus, (though that stimulus may have been already stored up and long lain latent in the tissue); and have no power of self creation.

This then is the real meaning of the doctrine of 'spontaneity,' that the current of force often comes first into consciousness in the act of expression; and when so explained it does not in any degree affect the purely physical part of the will: but owing to an unlucky vagueness of expression, Mr. Bain's exposition of it, though doubtless free from confusion in his own mind, is calculated to mislead an incautious reader.* As to the rest of his theory, Mr. Bain's error seems to lie in separating the trains of consciousness which end in action from those of pure thought. These differ only in their last term, and if volition be referred to that, it can be nothing more nor less than the physical law of action. Desire and emotion are really, as we have seen, homogeneous with thought; and so can influence it by becoming part of it through a change in their internal arrangement: and just in the same way do they influence action, by becoming it; only there the change is what we call 'molecular,' (like that of heat into motion), and so appears more mysterious than one which deals with larger elements. But the one process is as physical as the other, each being merely a phase of the universal law of the redistribution of Force, and it is only misleading to apply the name 'volition' to either.

Why is it then that people fancy that they have this power of willing, and how came it to be imagined that the freedom

* See Senses and Intellect, pp. 289-297; ib. pp. 73-83. Mental and Moral Science, pp. 14-17. Could any sentence seem more self contradictory than the following? "Certain drugs, as strychnine, *induce* excessive *spontaneity*." It certainly does not prove that "if there be an unhealthy spontaneity, there may also be a healthy mode;" for that would be to argue that 'if action sometimes follows from a cause it may also exist without a cause.'

of the will may be proved by a direct appeal to consciousness? To answer this question let us ask ourselves what it really is that consciousness tells us. We shall find that it is simply this:—that we produce our own thoughts, and act according to them, that in fact the ἀρχὴ of our voluntary thoughts and actions is ἐν ἡμῖν,* and not external. Now to this science completely assents, for it shews that our thoughts at any instant produce our thoughts in the next, and that action follows directly from thought by the fundamental law of animal life. It is therefore really true that our thoughts are in our own power in this sense, namely, that they are caused and produced by ourselves; for what are we but our successive states of consciousness? The 'ego,' if held to mean more than this, is simply a metaphysical essence with no warrant for its existence but a mere convenience of language. All that science adds to this fact of common experience is that this 'I,' which acts and thinks according to its nature, *has* a nature, or in other words that it is governed by laws like the rest of the universe. An 'I' which did otherwise would be unnatural, would be contrary to experience; we can form no conception of it. These laws are indeed less obvious and tangible than those of inanimate nature; and it is in fact owing to the number and intricacy of their convolutions, and to the progressive and dynamical character of their manifestations as well as to the consequent slowness and imperfection of the study accorded to them, that they have hitherto worn the appearance of chance and haphazard;† just as the ancients supposed that the heavenly bodies and even terrestrial objects of complicated action were governed by chance, or, in the language of polytheism, by a will. But as science has advanced the 'will' has been continually driven backwards, and as it has now no longer any refuge to fly to, its most prudent policy is to

* This is what Aristotle truly gives as the definition of ἑκούσιον; Eth. III. v. 6. But these ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν are not self caused, but are ultimately derived (through the first member of each series) from an external stimulus.

† Cf. Spencer, Psych. § 207.

surrender its last fortress at discretion, and so to leave the world at least with honour and without contempt.

Hence whenever we meet with the words 'will' or 'voluntary,' we must remember that the thoughts or actions to which they are applied differ in nothing as to their origin or nature from other thoughts and actions, but follow the universal law not only of our secondary consciousness but of the simplest mechanics, the law of the combination of forces. Action, like other motion, is necessarily in the direction and magnitude of the resultant; in other words, follows the strongest motive. We might prove the parallelogram of motives just as strictly as the parallelogram of forces. Voluntary actions seem indeed to differ from automatic, as including anticipation of the result, as being in fact intentional, but in using this language we are very apt to deceive ourselves. The future cannot influence us except through the present, and what is roughly described as a presentiment of the future is in fact an idea actually present to the consciousness by association, is really due not to the future but to the past. That the result corresponds with our anticipation, is not because it has produced that anticipation, but because of the uniformity of nature, and of the continuity of past experience, whereby the inner sequences have grown into correspondence with the outer. Besides, there is the same 'anticipation' in automatic or instinctive action, only that in the former case the association is conscious, the current of force being somewhat expended in radiation on the way, while in the latter it is direct and organic. Volitional therefore merely means conscious or intentional,* and will is only the impersonation of imperfect association. Voluntary actions therefore are not the highest; and will is a mark not of

* So Spinosa says, "voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt." Eth. II. 49; and Cog. Met. II. xii. 13, Cor. He however makes intellectus a "*res* cogitans," and so capable of action "solâ suâ materiâ in se solâ spectatâ." Cog. Met. II. xii. 9. The will is in fact nothing more than the 'Practical Reason,' and its results, like those of the Pure Reason, may be put into the form of a syllogism.

supremacy but of imperfection. A voluntary action in its simplest form is nothing more than a mental representation of the act followed by the performance of it,* is in fact just what we call a *conscious* act, and this, when performed often, becomes at last organic or unconscious; but whether an action be intentional, semi-intentional, or unintentional, it remains the same throughout, in so far as it necessarily follows the direction of the nervous current, as it is in fact the resultant expression of the impressed force.

'What then,' will be asked, 'becomes of responsibility, and of moral exhortation by praise or blame? Is not the existence of these inconsistent with a denial of freedom in thought and action?' The answer is only difficult because we find it hard to rid ourselves of the prejudice of ages. The feeling of responsibility is only the knowledge that in case of wrong doing or neglect we shall have to endure certain consequences; in other words, the consciousness of being unable to evade the universal law of cause and effect.† In fact if human action were not governed by law responsibility would be impossible. If a particular thought for instance does not always have the same effect, it may be either good or bad according to accident; and we are acting merely at random in choosing or avoiding it. If men were free (in the ordinary sense of the word), they could not only form no notion of Good or Bad,‡ but there would be no such things at all in existence.

* Spencer, Psych. § 206.

† This law is no abstraction, it is simply, so far as it affects us and so exists, ourself looked at in a certain light. Hence the consequences must fall on the actor; there is no abstract Fate to undergo them, and such reasoning as Cato's is based on a metaphysical illusion when he says—

"Summum Brute nefas civilia bella fatemur,
"Sed quo fata trahunt virtus secura sequetur:
"Crimen erit superis et me fecisse nocentem."

Lucan, Phars. ii. 286.

The true maxim is "causas non fata sequi." Ib. iii. 303.

‡ Spinosa makes this same remark (Eth. iv. 68) but in an entirely different sense. He defines a 'homo liber' as "qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit" (such as Adam before the fall, who of course could not know vice), and libertas as "virtus seu

What more than this foreknowledge of consequences Christianity or any other form of faith can be either able or wishful to supply it is difficult to see. Even if we exclude the Calvinistic doctrine of election, (which is Fatalism in its worst shape, that of personification, wherein the Greek Fate is retained without its modifying hierarchy of deities, and is set up as sole and supreme ruler of the universe), we find it a well recognized doctrine that good actions and virtuous resolutions are among the good gifts which are from above and come down from the Father of Lights. "A man's heart," it is said, "deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps."* Now if men's actions lie not in their own power it does not matter so far as responsibility is concerned whether they are "villains by *necessity*," or "fools by *heavenly compulsion* and by a *divine thrusting on*," or "knaves, thieves and treachers by *spherical predominance*."† There is no satisfaction in being told that one has either a "pouvoir prochain" or a "grace suffisante," if the "grace efficace," without which action is impossible, depends wholly on an external will.‡

Encouragement and blame are simply two natural forces which supply a great portion of the motives to action; and they owe their existence and force only to the universality of the law above mentioned. It is only because motives always produce their effect, that we use them;§ anticipated effect being our motive in actions respecting others as in those respecting ourselves; and therefore if action did not always follow motive, praise and blame would be not only useless but utterly impossible. As it is, the expression of pain or satisfaction at the

perfectio." Tract. Pol. ii. § 7. His meaning therefore is simply that where there is only virtue it is impossible to compare it with vice and thus to perceive it. But in the text the remark has a much wider meaning.

* Prov. xvi. 9. Cf. Gen. xx. 6. See also Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 404.

† King Lear, i. 2. ‡ See Pascal's Lettres Provinciales.

§ "*οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λυπῇ*." Ar. Eth. X. i. 1. Cf. Plato, Legg. II. 662, 3; where he says that even fictitious pleasures and pains are better than none at all.

deeds of another and the giving advice from our own experience and with a view to the benefit as well of him we advise as of ourselves and society, are the natural results of the social connexion of mankind and the power of expressing thoughts in language.

Reward and punishment are merely exaggerated forms of praise and blame, and their only value as active forces lies in the effect produced by them on human action. Hence they are concerned not with the past but with the future. The past cannot be altered and therefore can afford no motive to action, except so far as it is liable to be repeated or has entailed lasting effects. So punishment is an act of self-denial on the part of the state; and assuredly relies on the law of human action which we have been pointing out; for there is no self-denial that does not hope for its reward. It is in fact, as Bentham well expresses it, an expenditure of capital in the hope of receiving good interest on the outlay.

One more objection we must notice in conclusion, which is this: that by reducing the sequence of action and thought to physical laws, we are depriving man of his liberty, and making him a mere slave of circumstances. To this we answer:—was a man ever considered a slave because he could not make a stone swim, or water burn? The true secret of liberty and power, whether moral or physical or political, lies in obedience to law. The law of nature is the true and perfect law of liberty, and by conformity thereto does man gain freedom. For if action be in perfect harmony with nature, there are no obstacles to oppose it; and without obstacles there can be no sense of restraint; and what is freedom but absence of restraint? Therefore—

> "Qui se volet esse potentem
> "Animos domet ille feroces,"*

let him cease to be 'passion's slave,' and if any taunt him with having only changed masters, let him answer that the power to

* Boethius, Cons. Phil. iii. Met. 5.

do evil comes not of strength but of weakness,* and that only the good can be free because only he can do what he really wishes. To the will of the wise man there can never be any bar or opposition, for his will is that of the universe and his thoughts those of nature. The fool may choose the slavery of 'free will,' and may boast that he is a slave because he wishes it; but we tell him that he wishes to be a slave only because he is one already, just as a stone falls to the ground because it is heavy. Such freedom as he imagines he can never, happily for himself, attain; but there is a higher freedom within his reach which he thrusts away from him in ignorant scorn. It is as if men had refused to accept the law of attraction as lowering to the dignity of the human race and had insisted on treating bodies as now acting in one way and now in another. Would human power have been increased by such conceit? Is it not rather true that power grows only with knowledge, and freedom in nature with obedience to her laws? If it be so, moral freedom lies in that correspondence between mind and nature, of which we have so often spoken as the sphere of the great development of the universe; and is absolute only where this correspondence is absorbed in identity, where mind and the universe are one, and will is motion and thought reality: in the one undivided essence of an omnipotent because omniscient† Deity. Thus morally as intellectually man is ever creating himself into Deity, and at last loses himself in his own perfection.

Thus our conclusion from this section is that the dependence of action on physical law is not only warranted by science but is the necessary basis of all moral distinctions. With it we have moral order, without it there would have been moral chaos. Action therefore is not voluntary (in the ordinary sense), it is

* "Malorum possibilitas non est potentia." Ib. iv. Pr. 2.

† These two attributes coincide in their perfect development. God has power over all things, and is conscious of all things, because he is all things.—See above, p. 128.

only intentional. In other words it follows on motives (pleasures and pains connected by association with a previous state of consciousness); and as in many cases these pleasures and pains have been formed into particular combinations and have become organic, a large proportion of actions spring from Emotions. We have seen too that all we know of the mind is a number of states of consciousness following each other according to certain laws. We may therefore say if we like that one causes another, (because a cause means only an invariable antecedent); but not that each can produce any other that it likes: in other words we may admit the existence of a will (if the word be thought valuable), if only we take care to confine its sphere of operations within invariable laws. Our conclusion therefore is that voluntary is identical with deliberate action; and that the will is ever the strongest or (more strictly) the resultant motive, or, in the words of Hartley,* "is simply that desire or aversion which is strongest for the present time."†

* Theory of the Human Mind, p. 205.

† In illustration of the difficulty which we have felt throughout in getting rid of the misreading of consciousness which the ignorance of ages has almost made organic, we may notice the confusion which this phantom of a will has introduced into the mind of even a man of science like Dr. Maudsley. After shewing that it is merely a conception of the result with desire of attaining it, no definite innate faculty, no entity apart from its manifestations, and that it has limits even narrower than those set by the senses; after even quoting Spinosa's saying that the will and the intelligence are one and the same thing: yet after all he cannot rid himself of the idea that there is some occult influence distinct from the physical law of association which within certain bounds guides a man's actions. The character, he admits (p. 181), determines the will in any particular act; but "the way in which the will does operate upon the character, or affect the ego, is indirectly, by determining the circumstances which gradually modify it: we (he says, meaning apparently the *will*, not the ego, in an entirely unphilosophical spirit) may place ourselves voluntarily in certain conditions of life, but all the energy of the strongest will cannot then prevent some modification of character by them." His notion here seems to be derived from Aristotle, who says, (Eth. III. v. 10) "*τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν:*" and, *τῶν ἕξεων συνάιτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν* (ib. v. 20), for "*ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίγνονται;*" but this is a vicious circle, for each *ἐνέργεια* must depend on *some* previous *ἕξις* (cf. ib. 17); and Aristotle only means that the immediate cause of action is internal, which we

§ VI. Of Obligation.

'A man is said to be obliged,' says Paley, 'when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another.'*

have seen to be the true explanation of the phenomena of the will. (See note to p. 97.) Now Dr. Maudsley explains the ego to be a combination in which are contained the residua of all former feelings thoughts and volitions, (or, as we should say, the associative links resulting from these). That this is quite true, that in the coordination of thoughts and the trains of association is founded the notion of personal identity, is illustrated by the pathological fact that when this is lost the patient loses the consciousness of his identity; and by such cases of insanity as that quoted (p. 313) from Sir H. Holland's observation. This ego it is, he says, which is the agent in every action. But hence it is evident that the acts which determine circumstances must be as much due to the ego as any other acts (cf. Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 428): for the deliberation of which action is the result, (which action he elsewhere calls the will), is simply the following of the trains of association of which the character consists. The will then is identical with the character, and to say that a strong character is necessary to the fullest action of the will is to say that the character cannot act decidedly unless it is strong, which is an identical proposition. (We may notice that for perfect action it must also be of delicate mechanism, like a balance, to weigh accurately the minutest scruple, and so to avoid conflict and the wear and tear of hesitation, or, as he expresses it, to leave unimpeded the association of ideas.)

Dr. Maudsley's error is in his failing to see that not only is the will confined within narrow limits, but that, in the ordinary sense, there is no such thing at all. All action, whether automatic or voluntary, is due entirely to the character, acted upon by the particular circumstances of the time; the former being due to that part of the character which is already organic, while the power springs from that part which is still in process of organization. The other impulse, which he imagines as guiding the character and forming it, is merely a trace left in his mind of the metaphysical ideas, which he himself so much decries. Not only is it no absolute entity, but it has no manifestations; it is absolutely non-existent. He himself seems doubtful of its nature, and appears to intimate that it is some vague element of the supernatural. If we ask him whence comes the force which displays itself in this upward nisus, he can only lamely answer that "it comes from the same unfathomable source as the impulse that inspires or moves organic growth throughout nature." (p. 188.) Now we have seen that the aspiration of deliberating beings (of which the poetical and religious imagination is the highest phase) is merely a development of the desire or appetite of organic matter for that which is favourable to its growth; a tendency which he himself shews to depend on a law just as physical as that of the attraction of an acid for an alkali, or of positive for negative electricity. The true doctrine of the connection of this appetite with the will he quotes from Hobbes in the following words: "Appetite and aversion are simply so called as long as they follow not deliberation; but if deliberation have gone before, then the last act of it, if it be appetite, is called *will;* if aversion, *unwillingness.*" (Vol. I. p. 409.)

* Moral Philosophy, Bk. ii. ch. 1.

He tells us that on first studying the matter he was embarrassed by the mystery which seemed to be hung over the word 'moral obligation' by previous writers, and that it was only after study that he discovered that it was really only an *inducement* of sufficient strength, and resulting in some way from the command of another. Yet even at last he retained part of the old mysterious prejudice, for how can the character of a motive be altered by its proceeding in any way from the command of another? How can that command affect us except so far as pleasure and pain are connected with obedience or rebellion? Paley himself says 'We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves gain or lose something by, for nothing else can be a violent motive' to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrates, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain somehow or other depended on our obedience or contumacy, so neither should we be obliged without a similar motive to do right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commandments of God. It is difficult therefore to see how the command of another gives more authority than is to be derived from the instincts which he himself rejects as deficient therein. 'If,' as he says,* 'a man finds the pleasure of sin to exceed the remorse of conscience; of which he alone is the judge; the moral instinct man, so far as I can understand, has nothing more to offer.' What then has he himself to offer if a man finds the pleasure of sin to exceed the pain entailed by disobedience to the external command? It may indeed be the fact that particular kinds of motive only come from particular sources, but unless we can prove that those coming from a command are always the strongest, we cannot claim for them a position such as that implied by the word obligation, of being the highest or most universal motives. In a contest between two motives it is not the kind but the quantity which decides. For if two pleasures or pains be equal what does it matter where they come from? and if they be not equal, the greater, whatever its source, will always be the stronger motive.

* Ib. Bk. i. ch. 5.

Hence obligation is nothing more than a 'violent motive.' Prudence and Duty are both the following of the greatest pleasure; but so far as in ordinary language we make a distinction between them, the pleasure aimed at in prudence is proximate and only slightly greater than the pain, whereas in duty it is not only very considerably greater, but that greatness is further glorified by a dim aureole of magnificent generalities and the mysterious halo of an unfathomable future. This distinction, when looked at through the eye of religion, comes to be identical with that drawn by Paley, 'that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world, in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.'

And as the result of a motive is in no way dependent on its external source, so neither is it influenced by its mode of internal operation. A motive may be strong either by its own natural force, as a large excess of associated pleasure in one direction, or by the facility artificially given to its expression by the long continued custom either in ourselves or in our fathers of acting in a certain way on certain occasions. In other words the strength of a motive is not absolute, it is relative to the habits and predispositions of our organisms; but it still remains true that when one motive is pitted directly against another, the result is the same as when two unequal weights are slung over a pulley, and that which is dynamically the strongest must ever prevail in proportion to its excess of weight. Kind comes in only to determine the angle of opposition, and the general result is contained in the mathematical formula that action is ever in the direction and magnitude of the resultant motive.

Obligation is often again confounded with compulsion: but submission to physical force is not morally an act at all, because its ἀρχὴ or immediate antecedent is external to us, and therefore independent of our moral laws. The sequence of which it is the ultimate term is not a secondary sequence at all but a primary, a mere physical fact. We can never be

compelled to a moral action 'against our will';* in other words external force is as little able as any supposed internal power to alter the associations which govern our moral actions, except by supplying a motive and so becoming part of ourselves. Its general effect, if it tend to constraint, is to raise up within us an emotion of resistance, which as originating immediately within ourselves we distinguish from it, and call our 'will,' and it is this last element which constitutes the morality of the resulting action. An action from a moral point of view is not the muscular contraction but the victorious or resultant motive, and only by this motive can its value be estimated.

No objection therefore can be raised against our system on the ground of its excluding and failing to account for moral obligation; for moral obligation is nothing but a strong motive,† and is therefore coextensive with the pursuit of pleasure. Not only therefore do we admit its authority, but (as in the case of its correlative faculty the Moral Sense), we place it on a new and firm foundation, by shewing its harmony with the rest of moral phenomena. We have thus made it universal and not exceptional: we have transformed it from a heavy weight of matter resting on the back of a floating tortoise, to a well rounded planet rolling in its orbit and obedient to the universal principles of force. We have supported it from below instead of hanging it from above; and if we have thus somewhat lessened the awe which it inspired, we have at any rate secured ourselves against the danger of its falling and crushing us beneath its pitiless weight.

* So Aristotle separates *βίαιον* ("*οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος*") from *ἀκούσιον* proper, which consists in ignorance of the nature of action. (Eth. Nic. III. i. V. viii, 3.)

† This theory of obligation is not really inconsistent even with the ordinary use of the word. When a visitor says, 'I'm afraid I *must* go,' he means that though he may have great inducements to remain he has very much greater to go; or when one says, 'I *must* go to bed,' he means that his tendency to sleep and repose overpowers all other considerations. In a recent work on Whist I find mention of the 'Finesse Obligatory,' a name meant to convey that in that particular case the chances are so greatly in favour of its bringing advantage that the motive to try it is overpoweringly strong: and in every similar use of the word obligation, where it is not synonymous with compulsion, the same will be found to be its true intention and meaning.

§ VII. Of Pleasures that are called Bad.

Very little need be said on this subject, both because the answer to the difficulty has been already anticipated, and because it has been so often clearly set forth in other writers; no where more lucidly than by Plato in the Protagoras,* in which dialogue we find the first attempt to found a science of Ethics. We saw that Good differs from Pleasure simply by a widening of the field of calculation; whereby the pleasure of the moment is often found to entail future pain greater than itself (allowance being made for perspective), and is therefore condemned as Bad. When therefore we speak of pleasure as opposed to Good, we always mean the pleasure of the moment; or very often, by a still further narrowing of the term, sensual as opposed to intellectual pleasures. In its true meaning we have seen that it is coextensive with our whole nature, its parts standing to each other in the same relation as our divers faculties to the rest of the organism: it is therefore the material of Good, which involves all pleasures in their due proportion; for Good stands to pleasures in the same relation as the whole organism to its separate members. No pleasure therefore is bad except when it means pain.

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§ VIII. Rearrangement.

In the foregoing sections our object has been to verify the principles at which we arrived in the first part of our discussion, by shewing how they explain the more important moral phenomena, and this has been effected in most cases by tracing the effect of natural development on the moral nature of men. We have therefore been compelled to take our facts as they naturally

* Prot. 351, c, sqq. The theory here first started was handed down to later times through Aristippus, Eudoxus and Epicurus. Cf. Diog. Laer. X. 129, (quoted in Ritter and Preller, p. 352). See also Bentham, who shews what account must be taken of society; (cf. Plato, Rep. 470-1: 462, b: 464: 466, &c.): and Paley, Moral Phil. Bk. ii. chapters 6, 7, 8.

occur in discussion, and to treat them synthetically indeed but not in a perfectly synthetical order. Hence it has been impossible to look at the subject from a historical point of view, and the connection between the various parts of our system considered as a physical science necessarily appears somewhat confused. In order in some measure to remedy this want of perspicuity we propose in this concluding section to reconstruct very briefly and in outline the systematic formation of our moral nature. And since we are concerned principally with man, let us not trouble ourselves to consider how much of our description is true of other animals besides him, but let us try to trace the total effect of human development upon the nature of man's Good or Pleasure, which, depending on a relation between the organism and its circumstances, necessarily changes simultaneously with both.

Development or Organization has two sides: a generalizing and a specializing tendency. In the political world we recognize these in the centralization of government and the division of labour; and the same law may be traced in all development, which at once separates and recombines, or (to use the somewhat misapplied phrases of Mr. Spencer) at once differentiates and integrates the material on which it works. Both these changes are in fact implied in the result which universally marks the presence of development, that what were once units have become members of an organism. Heterogeneity involves both the separation of unlike and the aggregation of like among the original units. In the evolution therefore of humanity there are two simultaneous processes, which we may call the General and the Special organizations respectively; that of the race, and that of the individual. Again each of these organizations is in turn of the same nature with the whole of which they are parts, that is to say, each is in itself both general and special: and below this there are again similar subdivisions of ever increasing minuteness, into which a general survey like the present is unable to enter.

Taking first the General Evolution, whereby the internal relations of the human race are organized, we find mankind starting from a number of comparatively homogeneous units, and arriving at an organism of which the members are heterogeneous but united by a common bond of connection. In this we separate two processes, which for consistency we may call the General-general and the Special-general Evolutions respectively. By the first, mankind becomes an organism instead of a mass, and the end of the individual is gradually absorbed in that of the whole race; so that instead of individual pleasure the greatest happiness of mankind becomes the end of action, the greatest sum of pleasure being no longer divisible in mere arithmetical ratio among a number of equal homogeneous units, but being geometrically proportionable to each member according to his function and dignity in the organism. The consideration of this phase of Evolution came before us in our second and third sections, the former being more especially devoted to its universal aspect, the latter to its results in individual character: and to our former discussion we do not here propose to make any addition.

By the second of our subdivisions (which is correlative to the first), the place of each individual member or group in the whole is settled, and its particular function defined. The importance of this lies, as might have been expected, not so much in the investigation and illustration of general principles, as in their application to practice. In Applied Ethics or Politics (for the whole of this General Evolution affects Politics rather than Ethics, the general morality rather than the special), the history of the division of labour is all important, as shewing the proper scale and ratio according to which the general sum of happiness is to be apportioned among the various classes and sub-classes; but on Pure Ethics (our present subject) it has little direct influence, and therefore it has not come immediately under discussion in the foregoing pages.

Turning next to the Special Evolution, we find it distinguished

from the former as affecting primarily not the race but its individual members, as altering the moral relations of each man not from the side of the medium but through his own particular organism. It does not reach man through his circumstances, but guides history through man: and thus on comparing it with the former the very aspects of time seem interchanged, for what is young to each man is old to mankind, and the latest and youngest age to us is really the oldest to the universe. As Bacon says, "antiquitas sæculi juventus mundi;" or, as we might paraphrase it,—juventute sæculorum senescit mundus. Yet this evolution is but the correlative of that which we have been considering, and essential to its existence. Like the former, it has two correlative subdivisions; which we may distinguish by a similar nomenclature as the General-special and the Special-special Evolutions respectively.

By the first of these the different secondary states of consciousness, which form the groundwork of our mental nature, are gradually subordinated to each other, until the whole existence is unified under a central government, which, by coordinating wide spheres of experience, gives birth to general ideas and speculative beliefs. With this central consciousness the individual identifies himself; and so much is this the case, that he has a continual tendency to attribute to it, as the 'ego,' an absolute essence and individuality apart from its manifestations; an existence which has as little warranty as that of an essence of humanity or of the spirit of a particular state, being merely a relic of crude metaphysical speculations arising from the convenience of using general names in language. As humanity is nothing but its members, so the individual is nothing but his states of consciousness.

The result of this unification of our secondary nature by the continued organization of ideas is the expression of the general relations so produced in *philosophy*. The effect of this upon the moral nature we have traced in our fourth section, and we

* De Augmentis, Bk. I.

have therein seen how by its means the end of action is continually widening in universality beyond the family, beyond the nation (to which extent the inner and outer development are in perpetual cooperation), and then further, beyond the race, beyond even the planet in which we live; nay, we have seen that philosophy in its higher aspirations, which we call religion, has a vague anticipation, a mysterious feeling after one supreme unity of all, which it embodies in the conception of an absolute and infinite Deity. Thus to see himself in every part of nature and throb with the universal pulse; to extend his sympathies to the utmost bounds of his knowledge, and be content with his allotted share of the common good;* and finally, losing himself in his own infinity, to absorb thought in action and action in thought, subject in object and object in subject; and thus at last by a true apotheosis to die into Deity: this is the sublime conception of man's nature and destiny to which this portion of our subject has led us.†

The second subdivision stands to the first in the same relation as that which we found subsisting between the two phases of the General development, both as being its necessary complement and as affording the data for the application of its principles. For the specialization of our faculties produces on the one hand the various *sciences*, and on the other their obverse, the coordinated actions which compose the mechanical and practical *arts*; and it is only by means of scientific discoveries and of their natural application through artistic skill that man's

* Marc. Aur. II. 3:—"*τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ σύμφερον, οὗ μέρος εἶ· πάντι δὲ φύσεως μέρει ἀγαθὸν ὃ φέρει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις καὶ ὃ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν.*" Cf. ib. 9; x. 20. So iv. 23: "*πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει ὃ σοὶ συνάρμοστόν ἐστι, ὦ κόσμε.*"

† Cf. Coleridge, Religious Musings—

"'Tis the sublime in man,
"Our noontide majesty, to know ourselves
"Parts and proportions of one wondrous whole.
"This fraternizes man, this constitutes
"Our charities and bearings. But 'tis God
"Diffused through all that doth make all one whole."

relations with the universe can be practically adjusted, or the degree of correspondence between him and his medium to any extent increased. Only by successive organizations of particulars is man able to attain to general relations, and only through his special faculties can he react outwards upon nature. Confining ourselves now to the sphere of morality, we find that among the many separate functions which are portioned out to special faculties in the progress of the intellectual division of labour, one is the application of the universal principle of action to various classes of cases, the determination of the proportion of pleasure and pain arising under certain well recognized combinations of circumstances. In our first section we have seen how the working out of this function produces the different emotions, which are merely different combinations or organizations of associated pleasures and pains, each being suited to and created by its corresponding external conjunction of phenomena. We have seen too how by a still further evolution, special as regards the whole inner nature, but general as regards the moral, (what we might call a General-special-special evolution), these lower emotions are themselves subordinated to a higher organism which is gradually formed outside them, and so we ultimately arrive at one supreme emotion of emotions, in which we recognize our ideal of a Moral Sense, and of which the moral sense as we meet with it is only a foreshadowing. Under this perfect organization of our moral nature the correspondence of action and phenomena would be complete, and vice and evil would be entirely eliminated; each emotion would be completely under control, and not usurp more than its appointed share of influence; and thus virtue would be without a flaw and happiness without alloy.

In this evolution of the moral sense as a central government in our active nature, we see an instance of the many intermediate organizations which lie between the highest generality and the lowest particulars, at the existence of which we have already hinted, though into the details we have neither space nor skill to

enter. In this instance the origin of the special functional province was merely the association of certain pleasures or pains, with states of consciousness not immediately producing those particular feelings. By this process the active or motor force is organized, first into the lower emotions, and eventually to the full extent of its domain into a supreme emotion called the Moral Sense. Moreover this twofold aspect of generality and speciality characterises not only the ultimate organism, but each of its divisions, the simpler emotions, and each of their subdivisions in its turn, so that each minutest organized centre is a miniature model of the central government. For human progress advances not by creation but by growth, not by miraculous transformation but by the imperceptible though irresistible workings of nature; and nature is never capricious or fitful in her work, nor is she limited by the narrowness of individuality, but she is ever toiling at once upwards and downwards and round about on every side, and while she seems engaged on the sublimest masterpieces of majestic grandeur she is all the time pencilling with equal care the tiniest and most elaborate details.

Such are briefly the results due to each of the various branches of the great human evolution in its respective sphere of operation. Their meaning may perhaps be more clearly apprehended if we recapitulate also briefly the method or process whereby they are attained. We have seen that the great law on which all organic development depends is the law of Habit, whereby that which is usual or frequent becomes organic, and so a fresh starting point is reached from which the process of organization may begin afresh. Now in the mental evolution we call this Association; so that when certain states of consciousness often follow each other we say that they become associated together, meaning that each has a tendency to recal the other. When this association is very constant and has been often repeated, it becomes at last organic, and is henceforth an integral part of the constitution. When this stage is

reached, states of consciousness which formerly followed immediately on the second of the two associated feelings and on the first only by interposition of the second, come to follow immediately on the first. The step by which we used to pass disappears, and the passage becomes direct, or, as we say, instinctive. Thus we are now ready for a further associative operation, and the same process in all its stages is repeated continually, the superstructure rising ever higher and higher and pressing firmer together the basement on which it stands, until the whole sphere of phenomena is completely organized, and the mind is a perfect image of nature. We have illustrated this process from the growth of the moral sense, a complex product of association built up out of the simpler emotions, which are in their turn mere compressed blocks of pleasures and pains, the raw material of the whole structure.

That this is the true historical order of development we cannot indeed directly prove, because history cannot go so far back;* but, just as it so often happens in cases where the most evident method of investigation is impossible that another springs up to supply its place, so here, though we cannot by the historical method find evidence as to the early steps of our mental evolution, we are able in a measure to trace them backwards, and by watching the unravelling the web of nature to force it to confess the secret of its construction. For alongside of the general evolution of humanity, and subsidiary to it, there is continually going on a process of degeneration of individuals and families,† and it is in pathological phenomena of this kind that we must seek for verification of our evolutional theory.

Now taking the pathology of the moral nature or the phenomena of 'moral insanity,' we find that the commonest and least aggra-

* Though as to the latest stages, (as in the case of the Moral Sense and such emotions as Avarice, Patriotism and the like), we have important corroboration of our theory both in history and in the artificial history derived from a comparison of the different stages of development observable among the various tribes of men now coexisting on the earth's surface.

† Maudsley, pp. 247, 330.

vated form in which this disease manifests itself, appears to be due merely to an absence or perversion of the moral sense. According as this faculty is deficient or malformed we have the two varieties which Dr. Maudsley calls 'impulsive insanity' and 'moral insanity proper.' In the first case the patient appears to be in much the same state as an infant or a savage, (so far only has degeneration proceeded); he exhibits "passion in all its naked deformity and in all its exaggerated exhibition;"*—all organization is lost among the emotions, and there is an utter want of control of impulses.† In the second case moral organization is not wanting, but is distorted and anomalous, the result being deliberate vice,‡ and the wickedest actions done on conscientious principles: there is no step wanting, but the last step has been a false one. That the moral sense should thus be ever the first to be deranged is a clear proof that we have been right in supposing it to be the last in order of evolution: but the evidence goes even farther than this, for observation tells us that not only is this 'impulsive insanity' the first step in moral degeneration, but it is the beginning of mental derangement in general, preceding even intellectual disorder,§ thereby intimating that in the historical order the moral sense is not only the last of the emotions, but is built upon some of the most abstruse operations of the intellect. The next stage in moral derangement involves, as we might have expected, the disappearance of the more complex of the lower emotions, those involving the social and family relations; which, as we have already seen, must be at least as recent as the state of things from which they take their origin. The want indeed of that highest sympathy which we sketched as the perfection of our affective nature, is not held to betoken madness; (else nearly all mankind would be mad, for its possession is confined to a very small number of individuals of exceptionally wide sympathies and aspirations); but the social and family affections are now sufficiently established to render their absence a mark

* Maudsley, p. 322. † Ib. p. 346. ‡ Ib. p. 329. § Ib. p. 344.

of such inferiority to the average mental standard as to merit the name of insanity. As we come still lower down, we find that what we held to be the earliest and simplest emotions are the most stable of any. We seldom find an insane person incapable of anger or fear, and if we do so, we know it as a sign of perfect incurability. The higher stages may be sometimes artificially superinduced by suitable treatment, (malformation being naturally more difficult to deal with than deficiency), but the more elementary the results that are wanting the more hopeless is the prospect of inducing nature to complete her work. When finally we come to the very foundation of morality, the feelings of pleasure and pain, we find no instance of a living creature, however degraded, in whom these primary sensations are wanting. Such a want would imply the absence not only of all development but of the fundamental properties of animal tissue, of life itself. Hence we find the pursuit of motive universal through all phases of insanity, though often, owing to the morbid functional derangement of the organs, and a consequent imperfection in their correspondence with external phenomena, the baneful becomes pleasant instead of the beneficial, and the law of self-conservation is inverted into a tendency to self-destruction.

Thus by observing the order of the disappearance of the various moral faculties we gain a striking confirmation of our theory as to their order of development, and the method whereby the laws of nature are continually imprinting themselves upon the mind. We must here however meet an objection that will doubtless be raised against part of our theory as stated above, and which might be expressed as follows:—'Is not this fancied process of development which consists in the rendering organic and unconscious of previously conscious links of association really an inversion of the true order as we find it in actual history? Is it not rather the fact that mental evolution proceeds by the rendering conscious of what was before uncon-

scious, by the substitution of reason for instinct, and will for automatism;* just as, for instance, Logic is the conscious use of methods of reasoning which have been long used instinctively,† or as the present essay is an attempt to give a reason for the spontaneous dictates of the Moral Sense and other Emotions?' We may remark that even from this point of view rules must be derived from truth and not truth from rules;‡ but apart from this, the difficulty when rightly understood is really a strong confirmation of our principles. We have already seen that the general evolution is dependent upon the special; moreover, inasmuch as it has to use its results, it slightly follows it in order of time, though necessarily keeping pace with its advances. Now the consciousness of which the objector is here speaking as subsequent to the organization of the special faculties is that which is due to the general development.

For when we talk of giving a reason for anything, we merely mean connecting it in our mind with other like things under a general law.§ But this is exactly the result of the general organization, the office of which is to settle the relations among the various special faculties, which without it are mere units unconnected together and incapable of mutual explanation. But even before the operation of this general organization men acted consciously enough (in the sense in which we have been using the word); they knew what they were doing: and inasmuch as they always acted with the view of obtaining pleasure, different special faculties had been gradually formed to apply this law to

* So Cabanis (Rapports, i. § 1) says:—"Nous commençons par agir: ensuite nous soumettons à des régles nos motifs d'action."

† As "all a rhetorician's rules
"Teach nothing but to name his tools."—Hudibras, I. i. 88.
So Mr. Spencer (Psych. Pt. III. ch. i.) says:—"Systematization is a mark of completion in art and philosophy and science and language." Cf. Bacon, De Augmentis, Bk. i. p. 460 (Ellis and Spedding).

‡ Hudibras, I. iii. 1357.

§ Cf. Cabanis, Rapports, ii. § 8:—"Nous n'expliquons les phenomènes que par leurs rapports de ressemblance ou de successions avec d'autres phenomènes connus."

various sets of circumstances. Owing however to the imperfectly organized state of their mind they did not perceive the relations that obtained among these different sets of circumstances, and so they could not enunciate the general propositions by which we say we 'explain' the individual cases. Their experience was in fact superficial or isolated, not organized or scientific; and the observed sequences on which emotions were founded were mere empirical generalizations unconnected as yet with each other or with any higher law. Nay the simpler of them were probably never observed (in any true sense) at all, inasmuch as they seem to have become organic before the era of the cerebral hemispheres. At any rate all these emotions soon become organic or instinctive, still remaining separate and unconnected with each other, until at last when the general organization spoken of above has made considerable progress their connection is discovered and for the first time they become what our objector calls 'conscious,' but what it would be more correct to call scientific. It is in fact by this misuse of the word conscious that the whole of the difficulty has arisen, and if we remember that the consciousness which precedes the instinctive stage is that of sensation, or at farthest, of perception or intention, (involving the classification of an individual action with other individuals, of objects into a class), whereas that which succeeds it is that of scientific reasoning, (involving the classification not of individuals but of classes, not of objects but of relations between them), the confusion will at once disappear.* For when we say that we explain an emotion or a faculty, we are classing, not the things previously classified, but the very

* It is perhaps well to set forth the three meanings that can be given to the phrase a 'conscious action.' It may mean (1) *passively* conscious (the true sense), as walking or speaking or writing; or (2) *actively* conscious or intentional, as practising a new gymnastic feat or learning a foreign tongue; or (3) *scientifically* conscious, as constructing a bridge or investigating a mathematical calculus. The same action may be done in all three ways: (1) automatically or instinctively, (2) intentionally from rough observation, (3) deductively from general laws of science or philosophy. The confusion of the second and third meanings has caused the difficulty in the text: for a confusion of the first and second see above, p 42.

classifications themselves; not phenomena at all, but relations. Neither the philosopher nor the philologer classify things; they are concerned with classifications already made and represented by symbols, general ideas in the one case, and names which are the marks of these, and thus symbols of symbols, in the other. Hence philosophy arrives not only at knowledge of things but at knowledge of knowledge; and just as that only is perfect ignorance which is ignorance of itself, so that only is perfect knowledge which knows its own nature, which is not only conscious but self-conscious. Self-knowing ignorance and self-ignorant knowledge are the two middle terms and may often be found coexisting; and of the two, the former is the nearer perfection, inasmuch as it succeeds while the other precedes that middle unconscious state under which we have seen that the different faculties become stereotyped into their definite shape and take their places as recognized members of the central organism. We are therefore now prepared to give a definite answer to our opponent; namely that we are both right, that the instinctive or organic stage is both preceded and followed by an era of consciousness; but that the consciousness on the one side is very different from that on the other. The special faculty is active in the one case and passive in the other; in the preorganic consciousness it is the subject, the classifier, in the postorganic it is the object classified. Thus the mind throws away consciousness only to find it again clearer and more powerful than before; it sows the grain of simple perception and reaps the glorious harvest of science and philosophy.

Before we conclude it may be well to remark that the various phases of evolution which we have just been considering in their respective workings, are separable only nominally and for the purposes of explanation,—λόγῳ μὲν χωριστὰ ἔργῳ δὲ μή. In actual history they are continually acting and reacting upon each other, the individual on society, social progress on intellectual, philosophy on science; nay, to speak of them in the plural number at all is only a fiction of our finite comprehen-

sion, for in nature they are all one, and sprung from one common origin, the fundamental properties of nature. They are all but confluent currents in a single stream, the stream of Time, on whose bosom mankind is ever borne onwards towards the infinite ocean; and the airy foam and bubbles on its surface are his Ideals of good and happiness and beauty, which ever float before him in his course, and with their rainbow hues cheer him onwards to perfection. Thus with man his end is ever rising, like a shadow cast before him on his path ever near yet never to be grasped; and though the principles of morality are superior to the vicissitudes of time and change, being grounded on the very constitution of the universe, yet their manifestations are ever varying from age to age, as light changes its colour according to the surfaces on which it shines. Thus while the thoughts of the philosopher are for all time and for countless generations yet unborn, the laws and institutions of the statesman are like the steps of a traveller hastening on his homeward journey, in which length of stride and shortness of duration are the objects at which he aims, (thinking a majestic gait but dearly purchased by a longer absence), whose final is their physical end, and whose crowning virtue is to die. Politics and history are the feet, art the hands, and science the eye; but philosophy is the mind for which all the members work, and which should guide and direct them to the common good. In philosophy the various partial evolutions, whether physical, moral, political, or intellectual, are all coordinated in a common organism, and so impress themselves into self-consciousness upon the universal intellect of nature.

Finally, on surveying the results of this second part of our inquiry, we cannot fail to be struck with wonder, how, from being apparently insignificant and subsidiary to the first, it has grown by the process of discussion into the more important of the two. In seeking a verification we have found a reason. In examining apparent difficulties in the theory with which we started of the identity of human good and human pleasure, we

have stumbled upon a proof of its truth far wider than that which led us to adopt it, by shewing its derivation from a still wider principle, that of the identity of Good and Pleasure in general. In verifying the fact that action is determined solely by pleasure, as a law of human nature, we have discovered that it is but a part of a still wider law, the very widest of all, that on which depends the whole physical constitution of the universe. Like Saul, we had lost our father's asses, and in seeking for them we have found a kingdom; or like David, we were bringing parched corn and cheeses to strengthen our brothers to resist the 'Philistine' host, and lo! we have slain the great giant their oppressor, and have secured not only safety but an empire. Hence the relation between the two parts of our discussion has been unexpectedly reversed, and we are now in a position to look at our first part as a verification of the second. The general physical law which our late investigations have revealed may be finally accepted as true, because by our deductive proof in the first part we have shewn it to be true in the only instance in which we are capable of directly testing it, that of ourselves in our present state of development. In the progress of that development such truths as these are the great agents, for what is truth but a more perfect correspondence between mind and nature, and what is development but the advancement of the same correspondence? Thus in a spirit of humility rather than of pride may we not confidently assert that this our Moral Philosophy, if only a single step in a single movement of the mighty march, is yet one forward irretraceable step, one integral component part in the great natural evolution of the universe? And surely if the Good be once held up before him, man cannot choose but follow it; if the next landmark be shewn to him ahead, the sight cannot fail to quicken his steps.

CHAPTER II.

THEORIES.

In the preceding chapter we have examined the relation of our philosophical principles to some of the more important moral phenomena, as manifested in the actual constitution of our moral nature and faculties; but there still remains another extensive class of facts, of which any moral system claiming universality must give a satisfactory account, and to this we now propose to turn our attention. The facts so demanding examination are the different opinions and beliefs that men have held from time to time in respect of the subject under our discussion; and with regard to these beliefs as expressed in the theories of various philosophical schools our present system has a twofold duty. In the first place it must account for them as facts, for all facts are part of the truth of which it claims possession, and every portion of experience must be organized and harmonized with the rest; and in the second place treating them as systems of like nature with itself, it must either shew its supremacy by proving itself an organization of them all, and by pointing out the proper place of each in the common body of truth, or at once renounce its claim to a monopoly of belief. When we remember however that an opinion or belief is nothing but a reproduction of a certain portion of experience and can contain nothing which experience has not placed in it, we see that the two duties above mentioned really coincide, for if we shew that our system coordinates the whole of experience, it follows immediately from such proof, that it must reconcile all theories and moral systems, and be the organism of which they all are members. Hence if our last chapter could have been complete, if it could have embraced the whole sphere of moral phenomena instead of selecting only the more prominent, there

would have been no need of further verification; but, as it is, it seems advisable to supplement the deficiency of that inquiry and give a further verification of its results, by shewing that our principles are able to arrange in their due order the moral beliefs and theories of men as well as the facts and phenomena on which these beliefs are founded. We shall also by this course gain a new view of the evolution of moral philosophy, and of the exact relations of its different parts to each other and to the central organism. Inasmuch as belief is produced wholly by experience, there can be no belief which is absolutely destitute of truth, which is not a partial expression of facts; and it is the coordination of these partial truths into one harmonious system which is the true aim of philosophy, and which it is our present object to attain.

With this view our first duty is to arrange the various moral systems in their natural order, according to the relation in which they stand to the fundamental question of Pure Ethics, the nature of Good or of the End of Action. Taking this as our fundamentum divisionis, the first broad distinction which presents itself is between those systems which consider Good as a primary quality irresoluble into simpler elements, and which therefore look for the End of Action only in individual acts, or in fact deny its existence as a general idea altogether, and those which explaining Good as a derivative idea, capable of comparison and classification, set up a general standard of action by which all individual acts are to be tested, and by conformity with which they gain their only title to approbation. The subdivisions of each of these two main classes will be better set forth in the course of discussion; let us therefore without more preamble proceed to consider each of them separately.

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§ I. Systems which make Good a primary Quality.

Systems of this class are not in the true sense of the word systems at all; for without some general standard of measure-

ment there can be no approach to definiteness or to scientific accuracy. 'Good,' they say, 'is like redness or sweetness, perceived immediately by its own proper faculty: no account can be given as to *why* certain actions are good or bad; all that we know is that they are so, and this is all that we want to know in order to enable us to live a virtuous life.' They are therefore essentially practical systems; and inasmuch as they all agree in their treatment of the fundamental question of Pure Ethics, by simply refusing to give any answer to it whatever, the only means of distinguishing them from each other is by the answers which they respectively give to the second great question, that which, as we said, underlies the second division of Ethics, wherein the abstract principles contained in the first are brought into practical operation. Now to the question, 'How is Good perceived?' we may distinguish in this class of systems three different answers, which thus give us three subdivisions of the class. Two of these make the discerning faculty reside in the individual, while the third recognizes only the judgment of the σπουδαῖος, the Good man. They may be called respectively the Moral Sense system, the Rational system, and the Casuistical system.

Of these the first is the real representative of the class, the other two having arisen from attempts to remedy apparent imperfections in it. As to the Casuistical system (so called from its most eminent disciples), its point of departure (so far as we are at present concerned with it) from the Moral Sense school is the recognition of a difference between the moral faculties of different individuals and the appeal to those of the good man only.* Hence authority is its standard of morality, and for a

* This might at first sight seem to be Aristotle's view, but the σπουδαῖος with him is not an ultimate court of appeal (for he gives a general definition of good and virtue), but a convenient arbiter on matters of practical difficulty. The good man, like the good flute player, differs from others only by exhibiting his art in the highest perfection; and in morality every man is an artist to a certain extent. Inasmuch however as the good man naturally knows most about virtue, his opinion will often save considerable trouble. See Eth. Nic. I. vii. 14; III. iv. 5.

faculty which by an immediate intuition is able to grasp the supersensual, and to perceive objective reality: a sense in fact divested of all the inconveniences which Locke had fastened on it, a sense of the supersensual. Space, Time, and Good are all perceived by this faculty, which, like the Aristotelian νοῦς, is concerned at once with particulars and universals. Its objects remain undefinable primary qualities like those given by sense, but are not limited in their existence to our states of consciousness. This was the only distinction which he supposed to exist between Reason and Sense, and it was thus he thought that by a mere change of name to avoid the difficulties which were indissolubly connected with the latter word, and to reopen the gate of death to the old slain corpses of ignorance.

The weakness of this subterfuge is sufficiently apparent even in Price himself, for though he considers Good to be an objective reality, he expressly says that it is only a quality of action. Surely if it does not exist beyond our actions it must be relative to us, and the substitution of reason for sense becomes an unmeaning metonomy. Moreover the arguments of Locke and Berkeley are not confined in their operation to the mere word 'sense,' but are equally true of all our faculties. How is it possible to invent a faculty which shall be independent of ourselves and yet part of us? The truths of 'reason' are just as much relative to 'reason' as those of sense are to sense; and no possible manipulation of language can avoid this self-evident truth.*

is perhaps the better name for it, as clearly conveying the meaning. Surely this is not the ordinary signification of the word Reason!

* This truth of the relativity of Good is well shewn by Brown, another Scotch philosopher. "Virtue," he says (Lect. LXXV.), "is only a general name for certain actions which excite, when contemplated by us, certain emotions. It is a felt relation to certain emotions, and nothing more, with no other universality therefore, than that of the minds in which, on the contemplation of the same actions, the same emotions arise. We speak always of what our mind is formed to admire or hate, not of what it might have been formed to estimate differently; and the supposed immutability therefore has regard only to the existing constitution of things." The doctrine (nay even its extension by Berkeley) of the non-existence of sensations

There is however another distinction which has been drawn by philosophers of this school between Reason and Sense, to which Price does not consistently adhere, but which nevertheless requires examination. According to this both Reason and Sense are faculties of immediate perception, but the former is concerned with universals, the latter only with particulars. So the Rational System when thus interpreted makes Ethics and the Fine Arts proceed deductively from certain general principles which are the objects of a priori intuition. But this, like the former modification, is in flat contradiction to the principles of Locke, and still further, is at total variance with the whole testimony of experience. For not only does it imply a universal agreement on the first principles of Good and of Beauty, but asserts that these primary laws are better known than the secondary maxims which (by the hypothesis) are consciously derived from them. Yet it is only too evident that though men are moderately well agreed in admiring particular objects as beautiful or in praising particular acts as virtuous, no man has ever yet proposed a universally accepted theory of Beauty, or succeeded in founding anything more than a school of Morality. The very existence of ethical treatises is a plain disproof of the intuitive nature of their subject matter; for if all men had by nature a direct perception of a primary law of Good, any attempt to give them such perception by means of philosophical argument would not only be a mere waste of words, but could not possibly have arisen, inasmuch as there would have been no

apart from the mind is at least as old as Democritus, who however made the inconsistent exception of the primary qualities of resistance; "*νόμῳ γλυκύ*," he says, "*νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θέρμον, νόμῳ ψυχρόν· ἐτεῇ ἄτομα καὶ κένον.*" Aristotle, in Phys. IV. 14, applies the same doctrine to Time. He says, "*πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὔ, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τίς· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἠριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν, εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὔσης.*" He might have applied a similar reasoning to shew the impossibility of the existence apart from mind either of any of the primary qualities of matter or of any of the conceptions of morality and art.

ultimate final solution; for this we see not only to be far hid in the region of the unknown, but to be absolutely unknowable by our present faculties, which are irrevocably confined to a relative and therefore unexplainable sphere.

That the moral sense school was simply the germ of our present system is further evident when we consider its professed aim and character. Butler directly assumes that virtue is the following of nature, and his method is to determine its character from the particular nature of man, though using also the more abstract method to which he alludes of inquiring into the general relations of things. The result therefore depends entirely on his knowledge of this human nature and its connection with the physical universe; and it is merely because our knowledge on this head is greater than his that our system differs from his. He, like Kant, took man simply as the individual existent at any moment, without considering his medium or antecedents; hence he, like Kant, put many things in their wrong places, just as would a statesman who wrote a treatise on the British Constitution with no knowledge of its past history or of the circumstances with which it has been meant to deal. Conscience, like the power of the monarch, seemed to have upon it the impress of authority; so both have been at one time thought to hold their power by a divine or independent right. But as the growth of political science has dispelled the one delusion and proved that kings hold only a deputed authority, so we trust that it has now been shewn that conscience has no more divine or inherent right than royalty, but that it holds its office in trust for its subject faculties, and that therefore it is only on its fidelity to their interests that its tenure is secured. The moral government, like that of nations, has a tendency to become more centralized indeed but more constitutional with age; more representative and less autocratic. The establishment of general principles, or, in other words, the connecting of the empirical generalizations, of which moral and political institutions are but the fossilized expression, both

with each other and with the rest of experience, tends to place laws above institutions, and science above the old crude maxims of tradition. The sovereign conscience and the sovereign monarch are alike curtailed of their old superstitious admiration and rendered subject to a new sovereign, law. Butler and Filmer represent that stage in the progress when the absolute autocracy of royalty becomes suspected and has to be justified by some attempt at argument. This is soon however seen to fail, and then, if resistance be prolonged, comes a French Revolution with its utter abandonment of authority, its sans-culottism, its scepticism, and its sophistry. After it comes a third era in which society and morality are replaced on their true foundations, not metaphysical hypotheses, but the laws of positive experience. Then we obey conscience and king not because they are divine and can command our reverence, not bowing down in the dust before them as slaves before a despot, but because they are our own creations and the best that we can devise, because in obeying them we are at once obeying and ruling ourselves, obeying the only master whom it is no degradation to obey, and ruling the only kingdom which it is worth while to rule. So it was in the old Greek morality, with its dethroned and recrowned external polytheism, and so it is in modern also with its rejected and reinstated internal monotheism. For Conscience or Duty is our Zeus, once King of Heaven; and as the great god Dinos once drove out the latter, yet afterwards left him his vicegerent in common life, so has the great emperor of Dinos, Law, now forced Conscience to acknowledge his supremacy, yet content with such acknowledgment, not only confirms its power, but adds to it the weight of his own omnipotent empire. Both then and now γνῶθι σεαυτὸν is the great key to truth. When we truly know ourselves we shall lose not only irrational reverence but also irrational aversion for our own creations. In the lines—

> "Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia, nos te
> "Nos facimus Fortuna deam, cœloque locamus,"

"These systems," says Brown,* "assume the previous exist-
"ence of feelings for which the congruities of which they speak
"and the mere power of discovering such congruities are
"insufficient to account. There must be a principle of moral
"regard independent of reason; or reason may in vain see
"a thousand fitnesses and a thousand truths, and would be
"warmed with the same lively emotions of indignation against
"an inaccurate timepiece or an error in arithmetical calcula-
"tion, as against the wretch who robbed by every fraud which
"could elude the law those who had already little of which
"they could be deprived, that he might riot a little more luxu-
"riously while the helpless whom he had plundered were
"starving around him." All actions involve fitness of some kind, so why should we choose one rather than another? No one would say that virtue is coextensive with science; what then is the subject matter of the particular science of Ethics?

The incapacity to account for motive is fatal to all systems of this class. Mere reasoning has no energy, no motive power: "*διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ· ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική.*"† To consider only external nature or our primary sensations can be of little use in the discussion of morality, which lies in action; for the nature of a thing is determined not by its effects but by its antecedents, and Good and Evil can affect us only from within. Good therefore or Virtue can be connected with external nature only through motives, for Good is in fact nothing but the universal motive; and therefore without an analysis of motives no ethical system can be complete. When we have once determined the general motive, we are then in a position to treat of its relation to our primary states of consciousness, or to external nature. This relation may now be called the law of Good, and when expressed in ordinary language it appears as a part of the physical universe; but we must remember that in itself it is a mere abstraction like other laws, and that Good resides, not in it, for it is not an object but a formula, but in the particular

* Lect. lxxvi. † Arist. Eth. VI. ii. 5.

states of consciousness of which it expresses the relation. Hence that a certain relation is the law of external nature we know in one way, and that a certain other relation is the law of internal nature we know in another; and unless we can connect these two by the middle term (as we have done above by shewing the identity of the pursuit of pleasure with the physical law of action), the two extremes of Good and Nature cannot meet, and moral science is curtailed of half its existence, for either it is not moral or it is not science. When we find that the law of our motives is also a law of external nature, then and then only can we see Good in the universe, then and then only can we have a science of Ethics.

The same criticism holds good of Kant's moral system, which makes Good consist in the determination of the will by pure law apart from motive.* For it is evident that a man can will to follow a law only by liking or choosing to follow it, or in other words only because he is inclined so to do. Law therefore can act only through inclination, and hence such a notion of Duty as Kant proposes is void and self-contradictory. Kant saw that the will follows reason only partially because of the opposition of conflicting passions or inclinations, and fell into the erroneous conclusion that if we could abolish these passions altogether we should arrive at a perfect will: whereas the real difficulty comes not from the existence of inclinations, (for without them there would be no motive force), but from their imperfect organization, whereby is entailed an imperfect correspondence with phenomena. Hence arises 'ought', which if the correspondence were perfect would be merged in 'is.' If a machine does not work well, the way to cure it is not to shut off steam, (which indeed reveals but is not the cause of its defects), but by a better arrangement of its material parts to endeavour to rectify the hitch in its working. To kill a man destroys indeed his

* In our theory of the will this is nothing but a contradiction in terms. To talk of the determination of the will apart from motive is the same as talking of the force of gravity apart from weight.

"sires?" The same is as true of his Political as of his Moral Philosophy, for this is grounded merely on an analysis of the state as he found it, without inquiry either into its antecedents or into its physical or social medium.

Not only however does he neglect to inquire into the history and education of individual men and societies, but, what is still more important, he has no conception of the great evolution of man and society in general, in which alone, as we have seen, is to be found the true explanation of their present condition. He is therefore unable to reconcile the end of the individual with the requirements of society; to find a locus standi for the unselfish virtues. "It cannot but be admitted," he says,* "that the only interests which a man at all times and upon all "occasions is sure to find *adequate* motives for consulting are "his own. Notwithstanding this there are no occasions in "which a man has not some motive for consulting the happiness "of other men. In the first place he has on all occasions the "purely social motive of sympathy or benevolence: in the next "place he has on most occasions the semi-social motives of love "of amity and love of reputation." Now that he holds these motives to be so, partly at least, by the pleasures and pains which they involve is evident from his Table of the Springs of Action, where we find the Interests of the Heart, the Closet, and the Trumpet each occupying a separate category among pleasures. But how do these pleasures arise? and if they are not in themselves '*adequate*' what is there to make them so? If they differ from the ordinary personal pleasures, how do they come to be motives at all? For individual pleasure is his only consistent starting point, and he can admit no duty except duty to self. For that the state consists of nothing but its members, and therefore that private ethics must include political as the greater the less, Bentham clearly sees:† hence it follows that such virtues as Justice and Benevolence cannot be given by the state (because the state could only derive them from its

* Principles of Morals and Legislation, xix. 7. † Vid. ib. xix. 8.

members) but must rest for their ultimate basis on individual morality. Hence in his theory there is no adequate support for these virtues, and consequently he makes an apparent confusion between the ends of Ethics and Politics. He takes as his principle the Greatest Happiness of the Community, whereas all that he proves is the principle of Individual Selfishness, and he has not in any way shewn whether or how these two coincide. For he does not even pretend to assert that such a principle as that of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is enunciated by the intuitive sentiment of all mankind, seeing that such an assertion would be as ridiculous as an attempt to prove the law of attraction from the same source; but it is only at most the principle of personal utility that he thinks thus intuitively demonstrated. So there is a great gap in his system, which must thus fall to pieces; there is a link wanting in his chain, and all that hangs on it must thus fall to the ground.* It is only really possible to fill up this gap and to supply this link by tracing, as we have attempted, the genesis of society and the gradual evolution of the social affections. We are thus enabled to perceive how such emotions as Justice and Benevolence have become by gradual organization as much productive of immediate pleasure as the original more simple emotional states on which they were founded; so that in satisfying them a man is really fulfilling his own interests and furthering his own evolution. The ends of Ethics and Politics then become really identical,—for Politics is merely an art of which Ethics is the ruling science. But with Bentham this was at best only a hypothesis: his conclusions were not warranted by his premises.

This inconsistency in the system of Bentham, an inevitable result of his method, has been remarked by several of his followers, (we have already quoted Mr. Mill's criticism), and in order to remedy it, a partial change of method has been proposed, which, while avoiding the extreme narrowness of the former, is

* The chain is not only broken in two, but its upper end is not attached to any holding support. It is nothing but two bits of cobweb floating in the air.

it is himself alone that he sees throughout; the glasses can only magnify and diminish, they cannot add or take away, and if they alter the relative arrangement of parts, it is only because they are out of focus or inaccurate. Thus Religion can create no new conception, but must derive all its materials from philosophy. Imagination must be built on fact, hope on memory, religion on experience; and whatever there is in the result of different nature to the elements must be mere words—either meaningless or contradictory. Therefore theological or ideal systems of morality can introduce no new element, and what at first seems strange will soon be recognized as some well known shape dressed up in brighter colours and endowed with more majestic proportions. In discussing therefore such systems we have to deal with no new class of principles, we can meet no obstacle that we have not previously encountered. If any such seem to rise before us and summoning our courage we make trial of its nature, we shall find it yield impalpably to our strokes, and only to elude us because it has not sufficient existence to be slain. Like the phantoms in a dream, it turns out to be the ghost of some unnoticed wish or terror,—"materies vatum falsique piacula mundi."

In order to verify these remarks and to fix our meaning, let us take as our example the popular theology of the day, and Dean Mansel as its most philosophical representative. The principal characteristic of this philosophy is, as we have hinted, that while adhering to the fundamental principles of the psychological school, it is not blind to the great deficiencies of that school, but attempts to remedy them by recourse to theological hypotheses. Thus, for instance, Dr. Mansel clearly shews that the conception of Duty which Kant made the absolute rule of moral action as possessing the inherent power of a 'categorical imperative' is really destitute of such authority, inasmuch as it can be traced no further than itself, or in other words because no *reason* can be given for it. It really, as he sees, fails to distinguish itself from pleasure, for disobedience to its behests

entails at most nothing but loss of pleasure. Instead however of recognizing in it a mere metaphysical abstraction of motives, with no separate existence of its own, he takes its existence for granted and proceeds to account for its origin, apparently thinking that to make a single unproved hypothesis is an error indeed, but one which may be easily remedied by piling up others upon it, and that Kant failed not because he wandered from experience, but because his wanderings were too timorous and unsystematic. Obligation, he thinks, cannot really be explained except as emanating from a superior, who by rendering men accountable to himself creates in them the conception of Duty: hence it follows that virtue depends on the relations of man to God, and that religion is the only sphere of morality.

Now we have already seen in criticizing Paley's notion of obligation, that this conception of a Divine command can add nothing new to the notion of Duty or Virtue, but can only dress up the old motives under new forms. Disobedience, whether to a law or to a lawgiver, can only entail the necessity of taking the consequences, and if the consequences are the same in each case, how can it matter to the delinquent from what quarter they come?* There are indeed motives specially powerful in the case of a personal command, such as respect, and love, and gratitude; but these are made out of exactly the same stuff as the rest, and differ from the ordinary prudential emotions, not as being composed of something different from pleasures and pains, (else they would not be motives at all), but as containing these elements in different proportions and combinations. Their motive power is estimated only by their pleasure power, and if the total amount and direction of active force be the same in two cases, the work done is also the same whatever be the source of derivation.

Obligation then or Duty, when strictly analysed, means merely a very strong motive, or rather perhaps a very comprehensive motive. At any rate if it be a motive at all (and if not

* Cf. Dugald Stewart, Active Powers, II. vi.

we have nothing to do with it) it must be something composed of pleasures and pains. Hence it is evident a priori that neither the deepest theologian nor the most enthusiastic devotee can, if brought to the test, hold out any other inducement to virtue than that of pleasure to the actor; and to verify such a conclusion we have only to appeal to their maxims and mode of teaching. Most churchmen, though holding a perhaps reasonable yet generally unreasoning aversion to Paley, practically illustrate his doctrines in their teaching, for their arguments to virtue are little more than a series of tableaux representing the happiness of the good and the misery of the wicked, first in this world and afterwards in the next. It is indeed to the latter portion of this picture, to their monopoly of the hopes and terrors of immortality, that nearly the whole of their influence is due; for whom would they induce to do good and shun evil if heaven and hell were interchanged, or if the wicked man were allowed even as great a chance of immunity in the next world as he has in the present? And the very vagueness of the prospect enhances its awfulness, for the details being left to each man's imagination, he fills them up in those colours which are to him the most glowing and powerful; and the whole is then looked at through the glass of infinite duration, which makes even the most trivial object gigantic and the minutest motive irresistible. This undefined foreboding of a future life, this awful belief that men have "esse aliquid manes et subterranea regna," is the great stronghold of religious influence, and by it the familiar forms of prudence are so veiled in a gauzy dress of imagery and unreality, that under the names of piety and devotion they seem far elevated above the ordinary forms of pleasure-born emotion, and at length, in pride of their fine dress and the adulation of their worshippers, allow themselves to be set up in opposition to their own parents and relations, whom they anathematize as base-born and ignoble profligates, and bombard with all the artillery of heaven.

Yet methinks I hear one of my readers exclaim, 'Ah, but

'how cruelly and unjustifiably, in drawing so ignoble a picture, 'do you misrepresent true Christian virtue! Selfishness may 'be indeed the guide to the natural heart of man, which is in- 'capable of a higher feeling, but with the true followers of 'Christ His love constraineth them to all virtue,* by whose 'goodness alone it is that our duty and happiness coincide, 'seeing that for those that love Him He hath prepared such 'good things as pass man's understanding,—and for them that 'reject His love what punishment can be too severe, what hope- 'lessness too unending? In serving God we think neither of 'hope nor fear, but only how we may please Him to whose 'favour we owe our life and breath and all things?' To this we answer,—Even granting your position, that true virtue springs from love to God, your motive to any particular good action is after all only the satisfaction of this love, and an action done from love or gratitude to God is exactly similar to one done from love or gratitude to man, the origin of which, from an association of pleasures and pains, we have already considered in a former part of this essay. We can love God only so far as He is an idealization of man, and in the satisfaction of this love lies one of the purest pleasures of humanity. Hence it is part of the picture of heaven that "we shall be for ever in the presence of the Lord." This last fact is also a witness that no earnest love can rest wholly on the past. 'Even in the most unselfish

* Rom. v. 14. Sometimes this is put in the form of 'Do all for the *glory* of God;' but apart from the objection that we aim at God's glory only because we love Him and that therefore God's glory can affect us only through His love, it is difficult to see any real meaning in the expression 'the glory of God.' For glory lives in the atmosphere of man's social and political relations, in his fame and estimation among his fellows; but who are the fellows of God? "To whom will ye liken me, or to whom shall I be equal? saith the Holy One" (Isa. xl. 25; cf. Dan. iv. 35). Surely "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that He is Lord of "heaven and earth," cares not what men or angels think of Him, "as if he wanted "anything, seeing that he giveth to all life and breath and all things" (Acts xvi. 24). The glory of God therefore must mean either the pleasure which God feels in obedience, in which case it acts on us only through love, or the pleasure which we ourselves feel in contemplating the exaltation of our own ideal, in which case it is still more immediately only a form of our own gratification.

'love,' says Aristotle, 'the person loved must retain his nature. 'If he remain in the sphere of common intercourse his friend 'will wish him every blessing consistent with his own happi-'ness, but if he be removed into an inaccessible region he at 'once becomes an uninteresting object!'* Similarly the love of God depends upon His remaining in the same relation to man, in other words upon His still having power to do him good or harm. An incommunicable Epicurean deity could never be the object either of love or gratitude. Hence in this love there is insensibly mixed an anticipation of future benefits to be derived from it, though on this very account it tries to persuade itself of its pure unselfishness. Like the expectant heir who wishes his attentions to appear prompted not by expectation but by love, so men, forgetting the omniscience of Him they serve, have never been able to resist the temptation of "flattering Heaven with a lie"† degrading alike to the mind that offers it and to Him who is imagined to accept the offering.

If there be anything more than this, it is merely the result of association, whereby the pleasures and pains which flow from an object are associated directly with it, so that what was originally sought as a means to pleasure becomes at last a pleasure in itself. Hence, as we might expect, this earnest love of God appears only in men of strong feelings and susceptibilities, and mostly in times of great emotional excitement. The ardour of a young religion produced the fervour of St. Paul and the constancy of the early martyrs; and the fresh outburst of religious energy at the close of the middle ages could animate the heart even of a Cranmer with fortitude, and in the breast of a Fene-

* "εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, "μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δ' ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα "ἀγαθά· ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα, αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά."—Eth. VIII. vii. 6; cf. ib. IX. iv. 4.

† Hudibras, III. iii. 286. Cf. Bacon, Cogitata et Visa, vol. iii. p. 596, of collected works:—"mendacio Deo gratificari" (quoting Job xiii. 7). We cannot but recal the "preuses et saintes finesses," and the "saint artifice de devotion," which Pascal so ridicules in the Jesuits (Lettres Provinciales, X).

lon or a Madame de Guyon warmed the soul into the expression of a faith which could have had no power except over those who were already enthusiastic in its cause, and which was therefore rejected by the prudence of Christendom as injurious to the spread of a religion which it held forth in premature perfection. The Jesuits were wiser in their generation than their holier opponents; no religion can afford to "désespérer le monde."* For those in whom the elements of emotion are in an exceptionally advanced state of organization, are naturally looked upon by men in whom this process is more backward as enthusiasts or madmen, unfit to be trusted with the guidance of any souls but their own. Nay even their own successors, who owe to them their existence, soon come to look upon them with wonder rather than with emulation, as men inspired to found rather than to expound a religion. For establishment like marriage soon sobers and cools the fervour of pre-nuptial enthusiasm. In the marriage of the Church as well as of their wives "men are April when they woo, December when they are wed;" and churches, like "maids, are May when they are maids, but the sky changes when they are wives."† When religion becomes not only professed but a profession, the spiritual becomes like any other vineyard, and its labourers working for their daily hire have seldom either pleasure or 'leisure to run mad.'‡

Thus to the majority of men and in the majority of seasons simple unorganized pleasure is the only end and motive of action, and it is to this feeling therefore that religion has commonly to apply. This it does by promising the delight of self-

* Pascal puts the following words into their mouth :—"Les hommes sont aujourd'hui tellement corrompus, que ne pouvant les faire venir à nous, il faut bien que nous allions à eux ; autrement ils nous quitteraient: ils feraient pis, ils s'abandonneraient entièrement. . . . . Car le dessein capital que notre Société a pris pour le bien de la réligion est de ne rebuter qui que ce soit, pour ne pas désespérer le monde."—(Provinciales, VI.)

† As you like it, IV. i.

‡ Beaumont and Fletcher, Maid and Wife, V. ii.

approval on earth, and the unending happiness of heaven in return for a few trifling acts of self-denial and obedience. "The sufferings of this present time," it says, "are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us;"* "for what doth the Lord require, but to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"† God wants no worship or offerings for Himself 'as if He needed anything,' but cares only for the happiness of His creatures; He seeks not to influence their free choice, but only to enlighten their ignorance as to their true interests: "He hath set before us life and good, and death and evil,"‡ therefore choose ye between them, and take the assured consequences of your choice: *αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος.* That it is to such arguments as these that all the most refined and elevated appeals of religion must be ultimately resoluble, is easily evident to any one who applies his reason to the subject; nay it is often most apparent to those least capable of argument, inasmuch as they are the less liable to appreciate the subtleties and fine fancies whereby men seek to disguise its truth. "I have heard it preached," quoth Sancho, "that God is to be loved with this kind of love "for Himself alone, without our being moved to it by hope of "reward or fear of punishment: though, for my part, I am "inclined to love and serve Him for what He is able to do for "me.' 'The devil take thee for a bumpkin,' said Don Quixote; "thou sayest ever and anon such apt things that one would "almost think thee a scholar.' 'And yet by my faith,' quoth Sancho, 'I cannot so much as read."§ But those in whom the process of organization has gone farther, who are capable of higher emotions and sympathies than the common ruck of men, need not look with scorn or despite upon their weaker brethren; for they must remember that these their vaunted feelings are only those which they think so despicable in an altered shape,

* Rom. viii. 18: cf. 2 Cor. iv. 17.
† Micah vi. 8: cf. Deut. v. 33.
‡ Deut. xxx. 5; ib. xi. 26.
§ Don Quixote, ch. xxxi.

and that they can never, even if they wish it, get rid of the universal principle of action whereby man follows his greatest apparent pleasure, any more than they can make water burn or a stone to cease from falling. They should look with sympathy rather than with pride upon the men of vice or of ignoble virtue, as their less successful brethren in the struggle of life, as men who, aiming at the same object as themselves, and fighting perhaps harder for its attainment than they, have yet fallen behind them in their upward course, and been forced to content themselves with a lower level of ambition, not because they are less eager in their search for happiness, but because their natural vision is less keen, and their constitution less favourable to success. If men would remember this, there would be not only less Pharisaism, but what is of more consequence, less self-deceit in the world.*

But there is another way in which it may be thought that Theology is a guide to Morality, apart from the question of motives altogether. For 'even granting,' it may be said, 'that 'religion can introduce no fresh motive but can only develop 'and organize the old, the very power of direction and arrange-'ment is after all the most important function of all; for if, as 'you imply, men always follow Good when they see it, the real 'difficulty must ever be to know what is Good, and if Theology 'can teach men this, Theology must be their instructress in 'morality. Granted that to affect our actions God must work 'through our faculties, is it not true that He Himself is by far 'the most comprehensive and important of the 'circumstances,' 'in correspondence with which you yourself consider virtue to 'consist? Does not therefore the nature of Good depend prin-'cipally and ultimately on the nature of God, and if Theology

* In order to give more conviction to the preceding remarks I have thought it worth while in an Appendix to take a definite example (the first which occurred) from the teaching of our popular divines, and to examine its arguments seriatim, and thus see of what they really consist. I think my opponents will hardly charge me with partiality in the selection which I have made. See App. 7.

'can tell us of the Divine attributes must not Ethics be merely 'one of its subordinate branches?' Dr. Mansel adopts this view in his theory that the standard of Right and Wrong consists in the moral nature of God, and it is indeed common to all the more philosophical of the systems which we are at present considering. Now this is a great improvement on the cruder form of the theory which is sometimes met with, that morality depends upon the arbitrary will of God, in so far as it recognizes the existence of law in the moral world. 'God,' it says truly, 'did 'not create morality by His will: it is inherent in His nature, 'and coeternal with Himself: nor can He be considered as ca- 'pable of reversing it.' So far this is good; but there is a fundamental objection to the principle on which it is founded, namely, that which condemns all metaphysical hypotheses framed to account for natural laws. For if we assert that virtue depends on the nature of God, we are merely saying that the various phenomena of Good derive their existence from an absolute essence or ἰδέα. For when we talk of God in His relation to morality, as the fountain of goodness, we merely mean that He is the perfection or ideal of Good, of which man's highest virtue is a faint suggestion; and though we may personify this ideal as a self-existent being, just as our ancestors personified the essences of gravity and heat and light, which they supposed to have a real existence and to be at once the efficient and formal causes of the various phenomena included in the sphere of each, yet personification, so far as it is an artifice of our minds, can add no new fact or reality, much less can it alter or affect the facts which have preceded it. To say therefore that an action is good because it is of the nature of God is just the same as saying that an object is hot because it partakes of the essence of caloric; and such phraseology not only makes no addition to our previous data, being merely an inaccurate formula for expressing the amount of fact already ascertained in such a form as to hide the gaps and make our ignorance look like wisdom, but also reverses the true order of knowledge

and contradicts every fact of mental experience. Let us verify this a little more fully.

Our idea of God is, as we have seen, identical with our idea of perfection; He is to us the most perfect Being, the summit of creation, towards whom the whole universe points in its gradual rise from its lowest to its highest development. Hence if we try to picture to ourselves God, it is under the similitude of an ideal man; for man is the highest representation of the animal world,* "created of every creatures best,"† "endued with intellectual sense and souls, of more preeminence than fish and fowls,"‡ "the paragon of animals;"§ and the animal world is in its turn the highest phase of the visible universe. Thus God comes to be a name for our ideal of humanity, and we can imagine nothing in God, perfection apart, except what we find in man.‖ For all pictures of the imagination must derive at least their elements from experience, and though religion "is an art which does mend nature, change it rather, still the art itself is nature" in another form.¶ The divine attributes then are merely the idealization of our human attributes—wisdom and love and justice and mercy infinitely refined and freed from all their blemishes. It is not that they are indefinitely extended, for so their relative proportions would be lost,** but that they

* Arist. de Part. An. iv. 10.—"*πάντα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ζῶα γαννώδη τἄλλα παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.*"

† Tempest, III. i. ‡ Comedy of Errors, II. i. § Hamlet, II. ii.

‖ Arist. Met. xi. 7.—"*φάμεν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον.*" The earliest God was the king; then the deified hero; then, even when the ideal had become more abstract, the need was felt of keeping in sight its true origin, and the central figure of Christianity is at once God and Man, thus symbolizing the real unity of the divine and human natures. Do we not hold that man is made "in the image of God?"

¶ Winter's Tale, IV. 4; (see also the preceding words). So also Arist. de Sensu, 6: *οὐ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ὄντα*" (where he is shewing the impossibility of conceiving a point which has no extension); and passim. (Vid. App. 5.)

** This error has produced many confusions and difficulties, such as that between absolute justice and absolute mercy, which has led on to many others in its turn. Perhaps Luther's mode of argument is the most curious of any. Assuming God's

ultimate Being in whom all his conceptions of virtue and happiness are ideally realized.

Hence it is the essence of Religion ever to be progressive, and whether we reckon this progression backwards from a perfect being or forwards from the last lower stage of evolution, its scientific meaning remains the same. The very office of each successive religion is to raise the actual up to an ideal standard, and so by discovering a further ideal beyond to prepare the way for its own destruction. Any religion that claims finality, that refuses to give way or to modify itself when its work is done, becomes no longer useful but obstructive; it cramps and confines man's loftiest faculties, it chains the aspirations of the present to the ideal of a past and obsolete age. It is this clinging to worn out systems, this inflexibility engendered by success, that is the cause of the apparent conflict between science and religion. Science and Religion are truly one, for Religion is but a shadow of future Science; but Science and religions are often opposed, just as the astronomy of Newton is opposed to the horoscopes of astrology and to the hypothetical vortices of Descartes.* So soon as religion ceases to fill man's highest aspirations, so soon does it cease to be a true religion, and the verdict of philosophy goes forth against it,—"Cut it down for it cumbereth the ground." Then comes either a new revelation or a reformation, and mankind starts forward again on a new course, until again the boundary

" bodily presence, with glorified or adopted form, in order the more easily to attain " to it, because the lofty man can ripen only by a lofty one, as diamond can be " polished only by diamond."—Titan, Jubilee 1, Cycle 1.

* "Welche Religion ich bekenne? Keine von allen
"Die du mir nennst. Und warum keine? Aus Religion."—*Schiller.*

Thus Coleridge speaks of faith, the handmaid of religion, as a mere idealization of knowledge. He says that "though never contrary to reason, it is ever soaring above the region of ascertained fact: the euthanasy and apotheosis of our knowledge." Aph. ix. (on Spiritual Religion).

"Höher stets, zu immer höhern Höhen
"Swangt sich die schaffende Genie." (*Schiller*, Die Künstler.)

Knowledge rises from height to height, and Religion, its head, is ever in the air above.

is reached and a new extension is demanded. A religion that refuses to give way to this ever spreading ocean, becomes first like an overflowed embankment, a mere barrier to the reflux of the tide whose aggression it vainly tried to check, then an apparent break in the smooth waters of knowledge, until at last the rising tide flows triumphantly over its head, and it disappears for ever into the forgotten depths below.

That in Religion therefore lies the perfection of morality we fully acknowledge, nay, is an integral fact in our system. But we deny in the first place that Religion means a particular creed or string of dogmas, and in the second place that it is an original source of belief or action. That which is merely a name for certain beliefs or ideas cannot be their source, unless we consider them self-created, and if so they would be more distinct than those resulting from them; in other words, if religion were the source of morality, our notions of the virtue of God would be more distinct than our conception of a single human virtue, and the stimulus of duty keener than that of sympathy or affection. We can indeed form a true conception of moral as of physical laws only by idealization, for abstraction is the condition of all mental progress; but the very words ideal and abstract imply particulars from which to be formed, or if not, are mere unmeaning and impotent nonentities. We protest therefore against the reversal of the true order of knowledge; we must not build belief on hope or assertion on regrets; we must not fall down and worship as the source of our life and virtue the image which our own minds have set up. Why is such idolatry any better than that of the old wood and stone? if we worship the creations of our minds, why not also those of our hands? The one is indeed a more refined self-adoration than the other; but the radical error, the self-imposition and hypocrisy, remains the same in both. The old idolaters were wrong, not because they worshipped themselves, but because they worshipped their creation as if it were their creator; and how can any religion which claims to be the first

The result which we saw to follow from the labours of James Mill and his predecessors was the reconciliation of the different moral systems founded on the psychological method, and the consequent organization of psychological phenomena. Now these phenomena were simply the feelings and emotions of each individual man, and therefore any philosophy founded on them was necessarily confined to the same sphere. Hence in order that the organism of moral philosophy should be further expanded, it was first necessary that the field from which its data were taken should be widened, and the first step outwards was naturally from the contemplation of the single individual man to a general survey of the whole number of individuals whose actions and thoughts we are capable of observing, or in fact of mankind as pourtrayed to us in history. This step was supplied by the Historical method, which though in reality, as we have seen, merely a modification of the Psychological, inasmuch as it values the historical phenomena only as symbols of the inner feelings which it supposes to have produced them, still not only gives a more comprehensive view of these feelings and of the general laws which regulate their succession, but is at any rate a step towards looking at them from a truly scientific or objective point of view as existing so far as we can know them *only* in the phenomena by which they are evidenced. By this method the sphere of observation is sufficiently widened to enable us to trace the actual genesis of some of the later and more complex of the moral faculties, which before we could observe only statically in their developed form. This is especially the case with the social and political feelings, and with some of the virtues arising from an advanced state of civilization, such as those connected with property and law and the division of labour; and with these come the so-called codes of honour and the morality of fashion and the conventional rules of courtesy and good taste.* By these examples of actual observation we

* Mr. Herbert Spencer has given a good example, in his Essay on Mr. Bain's 'Emotions and Will,' of the way in which the formation of some of these complex

are able to form a more definite idea of the general laws which govern the genesis of emotions, and to appreciate the connection between man's inner nature and the circumstances by which he is surrounded. But this method is after all evidently insufficient to tell us all we want to know. History only goes a little way back; it tells us of the actions of hardly more than a single tribe of mankind; and its dicta can never be implicitly relied upon as free either from mistakes of the observer or from prejudice of the narrator. Hence in order to advance a further step and find a broader basis for our science, we must have recourse to a method still wider than the Historical;—one which shall embrace in its field of view not the actions of some few men only but of the whole human race: we must artificially expand History beyond the region of records and dates, and read it not in the letters and alphabet of some few hundred years antiquity, but in some far older cipher written in the records of man's inmost nature. For it is this very period of undeveloped moral and mental faculties, when men could neither reason nor express their reasonings in artificial signs, that is the most interesting of all to the mental philosopher; for this was the period which witnessed the making and development of all those faculties which we find ready made at the outset of history, and on the correct interpretation of its events depends the truth of the generalization on which his philosophy is grounded.

The apparently difficult task of supplying such a pre-historic history is accomplished by the method which has been applied with such success to the more obvious physical phenomena by Mr. Darwin, but which is equally capable of application to the similar though less easily observed phenomena which are comprehended under the mental and moral sciences; though in the latter case the almost insuperable difficulty of actual experiment has to be remedied by a somewhat more extended license of

emotions, which spring from an advanced civilization, might be traced in the history of the different tribes and races of men.

external has any meaning; and that they are in fact nothing but our own mind associated with certain external phenomena. Thus we see that this supposed consciousness is only the result of association, and is no distinctive element in the phenomena with which it is associated. Hence science has nothing to do with it, for science is concerned only with phenomena, or with relations among our primary states of consciousness; and if morality is to be a science at all it must stand on the same footing as the rest. The only difficulty is that the phenomena of which moral science treats happen to be those with which there is this peculiar association; but if we remember that the fact of this association is not one included under the subject of our science, but one belonging to a different subject altogether which has happened to get mixed up with it, this only difficulty immediately disappears.

Thus it becomes evident that the only consciousness with which physiology is concerned is that manifested in various physiological phenomena, and of this it shews the origin and laws: of any other it is naturally unable to give an account, for such account is not only in itself impossible, but could have no connection with the function of science. The 'is' of science is not the absolute 'is' of immediate consciousness in which there is no separation of subject and object, but a mere copula, expressing a relation and implying a proposition. For there are two meanings of the word existence which have been often confused by philosophers and have thus produced many of the difficulties of metaphysics. In the first it is identical with consciousness; and in this sense the only existence is the momentary state of consciousness which constitutes our self at any particular instant, that little speck "rounded with a sleep,"* that crest of the ever moving wave formed by the conflux of two eternities, that water-gate of time through which the future is ever discharging itself into the past. In the second sense the perception of existence is merely the expectation of a certain sequence among our states of consciousness, and is there-

* Tempest, Act IV. sc. i.

fore the result of association. It is in this sense that we know the existence both of ourselves and of outward objects, for it matters not whether the states of consciousness between which the sequence is expected be among those which we have classed under the whole ourselves, or those which we hold to constitute some external object. And it is with this second kind of existence only that science is concerned; for science is merely a classification of sequences among our states of consciousness, and with absolute existence it has nothing to do. The existence of an object from a scientific point of view is nothing but the sum or abstract of its properties, so that each proposition that can be made about it involves a portion of such existence. The science which we are at present considering treats of the physical constitution of animal life, of which it must be remembered that my, the observer's, body and actions are a part, and therefore just as much an object of science as the bodies and actions of others. It is therefore concerned only with the *phenomena* of life, and if life mean to us any more than its phenomena, physiology takes no account of that residue. Thus whenever in the foregoing discussion we have talked of reason, emotion, will, and so forth, all that we mean is the phenomena which we are accustomed to class together as the manifestations of these abstractions.* We may, if we please, take the phenomena as symbols of the inner states of consciousness, and hold what is proved to be true of their origin and relations to imply a similar truth concerning the faculties to which they point, but this is merely to translate the language of science into the inner language of consciousness, and is not part of the function of science. This importation of actual consciousness into actions, whether they be those of our own

* In describing the evolution of physiological phenomena we have often spoken of them as states of consciousness, because by a translation into the inner language the meaning of our statements is rendered more easily comprehensible, but in strictness we know nothing more than the phenomena which present themselves to our senses. Pleasure and pain and their developed varieties are to science nothing more than *physical* states of the animal tissue.

CHAPTER III.

OBJECTIONS.

HAVING now completed the building of our fortress, and properly apportioned the duties of its garrison, we must next proceed to supply it with a suitable armament of guns and ammunition, and to teach its defenders the best methods of repelling external assaults. It thus becomes necessary to review some of the more important objections that have been or may be made against our system; in order that, if we can succeed in disproving their validity, we may both be more secure against future surprise, and induce some, who by mistake or ignorance of our true principles are now our enemies, to forsake their opposition, and by their alliance add strength to our cause. A similar task has been already attempted at some length by Mr. Austin, Mr. Mill, and other champions of the utilitarian philosophy, but though we shall use their labours with thankfulness, our point of view is essentially different from theirs, and therefore we shall be seldom able to adopt their answers.

The objections which we have thus to consider may be conveniently divided into three heads, according as they assert the inutility, the untruth, or the contemptibility of our system respectively. Let us then proceed to examine these in order.

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§ 1. OBJECTIONS ON THE SCORE OF INUTILITY.

The first of the objections enumerated in the foregoing classification may be found in the Introduction to Mr. Herbert Spencer's treatise on Social Statics. To say that Good consists in Happiness is according to this view a void proposition, because Happiness is the less known quantity of the two, and therefore, in identifying it with Good, we rather diminish than add to our

knowledge of the latter. Now, in the first place, this criticism is untrue as a statement of facts. Happiness or pleasure is in reality a much more definite idea than Good: everybody knows what pleasure is, but nobody has without inquiry anything but a very vague idea of the nature of Good; and this idea would become very much clearer if men were told that the goodness of an action is measured by the amount of pleasure which is produced by it. Pleasure is the ultimate sensation which it is impossible to analyse, whereas Good is, as Mr. Spencer would allow, derivative, and therefore if they are connected at all (which he allows) Pleasure must be the simpler of the two, nay it must be the very elements out of which Good is compounded. Surely to resolve a compound substance into its primary constituents can never be a useless or unmeaning task.

But even granting that the criticism was based on truth, and that a knowledge of the nature of Good gave no immediate facilities for its attainment, it would still be invalid as an objection to a scientific principle. For otherwise the authority of all the great laws of nature would be discredited, because on their first discovery they teach men nothing beyond what they knew before, because they appear to the ignorant "nihil aliud quam concinnationes rerum antea inventarum,"* aiming only at enveloping the facts of every day life in an abstruse and pedantic phraseology. Everybody knew, long before science was thought of, that the sun rose and set once in so many hours, that water boiled at a certain temperature, and that different rocks were found one on the top of another; yet it has never been objected

* Bacon, Nov. Org. I. 8; cf. ib. 18. The man of science often appears to the vulgar as a Hudibras, who

"By geometric scale
"Could take the size of pots of ale:
"Resolve by sines and tangents straight
"If bread and butter wanted weight;
"And wisely tell what hour o' th' day
"The clock does strike, by algebra."—(Hud. I. i. 121.)

Yet how would men have got clocks, except by science? They receive gladly enough the gifts of science and then forget and laugh at their benefactor.

to the discoveries of astronomers, or chemists, or geologists, that their explanations of these well-known facts were useless, because they referred them to phenomena less familiar than themselves. If, on the one hand, the fact revealed by science be already certain, there is indeed no immediate practical use in rediscovering it, or including it under a law; but though the advantage be not immediate it is by that only more likely to be enduring and comprehensive. For without general laws fresh discoveries and therefore further material progress would be impossible; and the more abstract the law, and therefore the less immediate its applicability, the wider must be its field of operation, and the more numerous and important the benefits which it is destined to confer. Thus general truths, such as the principle which we defend, though they may be barren of immediate results, are yet the sources from which spring rivers which shall fertilize and enrich man's field of action long after the present puny and scattered rills of facts are dried up and useless. To condemn a scientific law for inutility or even for some direct sentimental annoyance is like Cyrus' ignorant chastisement of the Gyndes; a river that cannot drown a horse is likewise unable to give water for the coming harvest. It is the error of the spendthrift, who fancies he has invented a fine device for increasing his income, by drawing from his capital, but who soon finds to his disappointment that "reditus et vectigalia scientiarum augeri possunt, patrimonium et fundus minui."* No general truth is immediately useful, because practice is concerned only with particulars; but no new particular utilities can be invented except deductively from general truths, or analogically from like particulars, which is nothing but a defective form of the same process. General laws therefore, though useless in the narrow and unphilosophical application of the word, have a higher value than that of immediate utility: for they are in the most distinctive sense preeminently *good*, in-

* Bacon, De Augmentis, vol. i. p. 462 (Ellis and Spedding). It is the old story of the goose with the golden eggs.

volving a momentary self-denial as a means to the attainment of a greater ultimate advantage: they are useless in the lower sense because they are useful in the higher.* With the derivation of these eventual utilities we have in the present Essay nothing to do, for we are here treating of Pure and not of Applied Ethics; but that even now such a derivation is possible, is proved by the results already accomplished in this very sphere. Has there not been a Bentham ?†

If, on the other hand, the truth which science teaches is one which has never before been generally accepted or realized, all the arguments used above apply with redoubled force. The mere fact of the attainment of new truth is one of almost incalculable utility. For truth and utility are, as Bacon says, one and the same thing, and the principal value of facts themselves is that they are pledges of the advancement of truth.‡ Science therefore should care primarily for truth, and only secondarily for practical advancement: she must be neither "tanquam scortum ad voluptatem," nor "tanquam ancilla ad quæstum," but "tanquam sponsa ad generationem fructuum atque solatium honestum."§ To reverse the order, is not only to degrade the goddess into a milk-giving cow,‖ but to lose the very object for which such impiety is risked. Many a race has been lost ere now by the picking up of golden apples on the way.

* Cf. Plato, Rep. II. 357.

† In spite of the many faults of Bentham's work (and we have already noticed not a few), which discredit its claim to be a scientific treatise of morality, the classification of pleasures which it contains and the practical methods and maxims which it deduces therefrom constitute it immeasurably the greatest work on Applied Ethics of modern times.

‡ "Ipsissimæ res sunt veritas et utilitas ; atque opera ipsa pluris facienda sunt quatenus sunt veritatis pignora quam propter vitæ commoda."—Nov. Org. i. 124; cf. ib. ii. 4.

§ Bacon, De Augmentis, vol. i. p. 463.

‖ Schiller, speaking of science, says :—

"Einem ist sie die hohe die himmlische Göttin, dem Andern
"Eine tüchtige Kuh die ihn mit Butter versorgt."

And yet even a cow requires feeding, for without food how can she go on providing milk ?

Finally, each new law of nature that is discovered contributes to the general evolution of man, and thus to his greatest pleasure and utility; for it makes more complete the organization of his mental correspondence to the medium which surrounds him; it brings into more perfect harmony the two sides of his nature, the inner and the outer, the model and the original. Hence the propounding of such laws can never be useless, if only they are true, and therefore the only argument either from the scientific or from the utilitarian point of view which can have any validity, is one which impugns not their immediate effect or practice but their truth. If true they are sure to be useful, but if false they are preeminently hurtful. Let us then proceed without further delay to this second and more important class of objections.*

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§ 2. Objections on the score of Falsity.

The objections which we have now to consider rest upon appeal to sundry acknowledged facts and phenomena, with which it is asserted our system is at variance. Many of these have been already answered in our previous chapter, which was expressly devoted to the consideration of some of the more ordinary moral phenomena in their relation to our present theory. Such for instance are the following; that our principle fails to account for the immediate dicta of our moral faculties; that it excludes our sympathetic and benevolent emotions; that it gives no account of religious aspiration; that it contradicts our belief in duty and obligation; that the law of evolution, on which our escape from previous difficulties rests, implicitly denies the freedom of the will of which we have a direct intuition; and finally that there are many pleasures which are unanimously stigmatized as evil and degrading. These and many other objections which have been raised against our

* The objection which we have considered above, is answered also by Aristotle; Eth. VI. xii. 1, sqq. q. v.

system we have already disposed of, but there still remain not a few which, though not falling under any of the general heads into which our former chapter was divided, must still not be left without an answer, lest such omission should seem attributable rather to our incapacity than to our neglect.

1. The first of these which we shall notice is one which has been thought very dangerous to utilitarian systems of Ethics. 'A theory of morality,' it is said, 'which looks only at the 'consequences of actions, and weighs their worth by an 'arithmetical balancing of their results, leaves entirely out of 'sight an element of great moral importance, the motive which 'prompts the actor in each case. The same act may be good if 'done from a good motive, and bad if done from a bad motive, 'and thus consequences are an insufficient standard of moral 'value, and utility, though useful as a test, is utterly inadequate 'as a motive of action.' That this is a true criticism of the ordinary utilitarian systems, or at any rate of such of them as refuse to analyse the dicta of our moral faculties into their elements, we have already seen, but that it is in any measure applicable to our present principles we utterly deny. For in our view consequences and motive are or ought to be one and the same thing; the consequences, so far as they occur to the actor, are the motive which suggests their attainment. A moral action on an abstract point of view has two sides, motive and consequence, of which the one is a mere reflexion of the other by association; whatever of the consequences is not contained in the motive is extraneous and forms no part of the moral act, being the result of imperfect correspondence between the two sides of our nature, and according to the less or greater extent of these unassimilated consequences is the motive or action morally good or deficient. But in estimating the good or virtue of an individual we must take also into account the degree of correspondence to which his organism has already arrived, and as one of his actions is above or below the average of this correspondence so do we term it virtuous or wicked. Still

in both abstract and actual morality the value of an act is wholly determined by the motives which constitute it, and it is by these alone that we measure it; so that the larger the motive the better the action. We are indeed in appearance measuring consequences, but in doing so we are only measuring motives in a more convenient shape, for it is only in consequences that motives manifest themselves to our senses and thus become capable of observation. This method, whereby alone Ethics can be scientifically treated, has been rendered possible to us by means of the physical law of action. So long as we refuse to acknowledge the existence of laws or uniformities in the moral world, but attribute action to the influence of a supernatural indwelling power, independent of the universal law of cause and effect, so long we are unable to establish any connection between the moral nature of an act and its consequences; but when once action is seen to be the physical effect of associated pleasure, its various portions become connected by a universal relation, which enables us to pass by inference from one such portion to another at convenience. Thus our system asserts that in the abstract, that is to say in an organism of indefinite capability, we value the so-called 'voluntary' actions by just the same standard as that which governs our choice of external objects and our estimate of involuntary acts, by the total balance of pleasure or pain derived from them, but that in the case of a particular organism only those consequences must be considered with which it is already in *approximate* correspondence. Motive therefore is throughout simply consequence in another form, and the ultimate motive is the highest Good. Hence our philosophy is nothing else than a science of motives,†

* Hence the attempt which has been made to avoid the question of motives by denying that the motive is part of the action starts from the exact antipodes of truth.

† That this must be true of all real moral philosophy is shewn by Aristotle (Eth. II. iii. 1—11). Nay he goes further with us and shews that the common element in all motives is pleasure, for that the only three motives are *καλὸν*, *σύμφερον* and *ἡδύ*, and of these the two former may be resolved into the latter; "*κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη (ἡ ἡδονὴ) τοῖς ζώοις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ σύμφερον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.*" (Cf. ib. X. i. 1.) The only ground of

and it is simply because pleasure has been shewn to be the universal motive both *à priori* and by physiological experience that we have identified pleasure with the greatest good. So far are we then from excluding motive from morality that we measure the latter by the former; if the motive be large we call the action good, if it be small we call it bad, and that even though in a particular instance the actual result in the former case may be painful and in the latter pleasurable.*

But if under our system all motives are identical, and if the morality of an action depends wholly on its motive, how, it will be asked, do we draw any moral distinction between one action and another? To this we answer that the only difference between ourselves and our opponents is that we make motives homogeneous, and therefore differing only in shape and degree, while they make them heterogeneous, and therefore included under no common nature; with us therefore a science of Ethics is possible, with them impossible. An action is morally good

difference between Aristotle and ourselves is that he did not see that if pleasure be the test and the motive, it must also be the end of action, and that the different virtues which aim as he thinks at its form καλὸν are only various means of its attainment. The identification of good with the ultimate motive was universal in Greek philosophy, from the days of Socrates downwards; and thus virtue was held to consist in knowledge and vice in ignorance. (Cf. Plato, Tim. 86 D). Thus the Greeks, though leaving out of sight the unconscious associations which produce the greater part of actual motives, were freed from all the errors and prejudices which our modern 'invention' of the Will has brought in its train. The Greek philosopher could not conceive of action except as following the strongest motive, the modern has to deal with men in whose minds the pretence of such a conception forms almost the only moral idea.

* In this case we may notice that the action is virtuous but the abstract act is bad, or *vice versâ*. For any given outward act is preceded by an associative train of indeterminate length, and may consequently be either good or bad even in the same individual, and still more in individuals of various degrees of development. An action may be good to small knowledge but bad where knowledge is more extended, for in the former case it may be in advance of the correspondence already attained and in the latter case behind it; morality being ever as we have seen (see Prop. I. p. 15, relative to the organism. On its performance fresh experience is gained, and on its repetition it must be necessarily either better or worse than before. Thus a highly developed organism is endowed with a greater capacity for good or evil than a backward one, and this is what we mean by the responsibility of knowledge and the continuous elevation of the moral standard.

according to our system, in proportion to the extent and accuracy of its motive, to the clearness and far-sightedness of its aim, to the degree of correspondence between it and circumstances. The greater the proportion of eventual consequences, which by association are either consciously or organically incorporated with an action, (or in other words the greater its motive), the more fully will it exemplify the law of moral action, and contribute to the evolution of human nature. The law itself remains the same, and can only be applied; just as the law of attraction remains the same through all the complicated mechanism of a clock, the force being only distributed, not altered. Therefore, to sum up our statement, the morality of an action depends wholly on its motives, which motives are simply an associated portion of the consequences which follow on the action; and as this portion is absolutely large or small, so is the action abstractedly good or bad, and as it is relatively large or small, so is the action relatively virtuous or wicked. Also, since we cannot observe motives directly, we judge of them by the actual phenomena of which they are the ideas, or in other words by the results of the outward action to which they lead; and accordingly therefore as an action is in correspondence with a wide or with a narrow sphere of circumstances, or in other words as the general result is good or evil, so do we (in default of other evidence) judge it, or rather the motives of which it is but the manifestation, to be virtuous or wicked, and praise or blame it accordingly.* If the action brings in the long run more pain than pleasure, excluding from such result in any particular case what is evidently 'accidental' or extraneous, the motive must have been insufficient,

* The degree of correspondence may be increased in two ways—by a wider extent, or by greater minuteness. This leads to two classes of virtues (as also to two schools of art), the homely or practical, and the visionary or ideal, which as depending on different physical conditions are rarely united in the same person. The highest virtue however, such as that which we imagine in the Deity, would be at once infinitely and infinitesimally perfect.

and the amount of such insufficiency is not ill measured by the deficit of the balance; if, on the contrary, the result of an action, estimated as before, is on the whole favourable to the actor, though we are unable thereby to take an exact measure of the motive which prompted it, we assume in absence of further evidence, that the motive was of adequate extent, and approve of the action as having been virtuous, and as at any rate to be followed in the future. Thus, inasmuch as our standard of moral approbation is the degree of correspondence between inner and outer sequences, motive and phenomena, our system is at least free from the imputation of neglecting to consider motives. An action is its motive, and therefore what we want to discover is the adequacy of different motives, but this can only be done by an examination of consequences. Inasmuch, therefore, as consequences are in the abstract identical with motives, and in any particular instance the best test of them which we have, it is from consequences that the data of our science are taken.*

When we thus see the true explanation of this objection, it seems surprising that it should ever have created any great difficulty. But this surprise vanishes when we remember that it can only be met by the adoption of the physical law of action and the new view of motive thereby attained, and we therefore see the reason of the various subterfuges which Utilitarian systems have invented for the avoidance of the fancied stumbling block. The most ordinary of these is the famous distinction which has been drawn between Utility as a test and Utility as a motive; whereby it is supposed that a convenient standard of morality may be retained merely as a generally recognized fact, without the necessity of giving any further account of its

* We must remember that this power of judging of the value of a particular act of a particular organism is not a part of Pure Ethics, our immediate subject. Nor is it the most important function even of Applied Ethics. The real object of the latter is to improve action; and this can be done only by a system which looks at consequences, and so shews men how to enlarge their motives.

involves the presence of effort or sacrifice. The moral sense is a complex faculty, that is, its objects are complex; and therefore if an object or action be simply pleasant or painful without any conflict of associations, it falls under some simple and already organic emotion, and can in no way affect our moral judgment except so far as that emotion forms part of our moral nature. We have also seen that a further reason for the inapplicability of the moral sense to the greater part of external objects lies in the narrow limits of our powers of sympathy. To this we may now add the fact that whether it be or not true that only voluntary actions can be the object of approbation, it is certain that they only can be affected by it, and that therefore on them alone can it be applied with any beneficial result. For though it is an insufficient answer to the objection with which we are engaged, to say with Hume that approbation is confined to voluntary actions, because in any other application it would be wasted; still the reflected advantage of praise and blame is soon discovered and becomes a strong incentive to their use. For when with the good actions of others we associate not only a sympathetic pleasure but direct advantage to the rest of mankind or ourselves in particular, we have a great motive to multiply these actions by every means in our power, and thus a new element becomes mixed up with approbation and virtue. Now this is impossible with inanimate objects and involuntary actions, because neither are dependent on association or motive, and both are therefore incapable of being influenced by sympathetic forces. Hence the feeling of approbation which we feel for these is a sentiment not only much weaker than that which we call 'moral,' but apparently of a totally different nature, being destitute of the three elements of *sympathy, hope of benefit,* and *idea of effort.* Still the true sphere of morality in its widest sense embraces even the inanimate world; and some of its phrases are not entirely unused in their more general signification. Is not 'good' a term of commendation almost universal? Is not the whole universe "very

good"? and do we not 'approve' of a well grown wine or a delicate dish?*

Good, virtue, approbation, morality, all these are in their nature coextensive with pleasure, consciousness, the universe: but in a narrower sense they are taken to mean each their highest part, that which is for the time still unorganized; and in this sense they are coextensive only with that pleasure which is attained through pain. Thus the two assertions that Good is identical with Utility, and that some useful things are not good, are contradictory only in appearance, and the objection which takes its stand on their opposition is shewn to be nothing more than an equivocation of terms. In one sense everything which tends to evolution is Good, and the law of Good and the law of Evolution are synonymous; but in another sense Good is confined to the highest sphere of this evolution, the region of conscious or voluntary action. In the first sense health and prosperity are good, but in the second, only virtue; and we thus approve of virtue only as and because we approve of health, though in a higher degree; the feeling in the latter case wearing a changed aspect owing to several peculiarities in the objects with which it deals.

3. The third objection which we shall consider is perhaps the commonest and most obvious of any. 'It is ridiculous,' men say, 'to suppose that in every voluntary or moral action a 'man makes a calculation of consequences before he determines 'how to act, because we find on appeal to experience that 'scarcely one act in a hundred is preceded by any such calcula-'tion, and yet that the rest are not therefore held excluded from 'the application of the moral standard?' To this we answer by appealing to the store of prudential maxims which consciously or unconsciously form our ordinary guides to action, and which have been formulated and inscribed upon our moral constitution

* Adam Smith says:—"In propriety of language we approve of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction;—of the form of a building, of the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat."—Moral Sentiments, Part vii. § 3.

rality, according to our system, depends on the correspondence of action and circumstance, or on the perfect organization of motives. Now in the outer nature, and therefore also in the inner, its reflection, there are certain general resemblances and uniformities;—hence in the correspondence between them there must also be general laws, or, as we here call them, rules of moral action. Moreover it is only on the basis of these general resemblances or principles that the correspondence can be organized, and therefore morality be advanced. Hence such principles have not only the basis of the separate likenesses of men and actions and circumstances which they severally represent, but each concentrates in itself, as a member of an organism, the total authority of the other members. To break a well established maxim not only destroys a useful rule for a large class of actions, but invalidates the accuracy of all the other rules which derive their origin from a similar source. So far we go with the objection of the moral sense school. But further, the authority of these principles is proportioned to their generality, and if the principle in question be grounded not only on large but on universal experience, as in the case of a scientific law, there can be no conceivable instance in which we should be justified in abandoning it. For either the action under consideration is of that kind of which the principle treats, in which case by the law of uniformity everything is true of it which is true of the rest of the class; or it is of a different kind, in which case of course the principle has nothing to do with it. Thus we agree with the utilitarians in holding that morality really rests on its widest principle. In one sense therefore there are no exceptions in morality. There are no exceptions anywhere. 'Exception' is a word like chance or accident, arising from our ignorance and imper ect reflexion of nature. If there could be a real exception there could be no law of uniformity, and so no knowledge, and therefore no idea of exception. Exception could only exist by its own annihilation. But in the ordinary sense there are many 'exceptions.' These

are simply the result of rules, and their existence is just as necessary to knowledge as the non-existence of the former. For if there were no such 'exceptions,' there could be only one law, and such a result, by rendering perception impossible, would negative the existence of that single law, and thus with 'exception' existence itself would vanish. It is here that the ordinary morality fails, and that the importance of attending to the widest and most ultimate principle is apparent. For though in ordinary cases the special rules suffice, and, as we fully agree, it only introduces complication to go further back; yet when (as from the multiplicity of attributes which actions like objects possess, and which causes them to be included under several various classes, must often be the case) two of these rules come into conflict, and the result must be an 'exception' to one of them, how can we decide which is to give way unless we can appeal to a higher authority? This difficulty has been felt by the popular school of morality, and an attempt has been made to avoid it without deserting the empirical point of view, by introducing empirical maxims of subordination among the various virtues. Such for instance are the following:—'Be just before you are generous,' 'Charity begins at home,' and many others of a similar nature. So virtues are formed into a hierarchy with a cardinal college or triumvirate at the head; nay, there is even in theory a president, "the greatest of all." Of these the lower are ordered ever to give way to the higher, and only the highest is absolute. Thus there are cases in which all moralists allow a lie, all politicians resistance to government; and by collecting the more important and ordinary instances of such conflict of moral duties and prescribing the proper conduct in each case, it has been thought possible to compile an adequate Code of Exceptions. But that such a code is sadly insufficient is the every day experience of mankind. Not only does it fail in minuteness, and thus leave men without a guide in some of the most momentous crises of life, but its maxims, though representing a larger sphere of facts

has the sneer any real force in either case. The virtue of each animal is according to its nature; the more perfect therefore the organism the higher the Good it can attain to, and if it content itself with anything lower than the highest then indeed it does degrade its dignity. The most perfect being of which we have actual experience is man, and therefore human virtue is the highest which we know; but in imagination we are enabled to prolong the series of ascending stages and thus to form the idea of an indefinitely perfect Being whose Good and Virtue are elevated as far above man's as man's ideal transcends the heaven of sheep and goats. But we can rise farther only because we have risen so far; our thoughts can travel onwards only by an extension of our previous progress. The idea of God is the idea of perfection, and how can such an idea arise except from a comparison of the different stages of imperfection in the animal world? Hence it follows that the virtue of the Deity and the virtue of the lowest animal can differ only by development. We can form no notion of morality except in the correlation of organ and function, physical or mental; and though of course the higher the function the higher the morality, yet its material exists as truly in the very lowest as in the highest and ultimate organization. Without elements whence could come the finished structure? Without material what would there be to develope?

Thus then let us answer the man who charges us with degrading humanity by connecting it with animal nature. Let us tell him in the first place that truth can be no degradation, or, if it be so, then 'degradation' should be striven for with all our might: secondly, let us shew him that though we derive morality from physiology, yet we draw the same distinction as himself between the virtue incident to different grades of organization, the moral nature being an integral part of the whole constitution and therefore varying in a constant ratio with the rest; and lastly, if he remain unconvinced by argument, let us terrify him into silence by denouncing his theory as blasphemous and atheistic, at once dishonouring to our highest feelings and de-

structive of the testimony to a God in nature. If he refuse to 'degrade' himself to the imperfect beings below him, then neither can he raise himself to the perfect Being above. To rise higher he must draw up the steps from below; if he throw them disdainfully away, and from a dizzy vanity at the elevation he has reached dream that he can now fly unsupported through space, he will soon find that the sun to which he thinks himself so near will quickly revenge the insult to its majesty by melting the wax upon his wings, and that the very vigour and impatience of his efforts has only prepared for him a deeper fall into the darkness of infidelity below.

'On what principle then,' it may be said, 'do you account for the stigma which is universally attached to the word selfishness?' By the peculiar and unphilosophical meaning which in the ordinary acceptation is given to that word. 'Self,' in the ordinary language, means a man's animal nature, his passions, appetites, and so forth, to the exclusion of what is called his 'duty,' of his moral sense, and of his benevolent and universal sympathies. Selfishness in this sense is eminently wicked, for inasmuch as it neglects the future and looks only at the present, it contradicts the very definition of Good, the nature of which is essentially perspective and comprehensive. But this is not the true or philosophical meaning of the word. In reality a man's self is his whole nature and constitution, and in this sense only is selfishness coextensive with virtue. Selfishness therefore, in the higher sense, can exist only by the death of selfishness in the lower: that man alone being truly selfish who can control his appetites and look beyond them to his ultimate good. The more apparently unselfish an action, the more truly, if founded on a correct estimate of circumstances, is it selfish; as the sowing of seed which looks like a wasteful act is in reality a means to profit in the long run. Whenever therefore we condemn selfishness, we condemn it only for its imperfection; that which we really blame being the self-abne-

thus, having arrayed our system to the best of our wealth and ability, to send it forth to seek friends among the dwellings of men. Having finished our opening address, we will conclude by simply laying our Bill upon the table. This is its tenor.

Moral Science is a section of that division of Physics which treats of animate nature, and its special subject is the relation which exists between the active and passive elements of that nature. The fundamental principle therefore from which it starts is the ultimate correlation of the two primary qualities of organized matter, irritability and contractility.* The law of this connection is evidently derived from the laws of chemistry and electricity (taking these in their widest sense), but the exact particulars of its birth are at present unexplained, owing to the great imperfection of physiological science, and are quite irrelevant to the function of Ethics. We take the Law of Action as it is, just as the Dynamical student takes the Laws of Motion, feeling little interest in its origin, and careful only of its development in different complications of phenomena.

This elementary law may be expressed as follows. Certain irritations of the tissue are followed by certain contractions of repulsion, and certain others by contractions which result in continuance of the irritation. The former are such as injure or derange the tissue; the latter such as tend to its preservation and development. Animal motion is therefore at first merely the physical reaction of certain organized bodies upon others with which they come in contact; and inasmuch as different impulsions produce their appropriate reactions, a general correspondence is instituted between the agent and its medium.

The first modification which is introduced into this primary action springs from the application of a coordinate law which is manifested throughout a considerable portion of the inanimate world, and doubtless is derivative, like that of action, from the primary forces of the universe, but which comes into import-

* The germs respectively of τὸ κριτικὸν and τὸ κινοῦν. Arist. De An. iii. 9. See also Marshall's Physiology, vol. i. p. 101.

ance only in the higher spheres of nature, and especially in animal life, the highest of all;—the law of Habit, or (as it is here called) of Association. The result of this is that sensations or irritations not actually present are reproduced in certain cases by faint images of themselves, the image following immediately on a previous irritation which has before been frequently followed by the original. These images, or secondary irritations, at last attain sufficient strength to produce a working of the contractile force similar to that which follows on the primary irritations of which they are the copies. Thus "*τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει;*"* and an *internal* motor power is evolved, which tends to conform more or less completely to external phenomena. Thus an unconscious anticipation of phenomena comes into play, or what in the true sense of the word we call Instinct.

The next complication is due on the one hand to the growing delicacy and subdivision of the functions to which the organism becomes adapted, and on the other hand to the continued working of the same Law of Habit, which is the great operator in moral as in purely mental Evolution. From the first cause the variety of irritations affecting the organism is multiplied, and its experience consequently becomes more multiform and heterogeneous; and from the second these various irritations become connected together with greater facility, and so more capable of arrangement and organized operation. Now when from the first cause sequence or change among irritations becomes common, these sequences become by habit consolidated into single separate states, and thus in their turn capable of reproduction by images like simple irritations. Then both simple and mixed ideas become subject to a derivative phase of the law of Habit, that of Similarity,† and these produce Perception and Reasoning respectively; so that the actions resulting from them are no longer instinctive but conscious or intentional.

In order to make this result more easy to understand, we

* Arist. De An. iii. 8.

† See App. 2.

And if by the publication of this Essay I shall lose some friend or gain an enemy, I shall console myself with the reflection that either he has mistaken my object in writing, or he must be the enemy also of Truth; and that I may well be happy in having the same friends and enemies as she, who in proportion as she is the most worthy of love is also the most liable to hate. If she had never made an enemy could she ever either be a perfect friend? And if, on the other hand, this Essay be entirely unproductive, if it be never read by a single human being, and never cause a single inquiry or reflection, even so its author will not regret having written it, for he will thus have gained the many happy hours which its composition has given him and yet be freed from the responsibility of authorship and fame. For the sake of others he could wish that it had been written by a philosopher of learning and of weighty name, but for himself he has no conception of a happier life than one spent in thinking and speaking about the highest truths of existence.

And finally, if in the foregoing pages I have spoken hardly or presumptuously of any man's belief, or if I have unnecessarily wounded any honest feeling, pardon, I pray you, the words which have offended, for they have been unwittingly and not maliciously spoken. Think not that it is I who speak, but a servant of Truth, too jealous for his mistress' honour; and weigh your convictions not by my criticism but by her decision. If then the Truth confirm your judgment, the Truth will make you invulnerable against all attacks; but if the Truth condemn it, she, not I, is your judge.

And to you who take no interest in Truth or her affairs, and care little for her authority; to you who live your life as one long to-day, or, if you think of the morrow, dwell only on the little incidents and amusements that it will bring, without one thought of the mighty forces that are ever working around you; to you men of petty politics and practice, who sleep the soft siesta of incurious orthodoxy, and answer the questioning spirit of philosophy—

"Some querulously high, some softly, sadly low,
"We know not,—what avails to know?
"We know not,—wherefore need we know?
"We know not,—let us do as we are doing"—

to you I say, Have your wish, do on as you are doing. For knowledge loves not those who love not her, and in return for their forced civilities she accords only the drudgery without the rewards of her service:—and if activity mean only loss of ease, surely it is better to sleep on for ever. But to you then this Essay must be dumb; it cannot speak your language or make you understand its meaning: so I here disclaim all interest in your approval, and spurn all dread of your complainings and reproaches. But I tell you that the force of knowledge is the mightiest force in the universe, and that whether you will or no the truth shall eventually prevail. Ye are not my judges; ye cannot judge any man. Nay further, I submit that no age can judge fairly its contemporaries; for the products of thought, like those of the grape, if they have any good in them at all, gain not their proper flavour till they are old. The future only can judge the present; for the life of truth is in the death of men.

But to you who 'love wisdom more than thrones and rubies,' who 'hold her beauty higher than the sun's and above all the order of the stars;' to you I say, Attribute that which is good in this Essay to the dictation of Truth, our common mistress, and that which is bad to me, her unworthy ambassador; and remember that Truth is not blemished by the imperfection of her ministers, whose very zeal often thwarts its object, but that "she is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty: therefore can no defiled thing fall into her." "And being but one she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls she maketh them friends of God and prophets." For the love then of our common service, (and ye know that if glorious it yet is hard), look leniently on your fellow worker, and help forward his efforts by your own. Let us lay hold together upon the

"is involved the assertion that there exists a Non-Relative. From "the necessity of thinking in Relations it follows that the Rela- "tive itself is inconceivable except as related to a real Non-Relative, "and unless a real Non-Relative or Absolute be postulated, the Rela- "tive itself become Absolute; and so brings the argument to a con- "tradiction." To this we answer that if he confines the word relative to the only sense in which he has proved it to be predicable of knowledge, his argument is true and involves nothing more than what we have seen all along to be the fact. If there be a Relative, there must be an Absolute: for if there be relation, there must be terms of the relation, and these must eventually be absolute. That is to say, the terms which, if considered in reference to their sequents or antecedents are relative, are if considered by themselves absolute: and this we have seen to be true of the ultimate components of our knowledge, sensations. It is equally true that the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as compared with an Absolute; nay further, inasmuch as conception is only of relations and therefore incapable of grasping a single absolute sensation, the Relative is in the strict sense inconceivable altogether.* We can only arrive at a quasi-conception of it by attending to its different degrees: we cannot compare it with something quite different from it, because comparison involves it; we can only compare its higher degrees with its lower.† The Rela-

* There is another sense of the word, in which we may conceive our mind in the narrower sense as *relative* to the external world (see below p. 308); but this is not true relativity, it is only imitation.

† This is the case with many other ideas which strictly speaking are inconceivable as positive conceptions, but which are simulated by the indefinite extension of various portions of knowledge. Hence their seeming individuality; for their approximate conception naturally varies according to the particular natural phenomenon of which they are the extension. This apparent qualitative distinction therefore between the various branches of the unknowable does not prove, as Mr. Spencer thinks, 'that they are positive or real, since distinction cannot exist between nothings' (§ 26). The Indivisible and the Unlimited suggest different ideas, only because in order to form any notion of them whatever, we take them in the approximate and not in the strict logical sense, and so represent to ourselves the one as something indefinitely small, the other as something indefinitely large, conceptions which as the result of different processes are naturally not interchangeable. But in their strict logical signification, these words are entirely synonymous with each other and with that remaining sphere of experience to which the positive conceptions of which they are the negative do not apply: in the present case, with the inner consciousness of thoughts and ideas which are (in the sense here meant) both indivisible and unlimited, being separated from space and its attributes altogether. Hence if they convey different ideas, it is only because they are taken to mean

tive merely means different relations or changes, and our notion of it is of change as distinct from persistence,—the Absolute: but such notion can be approximate only and not perfect, for perfect persistence excludes perception of which change or time is the very form or condition, and therefore can not be a subject of direct knowledge; though for convenience of thought such absolute persistence, like the lines and surfaces of geometry, must be postulated as the ultimate term of relation, the groundwork or material on which the existence of knowledge depends. We must remember however that the only justification of such a postulate lies in its indefinite approximation to experience. To assume the existence of something which differs from experience not only in degree but in kind, and then argue from that to phenomena as actually presented to us (as is the case with Mr. Spencer and his Absolute) can not only never be useful, or in any sense true, but is fraught with the greatest injury to philosophy, and renders truth indistinguishable from falsehood.

The true explanation therefore of Mr. Spencer's difficulty is that our knowledge is a number of changes or relations between terms which are in themselves absolute; considered in its parts it is relative, but as a whole it is absolute. But his argument professes to

something different from what they pretend, something not absolute at all but relative: in their strict signification they convey no positive idea at all, and negatively merely other sections of the relative or knowable. Hence it follows that if there be no remaining sphere of the knowable of which they can be negatively predicated (and in any case this is an illogical use of predication, for a negative attribute is properly no attribute at all) the only meaning they or their opposites can have is approximate and therefore indefinite. This is the case with the idea referred to in the text, that of the Relative or Knowable, which from the very fact of its embracing all knowledge cannot, either by itself or its opposite, be known by a single direct act of perception. Nor is it of any avail to postulate for the purpose (as Mr. Spencer does) an Unknowable beyond it, for in order to be of any use in comparison this Unknowable would have itself to become knowable, and so the difficulty would be as great as ever. (See also next note). So we must be content to know knowledge (like time its 'form') not in the sense in which we perceive its parts, by a comparison with something external, for it is evident that we can neither know nor invent any such external existence, but only by approximation, through an abstraction of its different degrees. The same of course is true of its correlative idea, sensation, or the absolute; and hence we see how it is that the only conception we can form of the latter as compared with the former, is as an indefinitely vague instead of an indefinitely clear perception. But this has nothing to do with the Absolute in Mr. Spencer's sense: of that we are not only unable to form a distinct idea, but totally incapable of forming any idea whatsoever.—See further, as to these approximate ideas, note to p. 334 below.

with him the raw material of our minds whom we are continually fashioning into shapes, the πρώτη ὑλή out of which the different forms of matter are derived: the most rudimentary and least perfect form of existence. He is the Nothing-in-particular of which we sometimes think merely because we cannot stop thinking; and if we wish to form a conception of His nature we can only do so by thinking of as little as we possibly can. Religious ideas are thus curiously reversed, and instead of God being the creator and ideal of humanity, man becomes the fountain and perfection of Deity. Such a result might in itself cast suspicion on the correctness of the reasoning by which it was attained; and cannot at any rate claim the support of common sense or of universality of conviction.

APPENDIX II.

On the Laws of Association and of other Modes of Redistribution affecting Mental Phenomena.

The origin of the Laws of Association is probably to be found in a peculiar property possessed by animal tissue in common with certain inanimate objects—that of acquiring Habits. Electric conductors, sonorous bodies, magnets, all are found to have this power to a greater or less degree;* but it is in living tissue that its effects come most under observation, and it has accordingly been hitherto looked upon as a peculiar characteristic of conscious action. Nor even yet, though its sphere is seen to extend to the physical universe, does any distinct account of its nature or method of operation seem possible in the present state of the higher physical sciences.

For such theories as that of residua adopted by Dr. Maudsley,† besides being little more than hypotheses, only put the problem in a new shape. Why, (to take the instance mentioned,) should these residua be formed in this peculiar manner? Until this is shewn, their introduction is unwarrantable, and has the disadvantage of drawing away inquiry from physical analogies; for it is to living tissue only that the doctrine has a shadow of applicability. And even there it is difficult to understand it from Dr. Maudsley's state-

* See Cabanis, De la Sympathie, x. 11. † Maudsley, pp. 105, 191, etc.

ment. That the nerves have to supply waste, like the other tissues, is undoubted; but that "the nutritive repair takes the form made by the energy and coincident material change" is not a very intelligible proposition, unless it means that the replacement is exactly identical in form with the expenditure, in which case it is difficult to see how the nerve gains any new quality by the process.

It is however at any rate certain both à priori and from observation that the property, whatever be its immediate mode of derivation, takes its root in the physical laws of the universe; and therefore that all the results of its operation in the human organism, among which must be included the whole phenomena of Intellect, Imagination, and Emotion, are directly connected by an unbroken chain of causation with the elemental properties of the material world. Nor need this assertion, that our thoughts are merely combinations of attractions or forces, startle us, when we remember that Force is after all nothing but a general name for Consciousness; the two being coextensive in meaning, and expressing the two sides of existence in the two appropriate languages of the outer and the inner life respectively.

Having connected this property of acquiring habits with the physical universe, we must now proceed to trace its effects upon the phenomena of consciousness through the instrumentality of the nervous tissue. It first appears there under its most obvious and rudimentary form, which is expressed in the principle known as the Law of Contiguity. By this is meant the simple fact that states of consciousness tend to follow each other in the order in which they have followed each other before. When certain sequences are continually being repeated in the consciousness, these, like the analogous muscular combinations of a well-practised piece of music or gymnastics, soon become easier than others; so that when the first member is presented, the second tends to follow, and, if the habituation be strong enough, actually does follow (though in a fainter degree than the original), unless prevented by some still stronger claim upon the attention.

This power of reproduction is greatly aided by the fact that the seat of conscious sensation lies not in the eye or ear or other special organ (though these form indeed special habits of their own), but in the ganglionic centre with which each of them is connected. Now in the higher animals these centres are all further united into a common sensorium, which is localized in the brain; so that they are

laws, as supplying the immediate antecedents of action, and so being the sphere of what we call our 'will,' on which we naturally hoist the flag of our own personal presence. So the more fully these laws of association are carried out, the more exact is the correspondence between the organism and its medium, the higher the perfection of Life. Incomplete association causes hesitation, error, inconsistency; its completion would change man into Deity. So with a deeper meaning than that of the poet we may say—

> "O heaven! were man
> "But constant, he were perfect: that one error
> "Fills him with faults."*

On leaving this consideration of association and its results, we may remark that the conclusions at which we have arrived are not new or wanting in authority, but were in great measure seen and recognized by the earliest thinkers. Speaking of Memory, Aristotle says, "*ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινα κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ' ἣν ἐκείνη εἴωθεν. Διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς, καὶ ἀφ' ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς.*"† Here he gives the usual division, (the Law of Contrariety being evidently only a phase of the others),‡ and this we have seen to be true after development. But that it all ultimately depended on the Law of Habit, or Contiguity, he intimates later, when he says, "*ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω καὶ αἱ κινήσεις,*" and, "*ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστὶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ.*"§ He further gives an instance of an associated train, and shews how conflicting trains arise from the plurality of effects. Throughout this treatise on Memory Aristotle shews, as elsewhere, a marvellous anticipation of the results of modern science.‖

But Association is not the only mode of redistribution which affects the mental force. It would indeed be competent by itself to regulate all internal transformations, and if supplied with a sufficient quantity of consciousness or sensibility, would be able to or-

* Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act V. sc. iv. † De Mem. i. 7.

‡ See Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 160.

§ De Mem. i. 10, 16. See ib. 13, 15.

‖ Even in Plato we find a few traces of the doctrine of association. Thus, in the Phædo (73, D.), he argues in favour of *ἀνάμνησις* as an instance of association by similarity; and in the Lysis (219), he shews that we often love things in themselves indifferent because we associate them with persons whom we love.

ganize it into an orderly mental and moral system; but of the origin and dissolution of this consciousness, and of its connection with other coordinate forces, the laws which we have been hitherto considering can tell us nothing. Here then is the province of two other chapters of physical law, correlative to each other and derived from the same source as that of Association, the laws of Impression and of Expression, of the genesis and of the resolution of sensibility respectively. Now inasmuch as the operation of these laws is fixed and constant, while that of Association is progressive, their importance relatively to the latter is diminished with increasing development. Not only however are the first and last terms in every mental train always determined by them, but even on the intermediate terms, where Association seems to rule supreme, they have a subtle yet continual influence, which as not having come under our special notice before, and as being very liable both to escape remark and if observed to cause considerable perplexity, it seems here advisable to analyse.

The laws of Impression we shall pass over very briefly, both because we know as yet very little about them, and because they are of little practical importance in Mental or Moral science. In the beginnings of animal life, sensation was, as we have seen, produced only by resistance, which is probably the simplest mode of external force; but as organization was extended, sensibility became more delicate, and the tissue began to respond to the subtler modes of heat and light and sound, until at last, by natural selection and integration, organs specially suited for the reception and transformation of these complex forces were separated and localized in appropriate positions. Thus the impressions of the lowest grades of life may all be formulated under a single law, which would be (if we knew it) a simple statement of the relation of sensibility to the most general kind of force, that of mechanics, and would therefore only indirectly set forth its position in reference to the higher complexities of light and the rest; but in the case of the developed organism this law becomes broken up, like the sensibility of which it formulates the origin, into sections corresponding broadly to the different special senses; each of which treats of the genesis of sensation, not by formation of what we may call the elements or raw material of force, but by transformation of one of the various 'kinds' of force in which the originally homogeneous material has been already organized in molecular arrangements of differing

complexities yet admits of fresh redistribution, such as heat, light, electricity, chemical action, and possibly other modes which have either escaped observation altogether or have been improperly included in those which are better known. Thus for a complete science of sensibility (let us hope it will not be called *Sensology*) we should require, as in the coordinate sciences of Thermology, Chemistry, and the rest, not only a general formula to express the molecular constitution or distinctive arrangement of our special kind of force, but also explanations of the process by which it is derivable from each of the coordinate kinds respectively; we should want not only a law of sensation in general, but laws of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and so forth. Inasmuch however as there is not as yet a single kind of force however simple and easily observed, of which the nature and relations are sufficiently well understood to be stated with the precision of scientific laws, we need not be surprised at our present inability to sketch even the outlines and general character of these laws of Sensible Impression, but must be content with the belief in their purely physical origin, and with the knowledge that their formulation is of little practical importance at any rate in the science with which we are at present engaged, that of Expression or Morality.

Yet of the Laws of Expression, considered as physical formulæ, we know little if anything more than of those of Impression. We can indeed observe a number of results and class them together as manifestations of a single law, but we are constantly unable even to express this in a comprehensive phraseology as a generalization of the phenomena included under it, and much more to describe its connection with coordinate or superior branches of the great code of redistribution, of which we nevertheless know it to be a part. It is however evident that these laws of Expression must be equally numerous with and correlative to those of Impression; for as sensibility may arise from a rearrangement of each of the various coordinate forces of nature, so also must it be capable of resolution into them, and the process of this resolution, like that of formation, must be expressible in each case in scientific language as a certain definite relation among physical phenomena. Of the manifestation of some of these laws we know nothing, so we can only infer their existence à priori. Of that of others we have actual examples, as for instance of the transformation of sensibility into chemical action, in the oxidation of nervous tissue; by which process a portion of

the current is being continually absorbed or expressed, (as in the analogous case of the passage of an electric spark through a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen), and of which we have evidence both in the well-known exhaustion caused by prolonged thought, and by a chemical analysis of the state of the brain in various conditions of activity. The corresponding sectional law of Impression seems to lie not in the peculiarities of any separate sense but in the general physiological phenomena of nutrition, a process which has been hitherto imperfectly observed, but which besides providing the *means* of future sensation seems to imply the direct transformation of a certain amount of chemical action into nervous force, which however appears generally, or at any rate often, to lie 'latent' in the tissue until called forth and consolidated by a more considerable volume of sensation.*

Nor is it likely that the phenomena just mentioned are the only instances of partial expression of the nervous force in its passage through the brain. The details of the rest however we are unable to describe or even suggest; we can only say that their total result is that a certain portion of every nervous current (how great we cannot tell) is being continually transformed in its passage by minute quantities into chemical activity, and probably also into electricity, heat and other complex modes of force, and thus as never coming into that mode of expression which as being at once the most usual and the most easily observed we are accustomed to think of as the only mode,† appears to have been lost or dissipated in its transit.

* This mode of sensible impression by transformation of chemical force through nutrition is naturally most important where the other avenues of force are wholly or partially closed, as in the case of the lower animals. There in fact it seems probable that the only two sources of sensation are this of nutrition and resistance; that from the former source remaining generally inactive until evoked by what we call an *external* impression, *i. e.* a transformed resistance. So too this latent force is especially strong in the young and in all other cases where nutrition is of exceptional rapidity or amount. In it we find the explanation on the one hand of the 'spontaneous activity' which Mr. Bain remarks in children and overfed animals, (see p. 144), and on the other of the increased power of thinking gained by long-continued thought, a result which, though partially explicable by association, seems to owe something to an actual genesis of nervous force during the process of replacement of the wasted tissue. We must remember that neither the nutrition nor the oxidation is in itself sensibility; they are both instances of chemical action, but in the former case this is (partially at least) metamorphosed into sensation, while in the latter it is itself a metamorphosis of a preceding sensation.

† Throughout this essay I have spoken of action as if it were the only mode of

of all those that follow on action which follows also by reimpression on its faintest forms is that of muscular contraction, and if any of the rest follow it can only be by association. The 'will' therefore as distinguished from association (which is the distinction intended by Mr. Bain) has no influence upon the attention so as to cause the continuance of a pleasant and the dismissal of a painful passive idea, but such attention is merely the associative reflex of the correspondence between the action produced by the original of such idea and the external medium: all that the will can do is to produce the idea of the action, and even in this process the last step is due not to 'will' proper or physical reaction but to reimpression by external objects. We cannot therefore allow that the will has any influence, except through association, over any ideas but those purely muscular: its power ends in contraction, actual or ideal; and whatever follows on this is regulated by a law not of expression at all, but of reimpression and then of association. Desire may either influence a previous desire by addition or subtraction, (see note to p. 316), or it may produce indirectly a muscular idea; but independently of association it has no power of either producing or prolonging the idea of any passive or 'external' sensation. Moreover, as we have before remarked,* the 'will' in this and in every other case differs from pure association only in one or (if we include the reimpression as well as the expression,) in two terms of its sequence; and it is therefore useless and misleading to give to the whole train as distinguished from those two terms a separate name or consideration. As coextensive however with physical reaction the 'will' affects not sensations only but ideas, and both by exactly the same process; the degree of the result depending solely on the amount of force which it embodies.

In considering the connection of these two kinds of transformation, Association and Physical Reaction, we must not omit to notice the singular example of their coordinate operation in respect of different portions of a single force which is supplied by the somewhat rare and exceptional phenomena of what has been called the "idée fixe." By this is meant a very strong emotion or desire which, in an apparently inexplicable manner, defeats itself, and produces a result exactly opposite to that in which it naturally ends. Let us imagine the case of a very violent fear or horror. Now the idea of any great pain, such as this involves, produces directly by

* p. 144.

physical reaction certain contractions of avoidance, which are in most cases strong enough to cause actual escape, or at least the initiatory movements necessary thereto, or if too weak for this, manifest themselves in certain bodily contortions and gestures which are merely the same contractions in a less intense degree. So far is clear from what we have already said. But it is a physiological fact (for which I know not if there be a satisfactory explanation) that if the exciting emotion be immoderately powerful, that is to say, if the current of force rushing into action be excessively violent, it not unfrequently happens that a partial or total paralysis is produced in the connecting nerves, and thus the requisite actions cannot be performed.* But meanwhile this reactive expression is not the only channel through which the force tends to escape. For an emotion is never entirely pure or homogeneous, but always contains a certain amount of mixture or relation, a certain degree of perception of its object or cause. So part of its force is in a state unfit for active expression but prone to transmission by association. Now with the idea of a sensation is very closely connected the idea not only of the action which it produces, (which may follow either by association or by reaction, and which in this case we have seen to be frustrated by excessive vehemence), but (*by association only*) of that which produces it, as is exemplified in every intentional or voluntary act: and this, by suggesting (organically in the later stages of development) the passive idea from which it follows, tends to realize itself in actual contraction. In ordinary cases of fear this tendency is more than counterbalanced by the larger volume of force which both directly and through a second association seeks to express itself in the opposite contractions of avoidance; but when, as in our supposed case, the latter exit is closed, the force which is thus prevented from escape not only becomes less powerful in restraint, but pushing its way through the channel of the former association actually joins itself to the force already there, and so increases the power of the idea of the dreaded action to such an extent as to produce through the organic association above-mentioned the muscular contractions of which it consists. Thus men have been known when standing on the edge of a precipice to have

* In this we see part of the cause of the awkwardness of shy people, and of the confusion caused by great crises or unusual situations, though this is partly due also to the absorption of the force required for action in some inconsistent emotion, such as awe or anxiety. Hence also the meaning of the proverb, 'more haste, worse speed.'

Time is the *only* general idea which is absolutely universal, which is the necessary product of intelligence of any kind, independently of the particular circumstances in which it is placed. Turning next to special experience, it is evident that the first general division of states of consciousness must be that between the active and passive sensations, those due to the contractility and the irritability of the tissue respectively, Now from the comparison of these two classes an idea soon comes to be formed of the distinction between self and nonself, active and passive, organism and medium, inner and outer. But the corresponding terms of all these pairs are as yet blended confusedly together, and though in the distinction above described lie the germs of the later ideas of Space and Motion, a further process is yet necessary before these ideas attain any clearness or individuality. This process we will now proceed to trace in each instance; taking the latter first as the shorter and less complex of the two.

When the difference between the Muscular and Passive sensations has once been noticed, further experience soon teaches that sensations of the former kind are followed by change in those of the latter. Accordingly the notion of change of a certain kind becomes associated with the idea of action, and it is just this element of mutative power blended by association with the muscular sensations of contraction which constitutes the elementary idea of *Motion*. When first perceived therefore Motion means merely the change in our passive sensations which follows upon muscular action, and the idea of it is simply the idea of such action accompanied by the idea of such resulting change. In it therefore the general notion of Change or Time is involved, but not necessarily that of Space in its developed form; though when the latter is evolved the idea of Motion is greatly modified by it; as might be expected when we consider that our ideas of external objects are principally derived from those very muscular contractions from which we get our first conception of Motion.

Turning next to the Perception of *Space*, we see at once that this must be coincident with the formation of an idea of an External World. Now in a vague sense this idea is contained in the distinction above noticed between the sensations of irritability and those of contractility; but as yet it is mixed up with the notions of nonself, passivity, and probably of causelessness or Deity, and has no separate individuality of its own. Nor is such separation possible until Association has had considerable effect; for it arises from an

observation which cannot come very early in the scale of evolution, that of the difference between the two kinds of sequence among our states of consciousness, those of our primary and those of our secondary or associated sensations respectively. When this observation is made, we class together the primary sequences and their terms,* (all of them probably at this time being classes of resistance), and projecting them as it were outside of us, think of them together as an external world. 'Outside of,' however, conveys as yet no definite signification; but in setting apart these sequences we set apart also the general notion of sequence which underlies them all, and this considered in relation to the individuals which it connects forms the notion of Space. The different terms of the sequences, or the different primary bundles of sensations, become external objects, and the sequence whereby they are connected or separated re-appears as the interval whereby we pass from one to another, or whereby one is looked upon as external to another. Space is thus merely a general name for sequence of primary perceptions as distinct from ideas; for the time which it takes us to pass from one such perception to another. It is, in fact, external Time. 'Outside of' thus comes to have a meaning not of Time in general, but of that particular kind of Time which we call Space.

But though the parentage and early history of this idea of Space

* These terms are in themselves sequences, inasmuch as they are perceived classes. The ultimate terms, the actual sensations of pleasure and pain, are never separated from the consciousness of which they are the material. The outside world is a number of crystallized forms of what we may call simultaneous sequences, into which the train of consciousness is liable at any moment to fall, set apart and endowed with substantive, that is, potential existence. To think of pleasure and pain outside us and unconscious is impossible, because consciousness *is* pleasure and pain; but to think of white or hard or heavy objects apart from consciousness is possible, inasmuch as these are all well known forms of sequence, which consciousness may take at any moment, but of each of which it is entirely independent. Hence we see the meaning of the phrase 'Permanent Possibility of Sensation,' or, more strictly, of Perception. Similarly the different well known forms of secondary sequences, Emotions, Desires, Reasonings, Memories, are classed together as Permanent Possibilities of Feeling under the name Mind. Both Mind and Body are but different forms of consciousness, or of pleasure and pain, which is the string on which they are all hung, the matter of which they are all forms. Each is by itself a mere name, till for a moment it is brought into existence by being filled with consciousness, and then it relapses again into its former non-existence, like a shadow on the disappearance of the light. Existence follows consciousness, and both Mind and Body are but different roads along which it is accustomed to travel.

are such as have been described, yet few would now recognize it under this its primal shape, so much has it been altered by our later experience of the external world and its properties. Of these properties it will be here sufficient to note two, as the source of the most important characteristics by which our present notion of space is distinguished from that of time, its ancestor. The first of these is Uniformity or Permanence. The perception of this is due to the observation (which is much facilitated after the separation of the sense of sight) that a certain series of muscular contractions is always followed by a uniform series of passive sensations, and a reversal of the former by a reversal of the latter. By this observation we are led to look upon the second series as a permanent possibility of sensation depending only on the excitation of the first; and this idea of the outward universe as of certain definite objects or combinations of sensations which we can always see and feel if we will (i.e. if we perform the necessary movements), enters largely into our notion of outwardness apart from the universe, of room for objects or condition of sensation, Space. The second quality is perhaps still more characteristic; it is Simultaneity or Co-existence. This is impressed upon the mind partly by the power above noticed of reversing a given series of passive sensations, but principally by a peculiar property of the senses (especially those of sight and touch) of receiving more than one impression at once. By means of this property it is soon found that certain series of passive sensations are capable of being united in one apparently single though complex sensation, of which the terms of the series become parts, or, more strictly, that the order and nature of the series is not altered by the quickness or slowness of our passage from its one end to the other. Hence the series is looked upon as equivalent to the single complex sensation, and the sequence of its terms to the co-existent positions of the parts of the latter: in other words, that kind of Time which we call Space is looked upon no longer as serial but as simultaneous or co-existent.

Such are some of the associations by which the origin of our perception of Space has been obscured, and which we thus see to be merely the results of increased experience concerning the nature and properties of external objects. We may here also remark how the rudimentary notion of Space is connected with that of Motion. When we associate with muscular contraction the notion of the change which follows it among our passive sensations, we arrive at

a perception of Motion: when we class together the changes so produced, first as distinct from the changes in the active sensations themselves, and then as further distinct from the sequences among our secondary states of consciousness, we form the notion of Space. The idea of Motion is ever the connecting link between the two parts of our consciousness which we call ourselves and the outward world, muscular contraction its parent being external as to our mind, but internal as regards the universe proper; and thus it becomes the natural conductor of the idea of Space outwards, and enters largely into its ultimate composition. Motion, as we now conceive it, is impossible without both Space and Time, and Space means nothing but room for Motion, or the interval which has to be passed before one sensation can follow another.

Space, therefore, is the Form of the outer as Time is of the inner consciousness. For Time is, as we have seen, identical with the primary condition of thought; and if the objects of thought, or the terms of the sequence, be what we call outward objects, the Time which is involved in their perception is outward Time, or Space. Hence we cannot perceive or imagine objects out of Space any more than we can have trains of ideas out of Time. Also we are unable to conceive an end to Space, just as we are unable to conceive an end to Time, simply because where we can no longer pass from one state of consciousness to another the first condition of perception or imagination disappears.*

From this identity of Space and Time, it follows that if everything were reduced to half its size, yet impressed our senses as vividly as now, so that our states of consciousness were unaltered in number, or, in other words, if the size of objects were halved, and the keenness of our senses doubled, we should never find out the difference. It also follows that Space looks bigger to the keensighted than to the dullsighted man, and that if the latter could use the eyes of the former for a moment he would see Space swollen. But it will be said that this is all hypothesis, and that we can never have any proof of its truth. Direct proof is indeed impossible, but a very strong verification will instantly suggest itself. For though it is impracticable to make one man see with the eyes of another, or

* From this account of our notion of an external world it will be seen that we mean by it something outside our perception or ideas, not outside our whole consciousness. It is this mistake, whereby the ordinary belief has been made to assert a proposition which it really contradicts, that has introduced all the puzzles and paradoxes of metaphysics. See above, pp. 308, sqq.

thus reversing the distinction between the two terms as maintained in the foregoing pages, or rather perhaps introducing a new use of the word perception. He never takes the trouble to give the arguments for his belief, mentioning it rather as an ascertained truth and as an axiom which may be taken for granted. Thus he says, "Loco "assumpti ponatur, quod certissimum est, inesse omni tangibili "spiritum sive corpus pneumaticum;"* and "Inest omni tangibili "spiritus, corpus tenue invisibile."† Again in another treatise he says, "Videmus enim omnibus corporibus naturalibus inesse vim "manifestam percipiendi; etiam electionem quandam amica am- "plectendi, inimica et alia fugiendi."‡ He calls it "spiritus mortualis" as distinct from the "spiritus vitalis" of living bodies; though even the latter, so far as it is common to brutes, is derived "e matricibus elementorum;" 'from the dust of the earth.'§ If we endeavour to collect for ourselves the arguments which he had in his mind, we do not find them to be very weighty. When he says that air 'perceives' changes of temperature better than our senses, he is using perception in an unscientific and metaphorical sense; he merely means that its temperature is less stable than that of our bodies. The fact that an object is cold or hot is in itself no proof that it perceives cold or heat; and to describe such a fact in the language of perception, and then consider such description as proving the actual existence of perception, is an instance of the fallacy which he himself constantly reprobates, of looking at nature from our point of view instead of from her own. His other argument, that the observed 'affinities' of nature in certain directions, (as in the case of the magnet), point to the existence in objects manifesting them of affections and desires like our own, though more real and suggestive than the former, is yet obnoxious to the same criticism. It may be true that in these and like phenomena we may find the rudiments of the contractile force of animal tissue; but we ought to resolve the developed phenomena into their elements, not explain the elements

* Historia Vitæ et Mortis; (Vol. ii. p. 112 of collected works by Ellis and Spedding.)

† Ib. p. 213. ‡ De Augmentis, IV: (Vol. i. p. 610).

§ So he says, (ib. IV, c. iii.) "Anima sensibilis plane substantia corporea censenda est in animalibus perfectis in capite præcipue locata, in nervis percurrens, et sanguine spirituoso arteriarum refecta et reparata." Mr. Ellis quotes Telesius (De Rerum Natura, Lib. V), Donius (De Natura Hominis), and Campanella (De Sensu Rerum, ii. 4.) Such seems to have have been also Anaxagoras' conception of νοῦς, which he held to be a substance (though λεπτότατον πάντων) inherent in all material objects.

by the analogy of their developed forms, as by using such a word as 'affinity.' We must therefore conclude that Lord Bacon never really examined the question for himself, (or his acuteness would have seen through the idola fori which seemed sufficiently plausible on a superficial glance);—but that he took his theory ready made from the works of the Italian philosophers, captivated by its scientific appearance, its reasonableness, and perhaps also by its variance with popular prejudice.

Yet the doctrine was by no means a new one even in the hands of the Italian school. Leibnitz tells that "c'est une opinion presque "universellement reçue chez les savants dans la Perse, et dans les "états du Grand Mogul: il parait même qu'elle a trouvé entrée chez "les cabalistes et chez les mystiques."* At any rate in Greek physics it was the common theory, and was thence handed down to the popular philosophy of Rome, Instances would be too numerous to mention for they would comprise almost the whole sphere of Greek and Latin literature. One only shall suffice, and that is from Virgil, one of the least original or speculative of poets,—who propounds the doctrine with peculiar emphasis as a voice from the world to come.

"Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
"Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque astra
"Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
"Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet."†

It would not be too much to say, that, until the introduction of the Mosaic cosmogony by Christianity, this doctrine formed part of the ordinary belief, not only of the philosopher, but of every reflecting and educated man.‡

* Theodicée, § 8.

† Aen. VI, 724. So also Georg. IV, 221:—

"Deum namque ire per omnes
"Terrasque tractusque maris cœlumque profundum.
"Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
"Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
"Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referri,
"Omnia; nec morti esse locum."

‡ That pleasure and even reason were co-extensive at least with the animate world (including plants), seems to have been recognized by most early Greek philosophers. Aristotle (De Plantis, i, 1.) quotes Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus as among its supporters. Anaxagoras further held that νοῦς, which he identified with the first motor power or what we should call the attraction which developed the κόσμος, was inherent in, or at least co-extensive with matter. So also Par-

In modern times its history has been more chequered; for having become mixed up in theological disputes, it has been often forced to give way not to arguments but to anathemas, and offered a sacrifice to offended orthodoxy. To make mind a property or product of matter has been thought equivalent to its entire denial, and this error has been fostered by the fault of Materialists themselves, who have mistaken physics for metaphysics, and fancied that they could explain what is in its nature inexplicable, and create consciousness by arranging its forms.* Still in spite of persecution and misrepresentation, the doctrine has by no means been confined to the disciples of the Materialist school; for to leave out of sight the Idealists whether English or German, (in whose system it appears from an obverse point of view), it has been held by many upholders of the ordinary distinction between mind and matter, who have believed at once in the separation and the co-extension of these two ultimate realities.

As a proof that it is possible thus to believe in Universal Consciousness without either holding the universe to be consciousness, or consciousness to be the universe, we may quote the example of Leibnitz, of whose theory on the subject we subjoin a few passages.

In the treatise "De la Nature en elle même," (§ 11), he says, "Il "doit se trouver dans la substance corporelle une entéléchie pre-"mière, et comme une capacité primitive d'activité (πρῶτον δεκτικὸν "activitatis); a savoir une force motric primitive qui s'ajoutant à "l'extension ou à ce qu'il y a de purement géométrique, et à la masse "ou à ce qu'il y a de purement matèrial, agit incessamment, sauf à "être diversement modifée dans son effort et son impetuosité par le "concours de corps. Et c'est ce principe substantiel qui, dans les "vivants, s'appelle âme, forme substantielle dans les autres, et qui, "joint à la matière, constitue une substance vraiment une, mais par "soi constitue déja une unité; c'est ce principe que je nomme "monade." This he calls also 'force,'† and "une sorte de perception "et d'appetit,"‡ and "âme materielle."§ By the side of it human souls are "comme de petits dieux faits à l'image de Dieu, et ayant

menides believed "πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινα γνῶσιν." Cf. Plato, Phileb. 30, A (where we find exactly the materialist argument as given below).

* See below, (on Cabanis) p. 347, and note.

† Sur une reforme de la philosophie première, § 1: Système nouveau de la Nature, § 3.

‡ De la Nature, § 12.

§ Système nouveau de la Nature, § 6.

"en eux quelque rayon des lumières de la divinité."* He distinguishes it too from 'apperception' or 'conscience,' (Bacon's sensation), whch he shews may exist apart even in ourselves.†

Not only does he thus arrive at a theory very similar to our own, but he approaches it from the same point of view. For he says, "La perception, et ce qui en dépend, est inexplicable par des raisons "mécaniques, c'est à dire par les figures et par les mouvements;" it is a simple idea and cannot be resolved into any mechanical combination.‡ The elements therefore of perception must exist in the lowest elements of nature, and can be merely developed by organization. How this development is the result of heterogeneity of sensation, we have seen, and Leibnitz suggests. "Quand la monade," he says, "a des organes si ajustés que par leur moyen il y a du relief "et du distingué dans les impressions qu'ils reçoivent, et par consé- "quent, dans les perceptions qui les représentent, cela peut aller "jusqu'au sentiment, c'est à dire jusqu'à une perception accom- "pagnée de mémoire, a savoir, dont un certain écho démeure long- "temps pour se faire entendre dans l'occasion; et un tel vivant est "appelé animal, comme sa monade est appelée une âme. Et quand "cette âme est elevée jusqu'à la raison, elle est quelque chose de "plus sublime, et on la compte parmi les esprits."§

Leibnitz's error, as may be gathered from the foregoing extracts, was in extending individuality, the special characteristic of life, (because in living tissue only is associative representation effective), to the whole of inanimate nature. The theory of monads has no truth except in the animal world, and even there is productive of much mistake and prejudice: for we have no more reason to say that the attribute sensibility can be separated from matter than to say the same of extension or resistance. Why should we not add a monad of extension to sensibility or resistance, or a monad of resistance to sensibility and extension? Nevertheless Leibnitz appreciated the requirements of facts; it is only the particular forms of his solution, (his Monadology and Pre-established Harmony), that are crude and imperfect: and it is just because he thus represented a half-way philosophy, because he did not see what Berkeley saw a little later, that we have thought it worth while to quote his authority.

* Ib, § 5. Leibnitz was not free from the prejudice which Descartes had revived concerning the superiority and uniqueness of reason.

† Monadologie, § 14, 19, 20, 23: Principes de la nature et de la grace, § 2, 4.

‡ Monadologie, § 17. § Principes de la nature, § 4.

reveal to us anything of its relation to the original. In the last words we have really anticipated the answer, the principles of which have been indeed already expounded. For if we remember that the secondary states of consciousness or ideas are nothing more than reproductions of the primary impressions, or, in other words, that mind or consciousness (in the narrower sense, which, as will be observed, we often use in this Appendix) is merely a copy of nature, it will be very evident that the former is potentially co-extensive with the latter, but can never transgress its limits. The copy can never transcend the original; the wax can at most faithfully bear the impression of the die. Hence, on the one hand, we can imagine nothing of which the material differs from that of nature;—we cannot conceive the universe except as a congeries of sensations: and, on the other hand, we are equally impotent of fancy except where the forms too resemble those of experience;—the blind man can form no idea of sight, or the deaf of hearing.

Thus the whole self is made up of two correlative parts, the perpetual tendency of which is to approach nearer to a complete and ultimate union which we symbolize in the idea of perfection and Divinity; and these two are even now single in essence though one is perfect and the other imperfect. We have already seen that nature is instinct with mind, that each particle, therefore, tends to self-consciousness and the whole universe to mental organization: nor is it less true that mind from its side is ever expanding into comprehension of the universe, of its lowest and most minute as well as of its highest and grandest provinces, and that the organization of science ever tends to be a faithful picture of the great consensus of nature. Thus the perfection of mind and the perfection of nature are one and indivisible, so that mind and matter, subject and object, will be therein again indistinguishable from each other. Meanwhile, however, until mind becomes perfected into matter, both the distinction and the connection between them remains. The one is the original and the other is the copy: but the original always suggests the copy, and the copy must ever confess its dependence on the original.

Thus we have completed our survey of the connection between mind and matter, and proved the two to be really inseparable; first, by shewing how the elements of mind are contained in all matter; and secondly, by shewing how matter is the foundation of mind. Now it will be noticed that if these two have the same nature the

laws of their sequences must be identical; so that what is true with regard to the one must necessarily be true, if translated into the proper language, with regard to the other. And since we have already had a sufficient example of the inferring of laws of mind from laws of the universe, let us now, by way of further illustration of the conclusions drawn above, try whether on analysing the mind we can translate our results into general truths with regard to the universe. The attempt will at any rate give us useful practice in appreciating the connection between the two.

Let us then proceed to analyse as far as we can the conditions of our knowledge, and then translate the result into the proper language of the outer world. For we have ever two separate languages, the inner and the outer, (corresponding to the two divisions of our self), running continually alongside of each other, and using the vocabularies of psychology and of physics respectively; and so if their subject matters be really identical, any proposition made in the one set of terms must be merely the obverse of the same proposition expressed in the other; and the ultimate result of self-analysis* must coincide with the ultimate resolution of the universe. We have already practically gone through the greater part of the proposed analysis:† so to that extent we need only recapitulate our previous conclusions.

Now it will be remembered that all knowledge is of relations among states of consciousness. For the simplest and most elemental knowledge, therefore, is necessary, first, *consciousness*, the material, the terms of relation; and this, as we have seen, and as we may prove by reflection, is in its simplest form pleasure and pain, (the two varying by insensible degrees): secondly, relation or *change* in consciousness. Hence the simplest elements into which we can analyse our knowledge is a succession of pleasures and pains. In order to see whether the analysis is adequate, as thus stated, let us apply the crucial test of synthesis. Can we from these elements build up ourselves again, or at any rate see such a re-construction to be possible? Upon reflection we shall see that we cannot; that we

* The words 'self' and 'consciousness' in this discussion have generally their smaller and more ordinary signification, and our whole aim is to shew the relation of this to the larger and more philosophical meaning which has been usually employed in other parts of the Essay. The few exceptions to this will be sufficiently evident from the context.

† We have also used Mr. Herbert Spencer's luminous analysis of knowledge (contained in his Psychology, Part I.), as above referred to, pp. 46, 318, &c.

certain position, and changes as that position; for thought is ever to us consciousness in a certain relation, and changes as that relation. We can get rid neither of the matter nor of the form: the one makes the force-consciousness the necessary foundation, the raw material of the world-self: the other prevents our being able to imagine how it is so. A First Cause is quite inconceivable, seeing that we know cause only as effect.

Thus we have seen from every point of view that all that we can know is ourselves, and that every hypothesis that we can frame is nothing but an extension of ourselves. Hence on the one hand we perceive the futility of Metaphysics or Ontology, which is in truth nothing but an Agnoiology, a Non-Science of Ignorance. The only positive result which it attains is its own impossibility: if it begin to speak or think, nay, if it begin to be, it immediately destroys its essence: existence would be its death, for it and existence are contradictory the one to the other. The true metaphysician, therefore, is he who denies the existence of metaphysics; for the object of his science is what is beyond physics, and beyond physics is nothing. So that to parody a famous saying of Pascal's, "Se moquer de la metaphysique c'est être vraiment metaphysicien." Nor, on the other hand, can Religion claim to get over the difficulty, seeing that Religion is as much a part of ourselves as Metaphysics or Science; and all our knowledge (that is, all existence) is bound by the same invariable laws. But, moreover, as we have already seen, Religion is transgressing its proper function in inquiring into the nature of a First Cause, and while reversing the error of philosophical Rienzis "qui ont pris les souvenirs pour les espérances," is yet imitating the correlative fault of Rousseau and Hobbes, who have peopled the past with hopes, and confounded aspiration with history. The two must be kept strictly apart if either is to have any value; and anticipation must be grounded on, not govern experience.

Let us, in conclusion, sum up briefly the results of our previous argument. In the first part of our inquiry we were concerned merely with phenomenal consciousness, and we saw irresistible arguments for classing this with the other force manifestations of nature; so we concluded that in its elements it must exist in every part of the universe. Hence we saw ground to expect that the associations with which its obvious forms are at present connected will eventually be linked by a bond at first faint but of gradually increasing strength to all the phenomena which we call the inanimate world;

in other words, that man will eventually form the conception and belief of a universal consciousness of nature. Then, in the second place, turning from the outer to the inner experience, and arguing from mind to nature instead of from nature to mind, we saw that these two, mind (or consciousness in the narrow sense) and matter, are but two parts of our whole self, or consciousness in the larger sense; and that the former of them is a copy of the latter, and therefore necessarily dependent upon it, and tending to an ultimate identity with it. We then further verified this material and formal homogeneity between mind and its original by shewing the coincidence of the conclusions derived from a consideration of each separately, and the possibility of arguing from the one to the other. Thus the true meaning of the belief prophesied by our first argument becomes evident as embodying a more distinct conception than is at present realized of the connection of these two parts of our nature, the secondary and the primary. If mind be associated not with some portions of nature only, but with the whole sphere of phenomena, a more thorough consciousness of the ultimate unity of our whole self is attained, and a considerable step made towards that final idea of human development in which mind becomes a perfect reproduction of nature, and its sequences completely assimilated to the laws of the outer world; an ideal which we embody in the conception of a Deity in whom thought and existence, subject and object, are re-united, whose self is nature, and whose mind is the universe. In furtherance of this unity we have called forth each side to bear witness. First, nature came forward and proved that mind was inherent in her, and nothing but the highest of her forms: secondly, mind, on examination, confessed itself to be the offspring of nature and to draw its existence solely from her. Each in its own language asserts this relationship between them, and if nature says, 'Mind is my offspring,' and mind says, 'Nature is my mother,' and mind and nature are the only two speakers whose language is intelligible to us, so that between them they are the source of all our knowledge, whence is it possible to draw an argument which can invalidate their consentient testimony?

APPENDIX V.

On the Æsthetic Emotions.

That the evolution of the imagination lies half way between that of the lower emotions and that of reason, we have already hinted, and is evident when we consider that it involves a complexity of relations, and consequently a decree of associative power, greater than in the former case, but less than in the latter. Hence we might conjecture that the æsthetic faculties, being shaded off on the one side into emotion and on the other side into reason, would gain strength and concentration in proportion to the intimacy of the union between these two extremes of our nature; and this prognostication we shall find to be fully borne out by experience.

Now that the emotional and intellectual faculties can ever be entirely separated seems impossible; for as, on the one hand, we feel pleasure in the unravelling of the abstrusest mathematical problem, so, on the other hand, we are always able to assign some reason for the most violent fit of passion or excitement. And the cause of this is apparent when we consider their nature and origin,—how that perception is made of sensation, and emotion in its turn built up by reason; so that although both in their simple and developed forms, each tends to exclude the other, this exclusion can never be complete.* Not only do the organic links which bind together the complex bundles of emotion recal the associative perceptions or reasoning processes of which these links are but the petrified representatives, but there is, on the other hand, but a short step from the relation to the things related. Hence the higher and architectonic emotions, among which that of beauty is conspicuous, stand in an intermediate position between the two poles of our developed nature; so that we doubt whether to call them intellectual emotions or emotional intellect. The former name may indeed seem more appropriate inasmuch as their ultimate nature is of contemplation rather than of discursive† reasoning; but that the presence of both ele-

* That we cannot even form any idea of their complete separation is shewn above, note to p. 334. See also note to p. 304.

† This contemplative admiration corresponds in the complex emotions to the gesture or expressional language of the lower. The associated pleasures being here

ments is directly essential to their existence is proved by the fatal effect produced by the absence or undue preponderance of either. Emotion without reason results in a mere enthusiastic frenzy, and serves only to distinguish the madman from the idiot: reason without emotion turns poetry into science and art into philosophy. A man may be a keen observer, may possess an extraordinary power of classification and the memory of a lithographic die; yet, if this be all—

> "A primrose by the river's brim
> "A yellow primrose is to him,
> "And it is nothing more."

It suggests nothing, or rather, it suggests too many things: the train which it starts stops at no wayside station, but travels on till all its fiery force is spent,—scintillating into countless petty sparks which are extinguished or absorbed in some more powerful current long before they can kindle any abiding flame or heat. But such is not the constitution of a poet's mind. To him a flower is not a botanical specimen to be precisely dissected and methodically catalogued with myriads of others lying ranged in his mind in many a formal row, but the fountain head from which springs a stream of feeling, which, instead of losing itself amid countless intersecting canals and petty pipes of irrigation, flows straight onwards into the bosom of some mighty lake, and stirs the whole depths into consciousness by the fresh infusion of its life and motion:—

> "Oh, then his heart with pleasure fills,
> "And dances with the daffodils."

The mind of such an one may be less thoroughly irrigated than the other's, and less cultivated into a prim fertility of fields and fences; yet it has a charm which the other has lost, and which is often better worth having than the lucrative yet unlovely tillage from which it flies—the charm of majestic simplicity and the grandeur of a massive volume of emotion.

of a very general and abstract nature, and resulting from trains both very divergent and very complicated, are incapable of co-ordinate active expression. They are in fact too perceptive or intellectual to have much direct influence on action (see above pp. 326, 331), and their power is principally exercised in swelling the volume of other kindred but simpler emotions. Even the moral sense, whose special sphere is action, has no specific gesture or expression, but acts by concentrating force in one of its constituents.

It was on these subjects that art revived its power, and to the service of the church its mother it was long devoted. So again as of old one or two great ideas were untiringly represented; the forms only being changed to suit the growth in men's aspirations, which had meanwhile risen by the process of development from the sphere of the lower to that of the higher emotions, from the ideal of sense to that of morality. It was thus through beautiful forms that the Christian ἰδέαι as well as the Greek were connected with the world of sense; and the revival of art was merely the visible counterpart of the renewal of religious life.

We may now see the reason for the decline of modern art. Religion, so far as it has any living force, has lost its angelic hierarchies and saintly legends, and is removed into a sphere where even the intellect can hardly penetrate, much less the painter's brush and sculptor's chisel. For it has been continually pushed onwards in advance of science, and the latter has now travelled so far from the ordinary world of sense, that its conceptions are far too shadowy and abstract to be embodied in corporeal shapes. Nor has the development of the other side of man's nature, the active or industrial, been more propitious to æsthetic excellence; for this has ever tended to absorb itself in commerce or the purely mechanical arts, where far-sightedness is more valued than fancy, and accuracy than fine taste. So between these two extremes there is a great gulf fixed. Reason and Emotion are separated by a trackless waste of desert, and the common bond between them seems lost in their acquired individuality; as when cities congregate the intervening country becomes depopulated, or as when an empire outgrows the possibility of central government, its various provinces forget their common origin, and form rival nationalities with codes and traditions of their own. Art is consequently torn asunder into its component parts, and its peculiar essence is destroyed by the analysis. On the one hand, we have a bare imitation of nature in her humblest forms; on the other, a dry dissection of the skeleton of beauty by intangible rules of criticism. On the one hand, we model busts and portraits; on the other, we make a science of beauty and take its measure by mathematical formulæ. It is hard to say which is the less congenial to beauty, the vulgar money-laden air among the unlovely forms of the portrait painter's studio, or the unsympathetic

transmutation, I am told that there is at Eryx an altar and shrine dedicated to Santa Venere, V & M.

brain of the critic, hung round with his anatomical instruments and his pedigree diagrams. Even music, which has hitherto been less chilled than its sister arts by the growth of scientific knowledge, seems to be breaking up into a science of harmony on the one hand, known to but few and caring little for the emotional influences of melody, and a number of popular airs and dances on the other, made only to catch the vulgar ear. If the power of art be thus divided against itself, how shall its kingdom stand? The language of the emotions, like any other, lives not in its grammar or its alphabet, but in its power of embodying the thoughts of the heart in suitable external expression: and the noblest phrascology if condemned to talk nothing but ignoble nonsense must quickly die and be forgotten.

What then shall we say of the promise of Positivism to effect a regeneration of Art? M. Comte refers the present artistic degeneracy to the conflict of principles in modern life; and vaticinates "an inexhaustible resource of poetic greatness in the positive conception of man as the supreme head of the economy of nature." This may be in part true. Poetry may indeed worthily sing the praises of a united humanity, because the poet deals with thoughts and not with the outer senses; but when M. Comte goes on to argue that "the conditions which are favourable to one mode of expression are propitious to all," we must decline to follow him. Painting and sculpture lose their very essence if individuality is lost, and, like the slough of a serpent, must be cast aside when the spirit which they contain has transgressed their limits. Painting and sculpture are the toys of the world's childhood, and poetry the sentimentality of its early youth; in mature age reason and practicality divide the mind between them, driving forth the æsthetic sensibilities before them like fairies flying from the rising sun. Thus the world grows indeed wiser with age, but with the ignorance it cannot but lose also some of the freshness and gaiety of childhood.

Is the Beautiful then different from the True? No:—in their essence, Beauty, Truth, and Good are all one, for they are merely three aspects of that one correspondence between the two parts of our consciousness which underlies our very being. To the sensitive and active part this harmony is Good; to the reason it is the basis of Truth: to both combined, or to that perception which is neither of sensations alone nor of relations among relations, but of relations among sensations, to the faculty in which both extremes meet, it gives the conception of Beauty. Religion, the summit of science,

Virtue, the end of action, and Art, the impersonation of beauty have all a common birth; and in the early mind of man, before demarcations are broadly drawn, there is little distinction among them. Art and Religion are both aspirations, the one expressed more in the outer, the other in the inner language: Art imagining an ideal nature like our mind, Religion an ideal mind comprehending nature. Thus historically all art is an offspring of religious worship: painting and sculpture and literature being developed from the mural decorations of the old hero palaces and temples, and dancing, poetry and music from the festival ceremonies in honour of the deity or the conqueror. And this connection with Religion is conspicuous not only in the beginnings of Art, but (as we have seen) in all its later developments, and that not only in practice but in theory. So at the climax of Greek civilization, Plato not only held that virtue was a branch of science, but assumed the further identity of *τὸ καλὸν* and *τὸ ἀγαθὸν*;* placing them almost indiscriminately at the summit of knowledge, and identifying them with God its highest conception. Religion, Morality and Art were still one and undivided, and *μουσικὴ* was in truth the harmonious music of the soul.

In the details the same is true. A graceful posture or movement is both that which involves the least bodily exertion and that which the laws of mechanics prescribe. Even in common speech natural and graceful are almost synonymous. Thus too our model of beauty among horses and other animals is formed on their capacity for speed or labour; and even among men it was only the thrice victorious athlete whom the Greeks deemed a worthy subject for a statue. For the common element of all these conceptions, of Beauty, Truth and Virtue is *perfection* or accuracy of correspondence; and the Greeks rightly believed that all perfections are common results of a single law. Thus the perfect forms of beauty expressed the perfect soul within;† and so from them men could rise by a philosophic

* Hipp. Maj. passim. So in the Philebus he describes the *ἰδέα* of Good, which being transcendental is undefinable, by three of the shapes which it assumes—Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. The whole of Plato is in fact a running commentary on the doctrine stated above. In Aristotle too the same general conception of the Beauty of Virtue is prominent; as for instance in his making *καλὸν* the end of Ethics and Politics (Eth. IV. passim).

† Thus in the Memorabilia, Socrates says to Clito, 'it is not sufficient that you give to your works an expression of life, and choice of agreeable forms which will charm the spectator; you must represent by the forms of the body the different

ἔρως through beautiful minds and knowledges, to the one Ideal which unites them all, and which is at once the perfection of Beauty, the God of Virtue, and the essence of Truth. So our account of the connection of these three conceptions may be summed up as follows:—Virtue is in action but depends on reason; Truth is in thought but comes from experience of sense; Beauty is in both sense and reflection and owes its birth to their union.*

Yet though Beauty and Truth are thus in nature one, the Beauty of the higher forms of Truth is so far removed from sense that it loses its corporeal form and emotional power,† and dwells on the very verge of reason itself. Hence it is no longer a source of visible creations, (for emotion is the only active power), but rather resembles the echo of some long lost melody, the disembodied spirit of

emotions of the soul.' The ordinary notion of a gentleman implied both elements, of outward and inward beauty, as is shewn by the welding together of the names of both into the complimentary title καλοκάγαθός.

* I admit a groundwork of direct sensual pleasure in the æsthetic emotions besides the mass of acquired or associated pleasures which forms their principal bulk. This latter part varies in different men more than the former, and in some it is almost entirely wanting, so that they have only the direct pleasures of colour, harmony, or cadence. That there is a direct pleasure of colour is certain, and that the same is true of colour harmony is as little doubtful as in the case of sound, for a small common multiple among the received vibrations must be a condition of beneficial and easy work in the case of the nerves of the eye just as much as with those of the ear. The pain of discord or conflict is one of the most widely diffused of any. A nerve strung to a certain pitch cannot without distress immediately receive vibration of a widely different rapidity or intensity, but if the periods of coincidence are frequent the change is less difficult. This is especially the case for instance with octaves in music, (where the vibrations are merely doubled in rapidity), and to a less extent with thirds, fourths and fifths: and the harmony of colours doubtless depends on the same laws. Again, when a nerve is tightly strung an immediate start back to its normal position is infinitely less easy than a gradual relaxation. Hence the pleasure of cadence in music or oratory, or of a 'dying fall' in a melody or in the colouring of a picture. It was the mistake of Alison to leave out of sight this primary element in æsthetic feeling; but he has done immense service in drawing attention to the other side, by analysing the various associations of different kinds of perfection, such as usefulness, ease, power, sympathy, and virtue. To these last are due all the distinctions of different kinds of beauty; and also that part of it which we call expression as opposed to form: and it is by them that all progress in æsthetic sensibility is made possible, and that the sense of beauty is evolved like the moral sense, with which many philosophers (such as Shaftesbury) have confounded it.

† That emotion requires individuality, and disappears before an abstraction like a circle in the water widening into nothing, is a trite observation. Even Humanity

some vanished hope, invisibly haunting the memories of men, but incapable of appearing to their waking senses. When thought is little removed from sense, Religion, the aspiration of thought, and Art, the aspiration of sense, are mingled together in a common stream; but so soon as the field of knowledge becomes wider, the truths of reason become less bound up and identified with material forms, and religion becomes incapable of artistic representation. Only indeed through Beauty has man been led to Truth;"—

"Nur durch das Morgenthor des Schönen
"Drangst du in der Erkenntniss Land;"

for the world's children could learn truth only by picture books and toy images of art: knowledge comes to them in the guise of beauty;

"Der Anmuth Gürtel umgewunden
"Wird sie zum Kind dass Kinder sie verstehn:"*

but the grown intellect throws away the pleasures of youth, its lightheartedness as well as its innocence; for when we become men we put away childish things. Regret is useless even if it had foundation; but further, it is unjustifiable, for though Beauty is ever, as Plato says, the meeting point of Truth and of our faculties, its end is not in itself, but to lead us upwards to the love of Truth beyond it. When its mission is accomplished it dies, for like all other things on earth, it lives only on its duty. Nor does it become us to try to reawaken it by sorceries and enchantments into a false galvanic life; for an artificial childhood loses its only charm. Let then the dead years lie dead, and let their memory lead us to the future. Beauty is ever coy to those who turn backward on their path to seek her, but stands ready to welcome him who, uncheered by her presence,

is too wide an idea to excite emotion in ordinary men, and perhaps still less in women:—

"A red haired child
"Sick in a fever, if you touch him once,
"Though but so little as a finger tip,
"Will set you weeping; but a million sick,
"You could as soon weep for the rule of three,
"Or compound fractions."

And when the abstraction grows still higher, its emotional power, even though greater in volume, becomes utterly incapable of individual or artistic expression.

* Schiller, Die Künstler.

has yet performed her bidding to the end. Though flattery cannot win her, obedience surely shall.

"The Summum Pulchrum rests in heaven above;
"Do thou, as best thou mayst, thy duty do:
"Amid the things allowed thee live and love,
"Some day thou shalt it view."

APPENDIX VI.

On the Religion of Positivism.

Inasmuch as it was the avowed object of M. Comte to effect a complete regeneration of human knowledge, and as his method was based on the principle of what he calls the most profound sentence of the nineteenth century, the saying of the present Emperor of the French, that 'in order to destroy, you must replace,' it was necessary for him, in his war against the theological beliefs of the day, to find for them some substitute which should fill the gap which their destruction created in men's minds, and so prevent the total disruption of the scientific edifice. In short Positivism was incomplete without a religion.

Yet however imperative the demand, the difficulty of satisfying it seemed at first insuperable; for inasmuch as Positivism had placed itself at the opposite pole of knowledge to Theology, and devoted its principal energy towards demolishing man's belief in anything supernatural or ideal, a Positive Religion might well sound like an atheist's treatise on the divine attributes, or a necessitarian's encomium on free will. It was not therefore until much writing and applause had dispelled hesitation, that the bold resolution was come to of dressing up under the name of religion part of the ordinary philosophical creed, and of holding it up as an object of worship, until (as we may suppose) men's minds had become sufficiently imbued with science to do without worship altogether: just as a doctor who has forbidden smoking allows his patient for the first few weeks the occasional solace of an empty pipe. When once, however, this idea was hit upon, the carrying of it into effect gave little further trouble. For to choose an object of worship was not difficult, seeing that the best imitation of the supernatural

within the sphere of nature is evidently its highest part, and the principle of knowledge which most nearly transcends it is that which forms its summit: and when chosen, the simple process of personification and the addition of a suitable cultus immediately gave it the appropriate religious appearance. Thus we easily trace the history of the so-called 'religion' of Positivism: its God, the Grand Etre of humanity; its principle, the unity of mankind. Let us now notice how it wears its borrowed state, and the marks by which it is distinguishable from a genuine religion.

In the first place the personality or unity of its object of worship is only metaphorical and apparent. Though we talk of the Great Supreme Being as of a single personal deity, "we must remember," says M. Comte, "that the Great Being cannot act except through individual agents."* He, in fact, *consists* only of those individuals, or rather of their memories; and 'his development, and of course also his preservation depends on their free services.' To form, therefore, any notion of him as the ἰδέα of a class, apart from the particular members of whom he is composed, is a flagrant instance of a 'metaphysical' idolon, such as those of which M. Comte had so ably disposed. The worship of Humanity is therefore nothing more than a commemoration of individual benefactors, accompanied by the prayer often piously added in a college grace, 'ut eorum numerus continuo adaugeatur,' and with a further intimation that such a result will be for the advantage not only of the worshippers but of the object of their worship, inasmuch as without it both religion and its deity must die of inanition. Such a worship has all the faults of the polytheistic hierarchy and the mediæval saint calendar, with none of their advantages: it cannot be called Religion in any true sense of the word.

But the 'Religion of Humanity' has a greater fault even than this want of unity or continuity;—it fails in the very ground-work and essence of Religion, the ideal or imaginative element; it substitutes past for future, history for prophecy, memory for aspiration, experience for faith. If a man can make himself an object of worship by a lucky invention or an act of generosity, he is not likely to feel very deeply the grandeur of that worship: if his highest ideal is immediately within his grasp, and the end of his religion is the right to worship himself, his aspirations will at best be dwarfed into ambition and his devotion transformed into rivalry. When Posi-

* Catechism, Introd. Conv. ii.

tivism discards Theology from its system, it practically disclaims all claim to Religion; for Religion without Theology is an empty shell, a mere name wrongly applied. By Theology we do not mean creeds or subtle dogmas on irreconcilable attributes of Godhead, but some conception of a Deity in whom we can unite our aspirations after perfection greater than that of men, some embodiment of our dreams of development, some 'lodge for our thinkings' of an ideal futurity. No man can worship the past;—Religion can never be a mere Philosophy of History. Hope stands indeed upon knowledge, as on a sure and solid foundation, but the breath of its aspiration comes from the heaven of futurity above: it rises, not rests upon its data, 'the evidence of things unseen,' the apotheosis of the world's experience.* Thus we find Religion ever intimately connected with Art,† each depending on an idealization of the ordinary facts and phenomena of nature, and appealing to the imagination rather than to actual experience. If a religion be not poetical it is no true religion at all.

This, then, is the great mistake of M. Comte and his followers, that they imagine religion to be a part of philosophy instead of an extension of it. It ought indeed to "rest on demonstration," but it can never be a body of demonstrated facts, for so it would be no longer religion but science. It must be rather (as we have seen above‡) an anticipation of knowledge, a vague foreshadowing of future evolution. It must, therefore, continually advance with science as a shadow thrown before it, and that which is religion in one age becomes philosophy in the next. Thus the doctrines of Positivism might indeed have served for the religion of an earlier age, when the unity of humanity was still only a guess; nay, they did, in fact, form a large part of such religion; but now they are truths, not of aspiration but of science, not of imagination but of actual knowledge. They have thus lost the awe and veneration which they once inspired, as half-seen figures looming dimly through a fog seem less majestic when we can actually feel and

* A religious ideal may indeed sometimes take the form of imitation, as in the case of Christianity, but that is only where the model which is imitated is itself ideal. This is not really imitation, but an aiming at one's own aspirations personified. A Christian in imitating Christ is really striving after his ideal of perfection; a Positivist imitating Aristotle or St. Paul is following a model quite independent of himself. The one forms his model on his notion of perfection, the other takes his notion of perfection from his model.

† See Appendix V. pp. 369, sq. ‡ Pp. 119, 224.

measure them: we have become familiarized with their real extent, and can no longer regard them as mysterious objects of devotion. Since then mystery is the soul of religion, a system of philosophy which discards mystery, and refuses to admit anything but 'demonstrated fact,' can have no religion except in name;—and such accordingly is the "Worship of Humanity."

That true Religion however is by no means inconsistent with a Philosophy grounded on Science, and what is the real relation between the two, we have already seen. We have even gone further, and attempted to sketch the outlines of the faith which is the natural outcome of the science of the present age;* but it is hardly necessary here to recapitulate our conclusions. It will be sufficient if we just remark that the idea which stands to our present scientific knowledge as that of the unity of humanity stood to science 2000 years ago, is the conception of the unity of nature and of the continuous evolution of the universe. Hence we may expect that as the great motto of Christianity was that 'we are all members one of another,' the maxim of the succeeding phase of religion will be that we are all members of universal nature. This is the next region through which science must travel; and the morality springing therefrom is that to which the next age must be habituated. Now it seems beyond the compass of ordinary men, but our posterity will learn it on their mother's knee and inhale its atmosphere at every breath. Then they will point back down the page of history to those among us who are obstructing its progress and who taunt and deride its authority, as men point now with reproof to the Athenians who stopped their ears to the teaching of Socrates, and thought him unworthy to live for his heresies; or to the Jews, who stoned those who were sent to them and garnished the sepulchres of their prophets, and who at last crucified the great Apostle of modern truth; to those in every age and country who 'have shed righteous blood upon earth and by their sorceries have deceived the nations.'†

When we see how copious a field for true religion is thus opened up by science, we may well wonder how M. Comte, whose principles seem at first sight very similar to our own, should have failed to penetrate into it, but should have contented himself with that clumsy and fraudulent imitation on which he has endorsed his name and authority. The explanation of this, by marking out our exact point of divergence from his system, may help to throw new light as

* Pp. 124, sqq. † Cf. Matt. xxiii. 29, sqq. Rev. xviii. 23, 24.

well on our own doctrine as on his. It is to be found in the Positivist conception of the nature of philosophy.

Philosophy, they say, is a mere generalization of science, and science is coextensive with the phenomena of external nature and an arrangement of their laws. These laws are divided into two classes, statical and dynamical; and the division of sciences is determined by their subject matter, their connection following the course of natural evolution. Seeing therefore that knowledge is concerned only with external phenomena, and that its nature varies according to its material, religion, which is the highest knowledge, can be so only because it has the highest subject matter, and this can be no other than the highest sphere of developed nature, which is evidently the organization of the most perfect product of evolution, the human race. Hence it naturally follows that an organized humanity is the true ideal of religion and the only reasonable object of worship.

Now with the first position here stated, that all knowledge, philosophical or religious, must be based upon science or experience, we have already shewn our entire agreement: and we have also admitted that all experience must come through the senses, and can be concerned only with external phenomena. But though we admit that the material of consciousness is uniform, we deny that its degree is uniform also: though in fact we admit the derivation of ideas from impressions, we deny that the two are identical, while at the same time we claim them both as coordinate divisions of knowledge or experience. The laws of the secondary sequences are just as much part of our knowledge as the laws of the primary from which they are derived; and science is concerned with the one just as much as with the other. By excluding psychology, or the observation of mind, from the sphere of philosophy, the Comtist contradicts his own principle, which pretends to admit all experience, banishing only that which can never be an object of consciousness. By this inconsistency he is led to consider one part of evolution only, namely that which we may call the General or Objective Development; while he leaves entirely out of sight that other phase which we have called the Individual or Subjective, and which is in reality inseparable from the former. He considers the development of the medium, but he refuses to consider that of the organism to which it is correlative: he shews the political organization of the race, but he neglects the intellectual organization of its individual

members: he points out how the universe becomes developed into an organization of conscious units, but he is quite blind to the different stages of perfection in the consciousness of the latter by which it is continually approaching the complete representation of the universe. The former evolution can never affect religion except so far as it influences the latter; for religion depends upon belief and imagination, and these belong not to that part of our self which we call the outer world but to that part which is a reflection of the former, and which we distinguish under the name of our mind. The actual organization of mankind could never produce a religion of humanity, any more than the actual organization of the universe has produced a religion of the universe; but it is the belief, the idea of such unity, which can alone influence men's feelings. The one is a fact of politics, the other is a truth of conviction; and facts unperceived are, so far as men's belief and emotions are concerned, as inoperative as if they had no existence. Hence M. Comte's reasoning is fallacious, and the belief in human unity could never be made a basis of religion because the fact of human unity was the highest phase of the evolution of outward nature which starts from the physical elements and ends in man; it could be so only because the perception of the connection between the individual and his fellows was a phase of the ulterior intellectual evolution which spreads ever outwards from man and ends in the assimilation of the ultimate elements of the universe.

We can best see the one-sidedness of M. Comte's method when we compare it with that of the German school of philosophy. Whatever be the faults of the great masters of that school, they shew an immeasurably greater philosophical power and a much wider comprehension of facts than the Positivists who claim facts for their peculiar province. In the picture of the universe as a great Being developing himself at first objectively and then returning through self-consciousness on his former steps, until his subjectivity becomes a complete picture of his objective nature, we have a concise description of the two processes of evolution which we have above described, and a clear statement of the connection between them: but M. Comte leaves out the latter series of facts altogether, and refuses to include them in his philosophy. He refuses in fact to admit ideas and their laws to be part of experience, though without them we know knowledge to be impossible. M. Comte's error arises from the imperfection of his psychology, and his ignor-

ance of the true connection between the two component parts of our knowledge. That all our knowledge is derived from experience and that consequently our ideas must be dependent on phenomena he doubtless saw clearly enough; but the nature of this dependence he never worked out and thought unimportant, and he consequently neglected the whole sphere of intellectual development, of which this connection between ideas and impressions forms the sole content.

Our argument then against M. Comte comes simply to this; that by arbitrarily confining the word knowledge or experience to our primary states of consciousness he has attained only a onesided view of science and of evolution; and that it is among those facts and in that phase of development which he has omitted that the only source of religion can be found: so that his so-called religion cannot but be, what an examination of it on its own merits has proved to us that it is, a spurious pretender without any right to its assumed name and authority. True religion is like the foam and spray which the advancing tide of self-consciousness ever washes onwards before it,* renewed indeed continually from the restless struggles

* We may notice in passing that in this truth, which has so often come before us, that religion is the anticipation of science, lies the true explanation of M. Comte's law of the three stages of physical development. Since religion is the precursor of science, all science naturally commences in the theological stage; and the 'metaphysical' represents only the era of transition, when theology and science are mixed together and scientific facts are still treated from a quasi-theological point of view. But although theology in process of time retires from each particular branch in order of simplicity, it is only pushed further on, and always forms a misty exterior halo gradually shading off into total darkness, of which what M. Comte calls 'metaphysics,' but what are really depersonified abstractions, form the brighter inner rim. This far-famed law is therefore only part of a wider truth, and we may equally wonder and regret that M. Comte having gone so far should not have gone farther and seen the real relation of theology to science.

But even if he had seen the truth in this respect his theory of religion could hardly have been improved, owing to the imperfect view which he took of the connection of the various sciences with each other, in holding the most complex (sociology) to be the highest. The individual sciences are really nothing but collections of particular facts into a number of isolated laws, and in such a collection the simplest are naturally taken first. But it is only when these laws are mostly collected that true science, the science of sciences can begin; for these laws are its particular facts, and until they are observed it cannot commence its operations. Its natural course is then to work backwards, connecting sociology first with biology, then with chemistry, and so in succession until at last it arrives at the simplest of all and includes all knowledge under one system. M. Comte's error in taking the indi-

by which the stream is ever striving to transcend its rocky barriers, yet born not of the solid and material earth, but of the lightest and brightest particles of the deep flowing waters of thought, to be, as poets tell us, the natural essence and birth place of deities. It is like the thoughts of a homeward bound exile, who gazes longingly over his vessel's prow into the far distance ahead, and dreams of the country he is ever nearing; the country which he left in unconscious infancy long years ago, beyond the time when his memory was born or his imagination can carry him back. In his outward journey such an one had no such yearnings; for hope is the offspring of reason, and experience of realities can alone point to the Ideal. Hence it is in the intellectual evolution, in nature's homeward passage, that we must look for the birth of Religion; and if we look elsewhere we need not be surprised if our search is in vain. This is the error of M. Comte; not that he refuses to admit anything beyond experience, (so far his position is inexpugnable), but that having confined experience, to one class of facts, he attempts to educe from it that which can only be found in another and totally different class. His principle is good, but his interpretation of it is erroneous. If the Positivist thinks his system incomplete without the presence of Religion, he must be content to welcome also her family and connexions. If he declines to do this because of some fancied quarrel which he supposes them to have with his doctrines and himself, he must get on as well as he can on his own merits; for it is worse than useless to dress up in the garb of Religion one of his company whom he thinks to bear some resemblance to her mien and features, when the imposture is sure to be discovered the moment that she opens her lips to speak.

APPENDIX VII.

On the Theological Basis of Morality.

My eye was caught by a Sermon entitled, "The Attraction of Jesus Christ crucified," by one of the most eminent Churchmen and

vidual sciences as ultimate instead of as collections of 'axiomata media' ready for further generalization, made him stop short at sociology as the highest sphere of knowledge, and there, as was natural, locate his religion: but in reality religion has passed far beyond that limit centuries ago.

preachers of the day, and specially delivered in St. Paul's Cathedral on Good Friday (1868);* and feeling confident that there, if anywhere, I should find all the arguments for unselfish devotion brought forward in their full force, I eagerly read it, in the hope of gaining for myself some fortunate glimpse of that exalted prospect whose glories I had heard of but never seen, and of shaking myself free from these fetters of natural law, which seemed to me so tough and indissoluble, but which others appeared to get rid of so easily. Nor was I in one sense disappointed; for I soon found that a number of arguments of the nature which I had expected were clearly and systematically set in order by the preacher, and these I accordingly proceeded to examine with great interest. The main subject of the sermon is, as suggested in its title, the source of the attraction which the crucifixion of Christ exercises on the minds of his followers: and for this attraction three distinct reasons are given, which we will take in the order in which they occur.—

"1. That which first of all draws men in reverence and love to Jesus "Christ, hanging on His Cross, is the moral beauty, the moral strength "of sacrifice." Here we arrive at once at the very bottom of the question. If sacrifice be *in itself* good, selfishness cannot be at the base of morality. Let us then see how the preacher bears out this assertion. "This," he says, "for three reasons. First, It requires "a moral effort of the highest kind: it is an exhibition of strength."— Now either this is a mere reproduction of the theory of Hobbes, which deduces many feelings of pleasure from association with power; in which case power itself and not its evidence is the real object of our approval, and power, as we have seen, is good not as an end in itself, (for it is a mere relative term), but for the sake of the pleasure which it potentially implies:—or, it means that good is greater and higher in proportion to the extent of its perspective or foresight, and consequently in proportion as it 'sets aside and crushes man's natural instincts' and organizes his impulses in a comprehensive view of results; in which case it is in entire harmony with our own theory. But under neither supposition does it give any argument to prove that sacrifice or self-denial is good in itself. If we love it for the force which it implies, that force must (from whatever point of view we look at it) be a more ultimate object of approbation; and sacrifice therefore is good only so far and

* Preached by H. P. Liddon, M.A., of Ch. Ch.—Printed by Request.

for the same reason as the force or power of which it is the evidence.

But "Secondly, Sacrifice attracts because of its rarity." This hardly needs discussion. Rarity indeed enhances value from a political economist's point of view, (though not even there where the supply is only limited by the want of demand), but can never of itself create it. For if this were otherwise, a curiously disagreeable smell would be as dearly prized as the choicest and most exquisite perfume, and the fiendish malice of devils would attract us as much as the most godlike and self-abnegating virtue. But further, the supply of sacrifice is potentially unlimited, and any quantity of it may be had at any time merely for the wishing: its rarity therefore is only a proof that the majority of men do not like it.

"Thirdly, Sacrifice attracts by its fertilizing power. Sacrifice is "not mere unproductive moral beauty. Nay, all the good which is "done among men by men is proportioned to the amount of sacri- "fice which has produced it." Why, here are our own words almost repeated. Sacrifice is good, not in itself, but for its results, for the good it does, in fact for the pleasure which it ultimately produces. And if, as he says, we go still deeper, and ask the reason of this, the agreement between us is still more striking. For the answer which he gives to such inquiry is that contained in our Lord's words, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." "Why," he further asks, "is it more blessed? At first sight, it might seem more "blessed to receive than give. The man who receives augments his "stock of material for life and action: the man who gives diminishes "it. So it is at first sight; yet so it is not really. In reality he "who gives receives; he receives in moral power more than in "other ways he can possibly bestow." Throughout this argument we are entirely at one with the preacher. Whatever is most 'blessed' that we choose; and if sacrifice is so, if self-denial gives more than it takes, it becomes immediately part of virtue; and this previous question is one merely of detail and calculation. But this is a very different thing from saying that sacrifice is good *in itself:* so far from proving this latter thesis, all the arguments which have been yet proposed to us are conclusive to the contrary. Let us now turn to the next head.

"2. A second explanation of this strong attraction which Jesus "Christ on the cross exerts over the hearts of men is found in the "prevalence of suffering in human life." In other words this is merely

an appeal to the power of sympathy. Now that we sympathize with suffering is true, but in shewing the origin of this we have seen how sympathy and love are complex emotions, developed from original pleasures and pains. And in any case sympathy is a motive in our own breasts, and we act from it merely because to satisfy it gives us more pleasure or less pain than to thwart it. That Mr. Liddon cannot mean to hold more in the present instance is evident when we find that he attributes the need of sympathy from others to our inefficient appreciation of the abstract principles which teach us the necessity of pain; for if that be so, Christ being omniscient would need no sympathy, and the good of it must therefore lie entirely in the mind of the sympathizer.* As to the other attractive influence, which Mr. Liddon does not clearly separate from the foregoing, that of the sympathy of Christ himself with men, it can only influence action through rousing in them sympathy and love for Him in return; and is therefore ultimately resolvable into that which we have criticized above.

"3. But there is a third reason, deeper and more powerful than "any yet mentioned, for the attractive power which Jesus Christ cru- "cified exerts over the hearts of men." This lies in the "sense of sin," in "the feeling that man carries about with him, upon him, that "which is offensive to the purity of heaven." Now that man is ever striving upwards in restless aspiration, that he is ever longing after a higher perfection than he can at present attain, we know well; for is not this the very law of action we have tried to develope?

"Ja, ich weiss es, der Mensch soll
"Immer streben zum Bessern, und, wie wir sehen, er strebt auch
"Immer den Höhern nach."†

It is this straining after evolution, "this fond desire, this longing after immortality" and holiness, that we have seen to be the mainspring of progress and the great stronghold of religious feeling. But we have also seen, and it is evident, that from its very nature it is a purely personal feeling—a longing for our own individual perfection and happiness. For even if the contemplation of an external Ideal were held to be a pleasure in itself, apart from its effect upon our-

* We may also remark that the pain which Christ endured was *to him* neither a punishment for sin, nor a remedy for sin, nor a preventive to sin; and that therefore it was, according to Mr. Liddon, not pain of that kind with which we are able to sympathize.

† Goethe, 'Hermann und Dorothea,' 5.

selves, still it would be only through this very pleasure that such an Ideal could affect our actions. But stay;—for this is not the result that Mr. Liddon would prove: he draws from this 'sense of sin,' and the influence of religion upon it, a motive of action far meaner and more personal than even this of aspiration. For if Christ, he says, had only given us the knowledge of sin, he would but have heightened our misery; and thus (note the inference,) he would not have drawn all men unto him; he would in fact have given no new motive to action. "Why light up the horrors of the prison house, if you cannot bring "a mandate which restores to liberty?" In what then lies the true attractive power of Christianity? It is that Christ not only shews us our sin, but relieves us from its consequences: 'He offers the 'price which buys us out of bondage; He effects an atonement which 'restores us to the friendship of the Holy God; He makes Himself 'a propitiatory Victim to expiate our sins.' This is indeed a comfortable doctrine, and its truth is of vital importance to mankind; but will anyone say that it appeals to anything but personal and selfish feelings of the lowest and most commonplace order? It simply calls on man to love Christ because by so doing he will deliver himself from pain and punishment, and win eternal happiness. But unmistakeable as is the motive to which Mr. Liddon here refers, yet, as if to strip off all disguise and avoid the bare possibility of mistake, he concludes his reasoning with the following characteristic appeal. "Who," he asks, "is so confident that he is utterly "and for ever removed from the stifling vapours of the Eternal Pit, "as to be indifferent to the salvation, to the cleansing, wrought on "Calvary?"—a sentence which I leave to speak for itself as a commentary on the whole preceding argument.

Such then are the motives by which Mr. Liddon would draw men to Christ;—love of beauty, sympathy, hope of deliverance from torture. "Here surely," he says, "are attractions for all ages, for "all temperaments, for all stations, for all degrees of culture, "for all varieties of experience, for all shades of character." Attractions enough indeed, but all of the same kind, all appealing to purely personal interests. Does not even the very name attraction imply that this must be so? What can be attractive but that which produces pleasure? Accordingly, neither in this nor in any other sermon or theological treatise that I have seen can I find any appeal to motives other than those compounded of pleasures and pains,*

* That such an appeal is in fact impossible is evident a priori, when we remem-

the end proposed being always either the satisfaction of some present emotion or the securing of some future gratification. Many of these motives indeed are cloaked under high-sounding names, but when examined all resolve themselves (as in the present instance) into some well known forms of emotion already recognized in this Essay.

Nay I would ask further: Is the Ideal of the popular theology as high as the self-born aspirations, I say not of the philosopher or man of intellect, but of the general average of its professed followers?* Are not the general apathy in religion, the hardly concealed indifference with which the creeds and symbols of faith are treated as mere form and useful ceremonial, the ominous restlessness about external trifles of rubric and ritual, the shudder of impiety which tries to frighten away all free inquiry, and the generally prevalent scepticism professed or unprofessed which pervades the realm of Christendom, all signs that religion has ceased to supply the wants of men, and that it has become a traditional costume rather than a living reality? If such be the case, Christianity must look to itself. It has lived hitherto long because its great principles are both wide and plastic: but it has grown by degrees so encrusted with forms and dogmas, that, like Glaucus of old, its original shape has become almost wholly hidden. These therefore must be thrown away or

ber that motive is merely another name for associated pleasures and pains. See above, p. 56. What we mean by 'disinterested' motive is simply pleasure and pain that follows immediately (by organic association) on a perception of pleasure or pain in others. Its general name is Sympathy. See above, pp. 85, 351.

* I cannot here forbear quoting a passage from Cabanis (Lettre sur les Causes premières), which, though spoken from a hostile point of view, well shews the meanness and imperfection of the current notions about the Deity. "Lorsqu'on le "représente sous l'image d'un homme colossal, doué de tous les caractères de la "prudence et de la force, et auquel on prête cependant presque toutes les sottises "humaines et les passions les plus basses, produit de la faiblesse: qui se répent, "comme s'il n'avait pas prévu; qui se met en colère comme si quelque chose pou-"vait lui nuire ou l'offenser: qui se venge particulièrement, comme si la violation "de ses lois n'entraînait pas après elle une privation, résultat inévitable de ces lois "elles mêmes; enfin qui a moins de générosité que l'homme le plus mediocrement "virtueux et bon, et qu'on n'apaise que par des présents comme un despote "avide, ou paz des louanges comme un prince sot et orgueilleux; lorsqu'on se "peint ainsi la cause première, et que tel est l'Etre suprême qu'on offre à "l'adoration du genre humain, il faut avoir fait soi même bien peu d'usage de "sa raison, ou compter étrangement sur la folie et la credulité des hommes; "et il serait difficile de dire si, dans une idée pareille, il y a plus de démence "que d'impiété, en donnant à ce dernier mot la seule acception raisonnable qu'il "puisse réçevoir en matière d'opinion."

remodelled, else all is over with it: if the Church will not reform itself, reformation or neglect awaits it from without. Some indeed, its wiser members, have seen this, and have done and are doing their utmost to avert the catastrophe;* but most, alas, with proverbial theologic obstinacy, in their eagerness to retain some trivial party badge, are in danger of losing the whole object of their struggles. Ah! it is not creeds that lead men to heaven, but the love of Truth that dwells there. Without Truth your creed is blasphemy; with her you can win the universe without it. "What profiteth the graven image, that the maker thereof hath graven it?" You might as well fall down to stocks and stones as say to a dumb creed or ritual, "Arise, it shall teach!" "Behold it is laid over with gold and silver, and there is no breath at all in the midst of it. But the Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before Him."†

But with different forms and badges of religion we have not here to do. The point which we wished to prove is that Religion of whatever form or creed can give no new motive to action, but can only appeal to those which it finds ready to its hand in human nature; and this fact we have verified in this Appendix by a reference to the doctrines of the popular religion of our day. This religion may not be the best, and another may succeed it; but we may rest assured that its successor will no more contradict the physical laws of nature than can it, but will rather wear a garb still less supernatural, inasmuch as on its greater conformity to nature its only title to superiority will consist. We may finally sum up the whole of our remarks on this subject in the words of a far-sighted dignitary of the very Church whose doctrines we have been criticizing.—"Religion," says Dean Swift, "is the best motive of all actions, "yet" (or, as we should say, for) "Religion is allowed to be the "highest instance of Self-Love."‡

Yet before I close this Appendix and volume in which I have spoken many things harshly, perhaps with unbecoming harshness, of some of the forms and doctrines of our 19th century Christianity, and especially of that branch of it to which I belong, I cannot for-

* Among these I would mention foremost the late F. W. Robertson; in whose Sermons is I think to be found a higher Ideal and a less gross and material creed than in almost any other writings which have come from the Church of England.

† Habakkuk ii. 19, 20.

‡ Thoughts on Various Subjects, vol. iii. p. 402. (Collected Works.)

bear to express my belief that in Christianity rather than in any hostile school of religious thought, and in the Church of England as its most typical and comprehensive phase, lies the natural source of that regeneration of religious life and of that extension of man's belief and sympathy beyond the old dead letter of the law to the level of his highest knowledge and ideas, which I have ventured to prophesy and advocate in the foregoing pages. I am therefore convinced that no member of that Church, however dissatisfied he may be with certain aspects of her doctrine or ritual, who yet believes that the great ideas of Christianity are wide enough to comprehend the whole breadth and height of human aspiration, is in duty either bound or even free to separate himself from her communion. Let us only hold fast to these three truths: first, that 'God is' not a creed but 'a spirit,' and that 'they who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth;'* secondly, that the thoughts of God are written in nature, and that the 'Book of His Works' can never contradict the 'Book of His Word;'† and thirdly, that the sum of a Christian's duty is, as laid down by Christ himself, contained in the love of God and of his neighbour:‡ and then, so long as these are the answers which the Church of England gives to the three cardinal questions of religion (and are they not daily more and more recognised among us?) there can be no lover of truth however uncompromising, and no student of nature however fearless, who need refuse to subscribe to her creed or look with despair upon her future history.

* John iv. 24. See ib. vii. 32; Rom. vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. iv. 9, v. 1; Col. ii. 16; 1 Thess. v. 21.

† Ps. xix. 1; Rom. i. 20.

‡ See too 1 John iv. 7, 12, 16; Rom. xiii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 5—8; Rev. xx. 12; and Deut. x. 12; Micah vi. 8. And if we ask how we are to love God, we are told that such love is only an expansion of love to man from which it must begin: "for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" To love God is to keep his commandments (John xiv. 21, 23: 1 John v. 3), or, in other words, to follow the dictates of our highest nature.

THE END.

LONDON:
G. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS,
29, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.